Town of Randolph v. Elmer M. Montgomery

• Decision Date: 05 October 1937
• Citation: 194 A. 481,109 Vt. 130
• Parties: TOWN OF RANDOLPH v. ELMER M. MONTGOMERY ET AL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

194 A. 481

109 Vt. 130

TOWN OF RANDOLPH v. ELMER M. MONTGOMERY ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 5, 1937

May Term, 1937.

P L. 3950, Moving Paupers from One Town to Another---Counts Relating to Removal of Minor Children---Status of Members of Family---Construction of Statutes---Of Particular Word in Statute---P. L. 3951, Return of Pauper by Selectmen Construed---Support of Paupers---Intent with Which Pauper Brought to Town as Factor in Action against Selectmen for Removal Therefrom---Sufficiency of Intent---Question of Intent Held for Jury---P. L. 3920, Duty to Prevent Paupers from Strolling into Other Towns.

1. In action by town against selectmen of another town to recover penalty and damages under P. L. 3950 by reason of removal of pauper mother and her minor children living with her into plaintiff town, verdict for defendants was properly directed on counts relating to children, since mother was responsible head of family, and expense incurred in providing for children was same in the eye of the law as if incurred in providing for her personal needs.

2. Members of legally constituted family take their status from him, or her, who is responsible for their support; aid furnished them is, in contemplation of law, furnished party liable therefor, and his or her residence determines residence of those for whose support he or she is liable.

3. Underlying rule of statutory construction is to discover intent of Legislature in doing what it has done, or attempted.

4. In determining the meaning of a particular word used in a statute, the intention of the Legislature is to be ascertained, not from the literal sense of the word used, but from a consideration of the whole and every part of the statute, the subject matter, its manifest object, the history of its enactment, the trend of previous legislation upon the same subject matter, and the evils to be corrected.

5. P L. 3951, providing that under certain circumstances selectmen of town may return poor person to town from which he last came, is to be construed as only permitting return of poor person who has been brought in from other town with intent to charge selectmen's town with his support, so that person so bringing him in would be liable to penalty specified in P L. 3950, and does not apply in case of poor person coming into town voluntarily.

6. Generally speaking, aside from P. L. 3950, support of poor and indigent person falls on town where he has pauper residence, or, if he has none in State, on town furnishing such support.

7. In action to recover penalty and damages under P. L. 3950 for bringing poor person from one town to another, where defendant selectmen attempted to justify their action on ground that poor person was brought from plaintiff town to their town with intent to charge their town with her support and claimed that plaintiff town had been assisting her for several years prior to her removal to their town and continued to do so for several months thereafter, intent with which she was moved from plaintiff town to their town was determining factor in case.

8. In such circumstances, intent to charge defendants' town must have existed at time of removal of poor person from plaintiff town to defendants' town to avail as defense, though it was immaterial whether intent was to charge defendants' town with her support immediately or eventually.

9. In such circumstances, question of intent that induced poor person's removal from plaintiff town to defendants' town held for jury, burden of proof being with defendants.

10. In such circumstances, provisions of P. L. 3920 relating to duty of overseers of poor to prevent their paupers from strolling into other towns did not affect any phase of case.

ACTION OF TORT on P. L. 3950 to recover penalty and damages by reason of removal of certain poor persons from another town to plaintiff town. Plea, the general issue and special plea in substance justifying removal under P. L. 3951 as return by selectmen of poor persons to town from which they last came and claiming that overseer of plaintiff town had not performed his duty under P. L. 3920 to prevent paupers from strolling into defendants' town. Trial by jury at the June Term, 1936, Orange County, Shields, J., presiding. Verdict directed for the defendants on all counts and judgment thereon. The plaintiff excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Stanley L. Chamberlain and Raymond Trainor for the plaintiff.

Wilson, Carver, Davis & Keyser for the defendant.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, SHERBURNE and BUTTLES, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

P. L. 3950 provides:

"A person who brings a poor and indigent person from any town in the state to another town in the state, or aids therein, with intent to charge such town with his support, shall forfeit to such town a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars; and, if such town is not liable for the support of such poor and indigent person, the person making such removal, or aiding therein, also shall be liable, from time to time, to pay such town such damages as accrue for the support of such poor person, which, as well as the penalty, may be recovered in an action of tort, on this statute, in the name of the town."

P. L. 3951 provides:

"The selectmen of a town, if the town is not liable for the support of such poor and indigent person, without forfeiture or penalty, within one year after a poor and indigent person comes to the town, provided such person has there become a town charge, may return such person to the town from which he last came."

This action is to recover the penalty and damages specified in P. L. 3950 for the removal of Bessie Bacon, her seven minor children and James McNaughton from Braintree to Randolph. The declaration contains two counts relating to each person, one for the penalty and the other for the damages. The defendants, Montgomery, Flint and Howard, were the selectmen of Braintree at the time of, and caused, such removal, and defendant Rice was acting as Montgomery's agent and servant. Plea, the general issue, and in substance and effect that none of the persons so moved had a legal pauper residence in any town in the state, but were transient persons residing in Randolph, and were poor and indigent and being supported, in whole or in part, by Randolph; that such had been their situation as to residence and support for four years prior to November 11, 1935, when one Tilson, Randolph's overseer of the poor, moved, and aided in moving, them from Randolph to Braintree with intent to charge the latter with their support; that Randolph continued to aid in their support until April 1, 1936, when it declined to do so longer, at about which time they applied to Braintree for relief, and became chargeable for support; that Braintree was not, and is not, liable therefor; that on April 20, 1936, the defendants, acting in their aforesaid capacities, returned such persons to Randolph, pursuant to the provisions of P. L. 3951, and that the overseer of Randolph neglected to take effectual measures as required by P. L. 3920 to prevent such persons from strolling into Braintree.

During the presentation of its case, the plaintiff discontinued the same as to defendant Rice, and discontinued the two counts in the declaration relating to McNaughton.

On motion of defendants, a verdict was directed for them, at the close of plaintiff's evidence, on the remaining counts except those relating to Mrs. Bacon, to which plaintiff excepted.

At the close of all the evidence plaintiff moved for a verdict against each defendant as to liability and that the question of the amount thereof, alone, be submitted to the jury, on the ground that the evidence did not tend to show that the persons in question were moved from Randolph to Braintree with intent to charge the latter town with their support and therefore defendants were not absolved from their acts by the provisions of P. L. 3951. At the same time defendants moved for a directed verdict on the count declaring for damages for the support of Mrs. Bacon on the ground that damages were not recoverable under P. L. 3950 unless it appeared that Randolph was not liable for her support, and that this did not appear, and on the ground that if Randolph was liable for her support it could recover the same only after the notice required by statute had been given, and that notice had not been shown; and moved for a directed verdict on both counts on the ground that the uncontradicted evidence showed that they only did what, in the circumstances, they had a right to do under the provisions of P. L. 3951, and also showed that Mrs. Bacon's pauper residence from November 11, 1935, to April 20, 1936, in contemplation of law, was in Randolph. The plaintiff's motion was denied and the defendants' was granted, to both of which rulings plaintiff excepted.

The first question is whether the court erred in directing a verdict for defendants on the counts relating to the children. In the circumstances, this question must be answered in the negative. Mrs. Bacon, their mother, had...