Town of Ruston v. Dewey

• Decision Date: 29 October 1917
• Docket Number: 22654
• Citation: 76 So. 719,142 La. 295
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF RUSTON v. DEWEY

76 So. 719

142 La. 295

TOWN OF RUSTON v. DEWEY

No. 22654

Supreme Court of Louisiana

October 29, 1917

SYLLABUS

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The provision of section 33, Act No. 136 of 1898, requiring that a town ordinance shall not contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, should be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow a municipal council full scope to include in one ordinance all matters having a logical or natural connection.

T. S. Price and C. B. Roberts, both of Ruston (Friedrichs, Moise, Barksdale & Barksdale, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellant.

H. B. Warren, of Ruston, for appellee.

OPINION

LECHE, J.

Defendant was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 19 of the town of Ruston; he was tried in the mayor's court, was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of $ 50, and to serve 30 days in jail, and in default of payment of the fine, to serve 30 additional days in jail.

The ordinance under which he was prosecuted and tried is entitled:

'Ordinance No. 19. For the suppression of retailing of spirituous and intoxicating liquors and prompting its sale by principals, resident agents or drummers and suppression of tippling shops and fixing penalties.'

This literal transcription from the record clearly shows a clerical or typographical error in the word 'promting,' which is meaningless, and our opinion is that the word contained in the ordinance and intended to be copied was 'promoting,' thus showing a title meaning that the ordinance was for the suppression of selling, etc., the suppression of promoting its sale, etc., and suppression of tippling shops, etc. The language used in the title is neither artistic nor elegant, but that feature of it is not an issue in the case.

The body of the ordinance is in three sections, the first of which prohibits the sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors, and the keeping of grog or tippling shops within the town of Ruston; the second prohibits the soliciting for the purchase or sale of intoxicating or spirituous liquors in less quantities than five gallons within the limits of the town of Ruston, by principals, drummers, or resident agents, said liquors to be shipped by express, regular freight or by vehicle; and the third declares that any person who shall allow others to congregate in a room or rooms in the premises under his control for the purpose of engaging in drinking intoxicating or spirituous liquors, or who shall allow them to congregate and drink intoxicating liquors on such premises or in such rooms, shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance, etc.

The affidavit against defendant charged him with having on or about the 6th day of May, 1917, willfully violated the above ordinance by retailing spirituous and intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits of the town of Ruston.

Defendant moved to quash the charge on various grounds, only two of which under article 85 of the Constitution, which fixes the jurisdiction of this court, are reviewable by us, to wit:

First. That said Ordinance No. 19, under which defendant is charged, is unconstitutional, null and void, for the reason that said ordinance contains two objects in violation of section 33 of Act 136 of 1898 and the Constitution of Louisiana.

Second. That the said Ordinance No. 19 is unconstitutional, illegal, null, and void, for the reason that the same was not passed, read, and considered by sections and voted on final passage, as required by section 33 of Act 136 of 1898, section by section.

The trial judge being of opinion that these objections were not well founded, overruled the motion to quash, proceeded to try the defendant, with the result herein already stated. Defendant then took the present appeal.

Opinion.

The provision in section 33 of Act 136 of 1898, pertinent to defendant's first ground of defense, reads as follows:

'An ordinance shall not contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.'

We know of no adjudication by this court, nor has any decision been pointed out to us, interpreting this particular provision of the law, regulating the conduct of municipal corporations organized under that statute. Defendant invokes in aid of the position article...