Town of Norwalk v. Podmore
| Citation | 86 A. 582,86 Conn. 658 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 17 April 1913 |
| Parties | TOWN OF NORWALK et al. v. PODMORE et al. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Marcus H. Holcomb, Judge.
Application by the Town of Norwalk, Augustus F. Beard and others, Bridge Construction Committee, against Kate H. Podmore and another for the appointment of a committee to assess damages suffered by defendants from the taking of their land and building under a special act. From a judgment on the report of the committee for defendant named, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. See, also, 85 Conn. 498, 83 Atl. 629.
John H. Light, of South Norwalk, and John J. Walsh, of Norwalk, for appellants.
John C. Chamberlain, of Bridgeport, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the judgment entered upon the acceptance of the report of a committee assessing damages to the defendant Kate H. Podmore for land and building taken by the plaintiff town of Norwalk for bridge and park purposes pursuant to a special act (16 Sp. Laws 1911, p. 490). No formal judgment was entered upon the appointment of the committee to assess the damages to the claimants or owners of the land and buildings taken for the new concrete bridge, steel draw, and approaches to be constructed in place of the existing Washington street bridge in Norwalk. Nor are the jurisdictional facts, as recited in the application, which were necessary to be found before such appointment could be made, referred to in the order of appointment or in the judgment appealed from.
The parties have assumed that the order appointing the committee presupposed such a finding, and so it undoubtedly did, either after hearing had or stipulation of the parties. These facts should have appeared either in the judgment or order of appointment, or in the judgment upon the report. We shall treat these facts as a part of the record, as the parties have. The said defendant is in possession of, and is the owner of, the tract of land between high and low water described in the application which abuts upon the south side of the present Washington street bridge. She acquired title by two quitclaim deeds, and her title consists of the right or franchise which in this state may be obtained in or to land below high water.
The report finds that she is the owner of the land in question; in view of that finding, it is immaterial whether her ownership came through quitclaim deeds or otherwise.
This land is within the limits of the lands required for the layout of said bridge and park. The surface of the soil on each side of the bridge, over which the tide ebbs and flows, is five feet below the traveled portion of the bridge, except where built upon and reclaimed by the abutting owners. The town of Norwalk maintains a fence three feet high, except where the abutting property has been built upon, and the fence is a necessary protection to the public. A considerable, if not the greater, portion of the property abutting on the bridge has been built upon, and the fence removed, so that such abutting owners have free access to the bridge.
There is a fence in front of the defendant's property, except as to the 20 feet in front of a building, which was removed when the building was erected. This fence prevents access to the bridge from the defendant's land, and the defendant can neither have access to a highway from her land, except to said Washington street bridge, nor to the water below low water mark.
The committee in its report assessed the damages as follows:
The court found that the defendant had the legal right of access to said bridge along the entire front of her premises, and thereupon rendered judgment for said larger sum. The ground of appeal is the holding of the court that the defendant has the legal right of access along her entire front. The plaintiff's argument proceeds upon the theory that the structure in front of the property of the defendant was a part of a bridge and not a part of the highway, and that, while the owner abutting upon the highway owns to its middle and has a right of access to it, the owner abutting on the bridge does not own to its middle and has no right of access to it The trial court held that the part of said structure east of the drawbridge was the approach to the bridge and highway rather than a part of the bridge, and hence the defendant abutting upon the approach had the right of access to it.
The word "bridge," as used in public and private statutes, may include abutment, embankment, and approach. No necessary legal meaning attaches under all circumstances to the use of this term; each instance is controlled by its own circumstances, by the intention of the Legislature, as disclosed by these. The approach to a bridge may sometimes be regarded as a part of the bridge itself, and sometimes as a part of the highway leading to the bridge. Phillips v. East Haven, 44 Conn. 25, 30; City of New Haven v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 39 Conn. 128, 130; Cullen v. N. Y., N. H. R. Co., 66 Conn. 225, 33 Atl. 910.
The report of the committee does not present the circumstances sufficiently to enable us to know from them the probable intention of the Legislature as to whether this be approach or bridge. We know the distance from the abutment of the drawbridge to the abutment on the westerly side of Wheeler place to be 550 feet, and that the soil on either side of the structure is mud flats between high and low water and five feet beneath it, and that the part abutting this structure has been largely built upon. We do not know in what manner the structure abutting upon these owners has been built, nor its relation to the part below high water, nor do we know in what way the abutting owners have reclaimed. We cannot definitely tell, from the circumstances presented, whether the part of the structure abutting these owners is a part of the bridge or an approach to the bridge.
The act itself repeatedly uses the term "bridge" to include the entire structure, the new concrete bridge proper, with its steel draw and approaches. The report of the committee uses the term in the same sense, indicating its conclusion that the bridge...
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Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transp.
...although there may be an intent to serve abutting landowners when an ordinary or conventional road is built; Norwalk v. Podmore, 86 Conn. 658, 665, 86 A. 582 (1913); 2 Casner, American Law of Property § 9.54, pp. 493-94; there is no such intent when land is condemned for a limited access hi......
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Powell v. McKelvey
...was held to be taking of the easements of the other lot owners for private use, which is not the case herein. In Norwalk v. Podmore, 86 Conn. 658, 86 A. 582, bridge was built, and the surface of the soil, on each side of the bridge, over which the tide ebbed and flowed, was five feet below ......
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Antman v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
...... this court. Potter v. Putnam, 74 Conn. 189, 193, 50. A. 395; Fox v. South Norwalk, 85 Conn. 237, 239, 82. A. 642; Milford Water Co. v. Kannia, 91 Conn. 639,. 641, 100 A. 1064; y of Norwalk v. Norwalk Investment. Co., 95 Conn. 1, 3, 110 A. 557; Town of Norwalk v. Podmore, 86 Conn. 658, 660, 86 A. 582; City of. Waterbury v. Macken, 100 Conn. 407, ......
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