Town of Pownal v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 29 April 1999
• Citation: 1999 ME 70,728 A.2d 1254
• Parties: TOWN OF POWNAL v. George ANDERSON et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

728 A.2d 1254

1999 ME 70

TOWN OF POWNAL v.George ANDERSON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued April 5, 1999.

Decided April 29, 1999.

John F. Shepard Jr.(orally), Shepard & Shepard, Freeport, for plaintiff.

John W. Conway, Linnell, Choate & Webber, Auburn, for defendants.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

SAUFLEY, J.

[¶ 1] George and Janice Anderson appeal from an order of the Superior Court(Cumberland County, Brennan, J.) vacating a judgment of the District Court(Portland, Beaudoin, J.) and remanding the matter for entry of judgment in favor of the Town of Pownal in its forcible entry and detainer action against the Andersons.On appeal, the Andersons argue that the Town is not entitled to possession of the properties at issue because it failed to follow the required procedure for establishing and foreclosing on tax liens on those properties, and therefore that the Town cannot eject them through a forcible entry and detainer action.We affirm in part and vacate in part.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The Town of Pownal filed this forcible entry and detainer action to eject George and Janice Anderson from properties designated as Lots 44 and 45 on map nine in the Town's tax assessment plans.The Town claimed that it had previously established and foreclosed on tax liens on those properties due to the Andersons' failure to pay the assessed property taxes in 1992.In response, the Andersons asserted that the Town had contracted with the Andersons to reconvey the property to them in exchange for payment of certain sums.Alternatively, the Andersons alleged that the Town made several mistakes in the process of establishing and foreclosing on its 1992 tax liens and that those mistakes prevented the Town from acquiring title to the properties, thereby defeating the Town's forcible entry and detainer action.

[¶ 3]The District Court found that the Andersons failed to prove their contract claim.It found in favor of the Andersons, however, on their allegations regarding defects in the establishment and foreclosure of the tax liens.It therefore concluded that the Town was not entitled to immediate possession of the properties, and it entered judgment in favor of the Andersons in the Town's forcible entry and detainer action.

[¶ 4] After the District Court denied the Town's ensuing motion to amend the judgment, the Town appealed to the Superior Court.The Superior Court entered an order vacating the judgment of the District Court and remanding the matter for entry of judgment in favor of the Town.The Andersons appeal that judgment to this Court.They do not challenge the District Court's finding that no contract existed between the parties requiring the Town to reconvey the properties to the Andersons.They ask us, rather, to vacate the Superior Court's judgment, which set aside the District Court's determination that the Town did not properly perfect or foreclose on its tax liens.Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the decision of the District Court.SeeIn re Thomas B.,1998 ME 236, ¶ 2, 719 A.2d 529.

II.DISCUSSION

[¶ 5] A forcible entry and detainer action is "`a summary proceeding to decide who is entitled to the immediate possession of land.'"Tozier v. Tozier,437 A.2d 645, 647(Me.1981)(quotingBicknell Mfg. Co. v. Bennett,417 A.2d 414, 421(Me.1980)).In this matter, the determination of title is dispositive of the right to immediate possession.If the Town failed to perfect its title through the tax lien process, the Andersons remain entitled to immediate possession of the property.If, on the other hand, the Town properly obtained title through the lien process, the Town is entitled to immediate possession of the property.

[¶ 6]We will not overturn the District Court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.SeeWhite v. Zela,1997 ME 8, ¶ 3, 687 A.2d 645.The construction of the tax lien statutes on which the Town bases its claim of title, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.SeeCoker v. City of Lewiston,1998 ME 93, ¶ 6, 710 A.2d 909;Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc.,438 A.2d 218, 221(Me.1981).

A.Lot 45

[¶ 7] At trial, it was undisputed that George Anderson was the sole owner of Lot 45.Janice Anderson did not claim to have any rights of ownership, recorded or not, to that lot.The Town filed a tax lien certificate claiming a lien on Lot 45, which listed George Anderson as the owner of that property.George Anderson received the required notice and did not pay the overdue taxes on the property within the period of redemption.See36 M.R.S.A. § 943(1990).

[¶ 8] Nonetheless, the District Court held that the lien on Lot 45 was void because the tax lien certificate did not sufficiently identify the property that was the subject of the lien.¹We disagree.We have adopted a functional test for determining the sufficiency of property descriptions in recorded lien certificates.SeeAucella v. Town of Winslow,564 A.2d 68, 69(Me.1989).Generally, "`the lands must be so described that they can be identified with reasonable certainty and the descriptions must be certain or refer to something which can be made certain.'"Nadeau v. Town of Oakfield,572 A.2d 491, 492(Me.1990)(quotingOceanic Hotel Co. v. Angell,143 Me. 160, 162, 57 A.2d 143(1948));see36 M.R.S.A. § 552(1990).

