Town of Plainfield v. Town of Avon

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: ROBB.
• Citation: Town of Plainfield v. Town of Avon, 757 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. App. 2001)
• Decision Date: 06 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. 32A01-0107-CV-266.,32A01-0107-CV-266.
• Parties: TOWN OF PLAINFIELD, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF AVON, Appellee-Defendant.

757 N.E.2d 705

TOWN OF PLAINFIELD, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF AVON, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 32A01-0107-CV-266.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

November 6, 2001.

Melvin R. Daniel, James P. Moloy, Dann, Pecar, Newman & Kleiman, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Robert L. Hartley, Henderson, Daily, Withrow & DeVor, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

The Town of Plainfield ("Plainfield") appeals the trial court's grant of the Town of Avon's ("Avon") Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. We affirm.

Issue

Plainfield raises the following consolidated and restated issue for our review: whether the trial court properly dismissed Plainfield's complaint against Avon pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

Facts and Procedural History¹

The facts reveal that Plainfield is an Indiana municipal corporation located in Guilford Township, Hendricks County, Indiana. Avon is an Indiana municipal corporation located in Washington Township, Hendricks County, Indiana. Turner Trace is an Indiana limited liability corporation established for the purpose of developing the Village of Turner Trace at Avon (the "Development"). The Development is a residential and commercial complex to be erected along State Road 267 in Avon, Hendricks County, Indiana. The Development, situated in Avon, is two miles north of the corporate boundaries of Plainfield.

The West Central Conservancy District ("WCCD") was established in Avon in 1992 for the purpose of providing sewer service in Hendricks County, Indiana.² The WCCD's treatment facilities are located in Avon and several of the conservancy district's sewer lines are currently installed adjacent to the Development. WCCD has the capability to provide sewer service to the Development. In the early part of 2000, Turner Trace contacted the WCCD to inquire about the cost to connect the Development to WCCD's sewer system. Thereafter, WCCD tendered to Turner Trace a summary of fees and construction costs for on-site and off-site sanitary sewers for the Development. Turner Trace's portion of the costs amounted to $526,036.81. This amount did not include a fee of $2,000.00 to be assessed each lot connected to WCCD's sewer system.

On March 31, 2000, Turner Trace filed a petition with the trial court to mandate WCCD to connect the Development to WCCD's sewer system and to assess Turner Trace just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory connection charges. In response, the WCCD filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).³

Thereafter, Turner Trace contacted Plainfield regarding the feasibility and estimated cost of connecting the Development to Plainfield's sewer system. Plainfield had several years earlier adopted a resolution to extend its sewer system six miles into the corporate limits of Avon. Because the Development is encompassed by the language of the resolution, Plainfield submitted to Turner Trace a cost estimate to connect the Development to its sewer system. Plainfield's estimated cost totaled $495,450.00. In addition, Plainfield only required a connection fee of $1,000.00 to be assessed each lot. Also, Plainfield's average estimated monthly charge and unmetered monthly charge were significantly less than the WCCD's estimated charges. Consequently, Turner Trace decided it wanted the Development to be connected to Plainfield's sewer system because the municipality's proposed construction costs, connection fee, and monthly charges were less expensive than those proposed by the WCCD.

On August 14, 2000, Turner Trace and Plainfield entered into a contract entitled "Memorandum of Understanding" whereby the two entities agreed that Turner Trace would compensate Plainfield a certain sum in exchange for the municipality connecting its sewer system to the Development. On September 28, 2000, Turner Trace and Plainfield signed a document entitled "Agreement" which reaffirmed, ratified, and amended the "Memorandum of Understanding." The "Agreement" contained the following provision:

This Memorandum of Understanding is made subject to an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement to be entered into between [Plainfield] and [Avon] that sets forth the terms regarding the provision of the sanitary sewer services by [Plainfield] to the [Development].

Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 32.

Subsequently, Plainfield initiated negotiations with Avon to enter into an interlocal cooperation agreement whereby Avon would permit Plainfield to provide sewer service to the Development. Thereafter, Plainfield prepared an agreement entitled "Avon and Plainfield Interlocal Cooperation Agreement" and submitted it to Avon. The proposed interlocal cooperation agreement contained the terms under which Plainfield would provide sewer service to the Development. On September 28, 2000, the town council of Plainfield approved, and president of the council signed, the proposed interlocal cooperation agreement. On October 13, 2000, Avon notified Plainfield via mail that its town council had voted not to enter into an interlocal agreement with Plainfield for the provision of sewer service by Plainfield to the Development. Avon did not merely object to the terms or conditions of Plainfield's proposed interlocal cooperation agreement, rather the town council voted against entering into any such agreement with Plainfield.

Consequently, on December 5, 2000, Plainfield filed suit against Avon in the Hendricks Superior Court requesting that the court: (1) resolve any issues between Plainfield and Avon regarding the interlocal cooperation agreement; and (2) require the parties to finalize the interlocal cooperation agreement consistent with the determinations to be made by the court. On January 29, 2001, Avon filed with the trial court an Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Plainfield's complaint for failure to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 11, 2001, the trial court heard arguments on Avon's motion to dismiss. On June 27, 2001, the trial court granted Avon's Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Plainfield's complaint. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Plainfield argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint against Avon pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6). We disagree.

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss granted pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), our standard of review is well settled. A Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it. Borgman v. Aikens, 681 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.Ct.App.1997),trans. denied. Therefore, we view the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference in favor of this party. Id. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we stand in the shoes of the trial court and must determine if the trial court erred in its application of the law. Id. at 216-17. The trial court's grant of the motion to dismiss is proper if it is apparent that the facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances. Id. at 217. Furthermore, in determining whether any facts will support the claim, we look only to the complaint and may not resort to any other evidence in the record. Mart v. Hess, 703 N.E.2d 190, 193 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

II. Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers

Plainfield argues that it has concurrent jurisdiction with Avon over the area where the Development resides, and that Avon cannot preclude it from providing sewer service to the Development. Plainfield argues that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to a municipality over sewers within its corporate boundaries is a mere proviso limited to application between counties and municipalities. Plainfield further argues that it is entitled to a judicial determination of the terms of the proposed interlocal cooperation agreement, and that the trial court may force Avon, against its express wishes, to enter into such agreement with Plainfield whereby Plainfield would connect its sewer system to the Development.

We note initially that when interpreting the meaning of a statute, we are guided by well-established rules of statutory construction. A statute should be construed to ascertain and give effect to the expressed intention of the legislature by giving the words and phrases their common and ordinary meaning. Rush v. Elkhart County Plan Comm'n, 698 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. Where a statute has not previously been construed, the interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction. Chavis v. Patton, 683 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).

"When interpreting the words of a single section of a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent to carry out the spirit and purpose of the act." State v. CSX Transp., Inc., 673 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). There is a presumption that the legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id. It is only when the language of a statute is ambiguous and unclear that we will engage in statutory construction to determine the intent of the legislature to give effect and validity to each provision thereof. Id. A statute is considered ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable and intelligible interpretation. Id. Because the applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous, we do not need to look beyond the statutes for the legislative intent.

Our analysis begins by looking to Indiana's Home Rule Act.⁴ Ind.Code §§ 36-1-3-1 to -9. The Home Rule Act abrogated the traditional rule that local governments possessed only those powers expressly authorized by statute and declared that a local government possesses "[a]...