Town of Sunnyvale v. Mayhew, No. 05-92-01401-CV

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: OVARD; The City Council of the City may, after public hearing and proper notice to all parties affected, and after recommendations from the Planning and Zoning Commission containing such requirements and safeguards as are necessary to protect adjoini
• Citation: 905 S.W.2d 234
• Docket Number: No. 05-92-01401-CV
• Decision Date: 10 May 1994
• Parties: The TOWN OF SUNNYVALE, Appellant, v. Charles MAYHEW, Sr., Charles Mayhew, Jr., The Estate of Audrey Mayhew, and Sunnyvale Properties, Ltd., Appellees.

Page 234

905 S.W.2d 234 The TOWN OF SUNNYVALE, Appellant,
v.
Charles MAYHEW, Sr., Charles Mayhew, Jr., The Estate of
Audrey Mayhew, and Sunnyvale Properties, Ltd., Appellees. No. 05-92-01401-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas,
Dallas. May 10, 1994.
Opinion Supplementing Decision
on Rehearing Feb. 16, 1995.

Page 241

Alan W. Wright, Cole B. Ramey, Dallas, Robert H. Freilich, Terry D. Morgan, Kansas City, MO, Cary L. Bovey, Austin, for appellant.

Donald R. Black, Dallas, Luke C. Kellogg, San Antonio, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, OVARD and MORRIS, JJ.

OPINION

OVARD, Justice.

This case involves a challenge to a zoning decision. The Town of Sunnyvale appeals the trial court's judgment awarding Charles Mayhew, Sr., Charles Mayhew, Jr., the Estate of Audrey Mayhew, and Sunnyvale Properties, Ltd. (the Mayhews) $5 million in damages, $2,301,369.20 in prejudgment interest, $1,204,374.13 for attorneys' fees for services rendered through trial, $100,000 in attorneys' fees in the event of an appeal to this Court, costs in the amount of $175,038.14, as well as injunctive relief allowing the Mayhews to develop their property under their original planned-development proposal. The Town attacks the trial court's judgment on several grounds by challenging the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. In twenty-three points of error, the Town contends the claims were not ripe and that the trial court erred in entering judgment for the Mayhews. Specifically, in points of error one through four, the Town asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Mayhews' taking, substantive-due-process, and equal-protection claims ¹ because these claims were not ripe for review. In point of error nineteen, the Town challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support various findings made by the trial court. Because the Mayhews failed to reapply for development or seek variances, their claims were not ripe for review. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the Mayhews' claims.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

From 1941 to 1986, the Mayhews acquired 1196 acres of property located in the Town. ² They sought to develop their property in 1986. At that time, all residentially zoned property was subject to a minimum lot size requirement of one dwelling unit per acre. The Town adopted one-unit-per-acre zoning in 1973 because of septic tank problems.

In 1985, the Mayhews met with various Town officials regarding a planned development for which they sought approval. The Mayhews had never sought a change in the existing agricultural-use zoning of their property until that time. The Mayhews told the Town a planned development would not be feasible under the current one-unit-per-acre zoning. In 1986, after meeting with the Mayhews, the Town adopted a new comprehensive plan providing for a population of 25,000 by the year 2006. ³ The Town also amended article XV of the Town's zoning ordinance to permit planned developments with homes built on less than one acre.

The Mayhews paid more than $500,000 to conduct studies and prepare reports evaluating

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various aspects of the planned development. In July 1986, the Mayhews gave the planned development application to the Town's planning and zoning committee for preliminary review. At that time, the Mayhews' application said they requested approval for the building of 3650 to 5025 units. Two months after the Mayhews submitted their application to the planning and zoning committee, the Town passed a moratorium on planned developments. The Town, however, continued to process the Mayhews' application.

The Town's planning and zoning committee recommended that the Town Council vote to deny the application. In a memorandum, the committee said the proposed density was too high, the availability of adequate sewer service was uncertain, the public facilities were inadequate, the fiscal impact was negative, and there was a potential for an adverse impact on community characteristics. The memorandum further reported that a proposal with less density would be "preferred."