[¶ 9] The lien certificate purporting to establish a tax lien on Lot 45 provided the following description of the property:

MAP 9, PARCEL 45 OF THE ASSESSMENT PLANS, POWNAL, MAINE, DATED APRIL 1, 1974.REVISED TO APRIL1, 1992 DRAWN BY JOHN E. O'DONNELL & ASSOC., AUBURN, MAINE AND ON FILE AT THE TOWN OFFICE.

DEED RECORDED AND COUNTY REGISTRY OF DEEDS, BOOK __ PAGE __.

This description sufficiently identified the property at issue.We have found similar descriptions sufficient in the past to identify properties with reasonable certainty.SeeHamm v. Town of Medway,644 A.2d 1388, 1389-90(Me.1994);Aucella,564 A.2d at 68;Davis v. City of Ellsworth,281 A.2d 138, 139(Me.1971).

[¶ 10] Moreover, neither Janice nor George effectively raised the sufficiency of the description as a defect in the Town's process.Indeed, the parties stipulated to the entry of the Town's tax map into evidence and agreed that Lots 44 and 45 represented the lots at issue.The only serious challenge to the description arose when Janice became confused in her testimony regarding the properties that the Town's identification of the lots was challenged.Janice testified that she left all of the matters pertaining to the Andersons' real estate holdings in the hands of her husband George.Her personal confusion about the deeds and tax map did not render the Town's description of the property insufficient.Because the property was described in a manner that allowed its identification with reasonable certainty, the Town has complied with its responsibilities.

[¶ 11] Thus, the description of Lot 45 was sufficient to satisfy the functional test.Because the Town complied with the statutory procedure for establishing and foreclosing on the lien on Lot 45, and therefore acquired title and an immediate right to possess that property, the Town was entitled to judgment in its favor in its forcible entry and detainer action with respect to Lot 45.

B.Lot 44

[¶ 12] On appeal before the Superior Court, the Town, for the first time, raised the argument that Janice Anderson was not a record owner of Lot 44.The Town now contends that the deed naming George and Janice Anderson as joint tenants of Lot 44 had not been recorded in the Registry of Deeds.The Town, however, failed to make this argument before the District Court, where neither party disputed that Janice Anderson was a joint owner of Lot 44.In fact, in its complaint commencing this action, the Town actually relied upon the deed it now challenges, and the same deed was admitted into evidence pursuant to a stipulation, with no question as to whether it had been properly recorded.The District Court's finding that Janice Anderson was a record owner of Lot 44 is, therefore, amply supported by the record, and we do not disturb that finding on appeal.

[¶ 13] The Andersons assert that the Town failed to comply with statutory requirements regarding Lot 44 in at least three respects: First, they argue that the Town failed to notify Janice Anderson of the filing of the tax lien; second, they argue that Janice Anderson was not named on the lien certificate as a joint owner; and third, they again argue that the description of the property on the tax lien certificate was insufficient to allow the property to be identified with reasonable certainty.²

[¶ 14] This area of law requires careful attention to statutory requirements by both the Town and the taxpayer.Just as the taxpayer may lose her property if she fails to be vigilant in complying with the requirements, seeFitzgerald v. City of Bangor,1999 ME 50, ¶ 17, 726 A.2d 1253, so must the Town strictly adhere to its requirements.SeeDubois v. City of Saco,645 A.2d 1125, 1127(Me.1994);Blaney v. Inhabitants of Shapleigh,455 A.2d 1381, 1387(Me.1983);Arsenault v. Inhabitants of Roxbury,275 A.2d 598, 599-600(Me.1971).Only if departure from the statutory requirements is explicitly allowed by statute will such departure be tolerated.SeeAvco Delta Fin. Corp. v. Town of Whitefield,295 A.2d 921, 924(Me.1972).

[¶ 15] Here the District Court held that the purported lien was void because the Town failed to mail Janice Anderson a copy of the lien certificate on Lot 44, as required by 36 M.R.S.A. § 942.The Town responds that it was not required to provide Janice Anderson with a true copy of the lien certificate on Lot 44, citing 36 M.R.S.A. § 555, which provides:

A tenant in common or a joint tenant may be considered sole owner for the purposes of taxation, unless he notifies the assessors what his interest

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