Town of Strafford v. Town of Sharon

• Decision Date: 31 January 1889
• Citation: 18 A. 308,61 Vt. 126
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF STRAFFORD v. TOWN OF SHARON.

18 A. 308

61 Vt. 126

TOWN OF STRAFFORD

v. TOWN OF SHARON.

Supreme Court of Vermont, General Term.

1889.

For majority opinion, see 17 Atl. Rep. 793.

TAFT, J., (dissenting.)

I am unable to agree with the majority of the court. It is said that the petitioning town is not entitled to relief, for that R. L. § 28 is a bar. If this section has any application to highway cases, it did not require the aid of section 8 of the act of 1884, which forbade its application to pending causes, to protect the interests of the petitionee, for the repeal of the general provisions of the statutes, by the terms of section 28, could not affect a proceeding then had or commenced or a right accrued. I think it does not admit of question that the legislature had power to repeal section 28, R. L. There are two reasons why I think the case at bar is not affected by section 28. 1 think, in respect of this case, the section was repealed by the Acts of 1884-86. Section 8 of the act of 1884 provided that the act should not apply to pending cases; but in 1886 the act of that year provided that section 8 of the act of 1884 should be repealed. What is the effect of this act of 1886 other than saying the act as amended shall apply to pending cases? I think it is saying so directly. I do not think this section of the Revised Laws has any relation, nor was intended to apply, to proceedings instituted after the repeal of any statute relative to the maintenance of highways, the support of paupers, and like burdens imposed upon municipal organizations. The laws relating to such burdens are not in the nature of contract, and, except so far as executed, no absolute rights vest under them. Towns are created for public purposes, and it is competent for the legislature to amend, alter, or repeal all laws relating to them. Such laws are in the nature of police regulations of a public character, arbitrary in their quality, founded on no pre-existing right or equity, and all questions arising under them must be determined by the provisions existing at the time. I think the petitionee had no such absolute vested right that it could not be altered or taken away by act of the legislature, and for the same reasons the case is not affected by any constitutional prohibition. I see no difference between the principle underlying the law relating to the maintenance of highways and that of paupers, and the court held, at this term, in Town of Worcester v. Town of East Montpelier, 17 Atl. Rep. 842, and Town of Chittenden v. Town of Barnard, 17 Atl. Rep. 844, that the burden of supporting a pauper may be changed by an act of the legislature, and I see no reason why the principle of those cases does not apply to a case where...