After the planning and zoning committee recommended denial, the Mayhews met with Town officials. The Mayhews said they would submit the planned development application to the Town Council requesting approval for 3600 total units (slightly more than three units per acre). The Mayhews submitted the application for a planned development (PD application) to the Town Council in December 1986. The Town Council denied the Mayhews' PD application on January 13, 1987. The Mayhews did not reapply; nor did they utilize procedures for obtaining variances contained in the Town's zoning ordinance. The Mayhews did not contact officials from the Town after the Town Council denied the application. Instead, on March 6, 1987, approximately two months after the Town denied their PD application, the Mayhews instituted this suit.

Three days after the Mayhews filed suit, the Town passed another moratorium on planned developments. That moratorium lasted four months. At some time after the Mayhews filed suit, their neighbors, the Luptons, filed a PD application. The Town processed that application. The Town later denied the Luptons' application.

The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, from which the Mayhews appealed. This Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Town regarding statutory violations alleged by the Mayhews. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 774 S.W.2d 284, 299 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087, 111 S.Ct. 963, 112 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1991) (Mayhew I ). This Court further found, however, that issues of material fact existed. We reversed the summary judgment on the constitutional grounds and remanded the cause to the trial court regarding these issues and the issue of ripeness. In that opinion, we stated, "If the door [to further development applications] is closed, then [the Mayhews] cannot develop [their] land. A property owner need not engage in futile reapplications." Mayhew I, 774 S.W.2d at 289.

This appeal is from the trial on the merits. The Mayhews' theory at trial regarding ripeness was that the Town's denial of their PD application and their neighbors' PD application and the imposition of the moratoria together established it would be useless or futile to reapply for development. As set forth above, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Mayhews. The trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law applicable to ripeness.

Findings of Fact

101. In denying the application for planned development approval for the Mayhew Ranch Planned Development and the application for planned development approval for the [Luptons'] Planned Development, and in enacting numerous moratoria on applications for consideration of planned development approval, the Town of Sunnyvale has acted pursuant to an official policy not to allow development with a density of greater than one dwelling unit per acre.

130. The Town of Sunnyvale considered and rejected countless alternative densities during the consideration of the application for Planned Development Approval for Mayhew Ranch Planned Development and

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permutations to the density originally proposed by plaintiffs.

131. The actions of the Town of Sunnyvale reveal a pattern and practice which demonstrates the intent of the Town of Sunnyvale to deny any application for development approval with a density greater than one dwelling unit per acre.

132. Plaintiffs have exhausted all of the possible remedies and avenues of relief which were realistically available to them in the Town of Sunnyvale. ⁴

133. The Town of Sunnyvale has closed the door on future reapplications by Plaintiffs at a realistic or economically viable density.

Conclusions of Law

186. Plaintiffs have exhausted all of the possible remedies and avenues of relief which were realistically available to them in the Town of Sunnyvale.

187. The Town of Sunnyvale has closed the door on future reapplications by Plaintiffs at a realistic or economically viable density thus rendering the possibility of reapplication futile.

188. Reapplication by Plaintiffs for planned development approval with Defendant Town of Sunnyvale would have been, and is still, futile.

189. When the Town Council considered the application for planned development approval for the Mayhew Ranch Planned Development, the Town Council had the authority to and did consider and reject each and every level of density between one and four and two-tenths [4 2/10] dwelling units per acre.

190. This case was ripe for adjudication.

APPLICABLE LAW

1. Standard of Review--Findings and Conclusions

Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon special issues. City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Findings of fact are not conclusive, however, when a complete statement of facts appears in the record. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] ), writ ref'd n.r.e. 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); Stephenson v. Perlitz, 537 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An appellant may attack the trial court's findings of fact on both legal and factual sufficiency grounds. See Valencia v. Garza, 765 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1989, no writ).

A conclusion of law is reviewable as a question of law. Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), overruled on other grounds by Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 894 (Tex.1991). An appellant may not challenge a trial court's conclusions of law for factual insufficiency. However, an appellate court may review the trial court's conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. Id...