Town of Rushville v. Adams

Decision Date23 September 1886
Docket Number10,502
Citation8 N.E. 292,107 Ind. 475
PartiesThe Town of Rushville v. Adams
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

From the Rush Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

W. A Cullen, B. L. Smith, J. J. Spann and J. Q. Thomas, for appellant.

C Cambern and T. J. Newkirk, for appellee.

OPINION

Zollars, J.

Appellee charged in her complaint, that the town licensed, and with knowledge permitted a person to carry on the business of manufacturing candy on one of the streets, and in said business "to use a tripod supporting a vessel containing syrup, which was boiled and manufactured into candy by means of fire built under the vessel;" that she and her husband were driving on the street, when the horse became frightened at the fire and ran away, throwing them out, and injuring her; that the injury was not caused by any negligence or carelessness on her part, but was caused wholly by the negligence of the town in permitting said person to maintain and carry on the said business.

Counsel for appellant urge three principal objections to the complaint. Assuming that appellee's husband was driving the horse, the first is that there is no averment that he was free from negligence contributing to the injury.

Without deciding in what respect, if any, the husband's negligence might affect the rights of appellee, it is sufficient here to say that it in no way appears from the complaint that he was driving the horse.

The second is, that as the buggy did not come in contact with the tripod, or any obstruction on or defect in the street, the town is not liable; in other words, that cities and towns are not liable for injuries resulting alone from the fright of horses at objects upon the streets, no matter what may be their character, and notwithstanding that the city, with knowledge, may have allowed them to remain upon the streets for an unreasonable length of time, or may have granted permission for placing and maintaining them there.

We do not understand that cities and towns are entitled to such immunity from liability. The duty rests upon such corporation to keep their streets in a safe condition, and free from all obstructions that may seriously interfere with travel, and thus result in injury to travellers. This duty relates not only to defects in the roadway, and objects thereon against which vehicles may be wrecked, but also extends the liability to injuries from falling awnings, ice and snow, and to injuries resulting from the fright of horses, of ordinary gentleness, at objects upon the streets naturally calculated, and which may reasonably be expected, to produce such fright. It can not be said, with reason, that streets in which obstructions are suffered to be placed and remain, which, by their appearance, are calculated to frighten such horses, are in a reasonably safe condition. The purpose of the law is to secure to the public safe highways. As said in the case of Morse v. Town of Richmond, 41 Vt. 435 (8 Am. L. Reg. n.s. 81), "That purpose may be as effectually defeated by an obstruction which impedes travel by its frightful appearance as by one which, if it is hit, will be an obstacle to the secure passage of the wheels of a carriage." And, as said in the case of Bartlett v. Hooksett, 48 N.H. 18, "Objects calculated to frighten horses would often be far more dangerous, and much less easily guarded against by the traveller, than many obstructions with which he comes in actual contact or collision."

In the case of Foshay v. Town of Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288 (3 Am. R. 73), it was said: "We adopt upon this subject the rule established by the Supreme Courts of Vermont, New Hampshire and Connecticut, that objects within the limits of a highway, naturally calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness, may constitute such deficiencies in the way as to render the town liable, even though so far removed from the travelled path as to avoid all danger of collision."

Other cases to the same effect might be cited. In our judgment reason, and the...

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