Town of Scituate v. EFC Construction Co., C.A. No. PC 04 0912 (RI 3/3/2005)
| Decision Date | 03 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PC 04 0912 |
| Parties | TOWN OF SCITUATE, a Municipal Corporation v. EFC CONSTRUCTION CO., a/k/a EFC CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT INC., JOHN J. HARRIGAN, JESUSA S. HARRIGAN, ADMINISTRATRIX of the ESTATE of JOSEPH F. HARRIGAN, and The ESTATE OF JOSEPH F. HARRIGAN |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Before this Court is a motion to dismiss an action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Town of Scituate (Town), a municipal corporation, as Plaintiff, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants EFC Construction Co. (EFC) and John J. Harrington (Harrington), who is the duly authorized representative of all owners of the property. The Estate of Joseph F. Harrington (Estate) is represented by Defendant Jesusa S. Harrigan (Administratrix), who is Administratrix of the Estate. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1 et seq.
The property in question contains approximately 25 acres of vacant land. The property is located in an RR 120 zone under the Town of Scituate Zoning Ordinances. Harrington is the owner of Lot 97 in Assessor's Plat 50, while the Estate owns Lot 78 in Assessor's Plat 50. EFC is the authorized agent of the owners of Lots 78 and 97 for purposes of application for a comprehensive permit under the Low and Moderate Income Housing Act (Housing Act) § 45-53-1 et seq.
EFC applied for a comprehensive permit to develop a residential subdivision with 20% of the units being reserved for low and moderate income persons under the Housing Act. EFC sought to build 25 single family detached three bedroom dwellings including five of which would be reserved for low or moderate income persons. EFC filed its application for a comprehensive permit on December 30, 2003. Due to the lack of specific forms available at the time, the application was submitted on a standard form ordinarily used for zoning relief such as variances or special permits.
The application was duly advertised in accordance with the Act and placed on the Town of Scituate Zoning Board of Review (Board) regular meeting agenda for January 27, 2004. At that meeting, EFC appeared and requested the hearing be rescheduled. The Board acknowledged receipt of the application, accepted four exhibits into the record, and informed EFC that an official application form was required. The Board then rescheduled the hearing for February 11, 2004. On February 5, 2004, however, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed legislation that included a moratorium on comprehensive permit applications submitted by "for profit" developers of low and moderate income housing projects. The bill took effect on February 13, 2004 according to § 45-53-4(d).
On February 11, 2004, the Board held the hearing regarding EFC's application for a comprehensive permit. At the hearing, the Board raised several questions, including whether the moratorium precluded EFC's application and whether the property in question was still subject to a condition imposed years earlier in conjunction with subdivision of the land. In 1975, the Town of Scituate Plan Commission granted a request to subdivide lots 96, 97, and 78 subject to the specific condition that no further subdivision would be permitted unless a road was built to provide lot 96 with access and frontage. No such road has ever been built on the property. At the close of the hearing, the Board voted unanimously to ask the Town, through the town solicitor, to seek a declaratory judgment in this Superior Court with regard to the two questions: applicability of the moratorium and availability of relief to the property given the unmet condition imposed by the Plan Commission.
The Town filed the present action seeking declaratory judgment on those two issues and also seeking injunctive relief in order to enjoin the Defendants from proceeding with any actual development through clearing of brush, etc. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. This Court renders its decision herein.
The purpose of the Declaratory Act is "to facilitate the termination of controversies." Capital Props. Inc., 749 A.2d at 1080. The decision to issue a declaratory judgment lies within the trial justice's discretion. Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) (citing Woonsocket Teachers' Guild Local Union 951 v. Woonsocket Sch. Comm., 694 A.2d 727, 729 (R.I. 1997)); Lombardi v. Goodyear Loan Co., 549 A.2d 1025, 1027 (R.I. 1988) (citing Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 628, 240 A.2d 397, 401 (1968)). Section 9-30-12 provides that the Declaratory Act should be "liberally construed and administered." See also Taylor v. Marshall, 119 R.I. 171, 180, 376 A.2d 712, 716-17 (1977) ().
Defendants allege that the Town has no standing under the Housing Act, all authority and jurisdiction instead being vested in the Board. Defendants state that the Board is the only body with authority, assuming the authority of all other town boards when dealing with applications under the Housing Act. Defendants cite § 45-53-4 as stating that the Board is the only entity with an "interest" in connection to the development application.
Plaintiff argues that the Defendants confuse the application under the Housing Act with the present action for declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Act, stating that the Town has sought simply to address the moratorium, not to address the Defendant's application itself. Plaintiff also articulates that it may request guidance from the Superior Court through the town solicitor in order to represent the interests of the community. The Town argues it is a "person" under the Declaratory Act and therefore has standing to seek declaratory relief. Plaintiff also points out that the Board does not have standing under the Declaratory Act and cites Town of Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review v. Omni Dev. Corp., 814 A.2d 889 (R.I. 2003), for the proposition that a zoning board lacks standing to bring an appeal.
Under the Declaratory Act, a town qualifies as a person entitled to seek declaratory judgment. Section 9-30-13 provides that "[t]he word `person', wherever used in this chapter, shall be construed to mean any . . . municipal or other corporation of any character whatsoever." Thus, a town or municipal corporation is a "person . . . who[] . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . ordinance . . . ." G.L. 1956 § 9-30-2.
Prior sections of the General Laws (§ 45-24-6 and § 45-24-7) Town of Coventry v. Hickory Ridge Campground, Inc., 111 R.I. 716, 720-21, 306 A.2d 824, 827 (1973). "[O]nly the town through its solicitor can initiate actions to enforce local zoning ordinances . . . ." Id. at 724, 828-29 (upholding Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 95 R.I. 280, 186 A.2d 728 (1962)). Our own Supreme Court has "never departed from the statutory dictate that only the town has standing to initiate the action." Town of Charlestown v. Beattie, 422 A.2d 1250, 1252 (R.I. 1980) (). The current General Laws provide that "[t]he city or town may also cause suit to be brought in the . . . superior court . . . in the name of the city or town, to restrain the violation of, or to compel compliance with, the provisions of its zoning ordinance." G.L. 1956 § 45-24-60(b). By implication, the town also has standing to seek declaratory judgment because "the superior court . . . shall, upon due proceedings in the name of the city or town, instituted by its city or town solicitor, have power to issue any extraordinary writ or to proceed according to the course of law or equity or both." G.L. 1956 § 45-24-62.
"Standing in zoning cases is accorded only to applicants who are aggrieved by the judgment to be reviewed either personally or `in an official capacity as a representative of the public.'" Barrington School Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 120 R.I. 470, 474, 388 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1978) (quoting Hassell v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of East Providence, 108 R.I. 349, 351, 275 A.2d 646, 648 (1971)). When invoked in a zoning context the expanded interpretation of aggrievement can be either private or public. City of East Providence v. Shell Oil Co., 110 R.I. 138, 142-43, 290 A.2d 915, 917-18 (1972). "`[A]ggrievement' in the public sense occurs whenever there is a threat to the very real and legitimate interest which the general public has in the preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the zoning laws." Id. at 143, 918. "T...
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