Town of Williamstown v. Williamstown Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 January 1929 |
| Citation | 144 A. 203 |
| Parties | TOWN OF WILLIAMSTOWN v. WILLIAMSTOWN CO., Inc. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Orange County Court; John S. Buttles, Judge.
Action by the Town of Williamstown against the Williamstown Company, Inc. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Judgment affirmed.
Argued before POWERS, SLACK, MOULTON, and CHASE, JJ., and WILLCOX, Superior Court Judge.
C. O. Granai and J. W. Gordon, both of Barre, for plaintiff.
Elwin L. Scott, of Barre, and Stanley C. Wilson, of Chelsea, for defendant.
This action is brought under G. L. 917, to recover taxes for the years 1920 to 1926, inclusive. Trial was by court. At the close of plaintiff's evidence the court, on motion of defendant, struck from plaintiff's specification all items for taxes, and following the filing of its findings entered judgment for the defendant, to all of which plaintiff excepted.
We first consider whether the unchallenged findings support the judgment, since if they do many of the exceptions are unimportant to a disposition of the case. We attach no importance to the action of the court respecting the specification, since neither the findings nor judgment appear to have been influenced thereby.
It appears from findings not excepted to that the plaintiff voted each of the years in question to collect its taxes by its treasurer; that the selectmen made out a rate bill, or tax bill, to use the language of the statute, each year, and delivered it to the treasurer for the collection of the taxes therein; that the only tax standing against the defendant in the tax bill for 1920 was $44, which was paid; that the tax bills for the four following years contained no item of any tax "laid or assessed against the defendant"; that no evidence was introduced to show that in any of the years in question the treasurer either posted notices notifying the taxpayers of the taxes he had in his hands for collection and the place where and time when the same should be paid, or gave the defendant notice of any tax in his hands for collection against it, and the place where, and time within which, the same should be paid.
The effect of these findings upon plaintiff's right to recover, namely, its failure to produce a tax bill showing a tax against the defendant for the years 1920 to 1924, inclusive, and its failure to show that its treasurer gave the taxpayers the notices required by statute are treated in inverse order.
The plaintiff insists that, since the town elected to proceed against the defendant in this manner rather than by warrant, the notices by the treasurer required by G. L. 890, were unnecessary, and that no demand for the tax was required. In other words, that since the town adopted this method of procedure it might hale the defendant into court as a delinquent the moment a tax was voted, and the value of his taxable property was ascertained, irrespective of a tax bill, and without notice of the tax or demand for its payment, even though the town had voted to collect its taxes by its treasurer.
It is not apparent why a taxpayer against whom a town elects to proceed by warrant should be entitled to the notice provided by G. L. 890, if the town votes to collect its taxes by its treasurer, or to the notice provided by G. L. 881, if the town does not so vote, and another against whom the town elects to proceed by the method here invoked should be entitled to no notice whatever. The necessity for notice when collection is by warrant is not questioned, nor can it be. Brush v. Watson, 81 Vt. 43, 69 A. 141; Brock v. Bruce, 58 Vt. 261, 2 A. 598. That it is equally essential when collection is by a suit at law is established by Smith v. Stannard, 81 Vt. 319, 70 A. 568, which action was brought under a statute similar to the present one, so far as the necessity for notice is concerned. A careful examination of G. L. 918, shows that it deals solely with questions respecting the validity of the tax—the method of presenting issues touching its validity, the burden of proof, etc. Nowhere does the statute in express terms, or by necessary implication, attempt to change the existing requirements respecting notice to the taxpayer. Moreover, all of our laws relating to the enforced collection of taxes are aimed at "delinquent" taxpayers and "delinquent" taxes. G. L. 919. which is part of the statute upon which this suit is predicated, provides: "Whenever the treasurer, collector of taxes or other proper officer has a delinquent tax in his hands for collection, he may notify the agent," etc. It was the delinquent tax which the Legislature here, as in other sections of the statute, had in mind. "Delinquent," according to Webster's New Int. Dict., means "failure or delay; offending by neglect or violation of duty." A tax cannot be said to be delinquent within the meaning of the statute until the party liable therefor fails to pay same after receiving the required notice. We hold that the notice required by G. L. 881, or by G. L. 890, as the case may be, is necessary whether collection is by warrant or by action under the statute.
It is found that the taxes for 1925 and 1926 appear in the tax bills delivered to the treasurer in those years; that they were not paid to him; that together with other delinquent taxes they were turned over by him at the expiration of the time fixed by G. L. 890, to the collector of taxes; that the collector demanded payment of the same from defendant, but made no further effort to collect them. Whether his demand was met by such a refusal to pay as would obviate the necessity for notice, as in Brock v. Bruce, supra Wheelock v. Archer, 26 Vt. 380, and Downer v. Woodbury, 19 Vt. 329, does not appear. Since the plaintiff failed to prove the required notice, it was incumbent on it to show circumstances that made it unnecessary, if it could. Because of its failure in both respects it cannot maintain this suit.
It is not necessary to notice the remaining exceptions; but since some of them raise new and important questions, and are fully briefed by both parties, we deem it advisable to consider them.
The plaintiff insists that it was not necessary for it to prove the existence of a tax bill in order to make out a case; that if it showed an assessment of defendant by the proper officials, and the rate of tax can be determined by the vote of the town or "statutory imposition," it is entitled to recover. If notice to the taxpayer of the tax standing against him is essential before proceedings are commenced to enforce payment thereof, either under a warrant or by a suit of this nature, as we hold it is, it is not apparent how the tax bill can be dispensed with, since the only provision for notice is by the collector or treasurer, and neither has authority to give such notice until the tax bill is placed in his hands for collection.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the tax bill is made up largely from known data collected from various sources, data from which it would be possible for the court to determine the tax against each individual taxpayer, but the Legislature has seen fit to make the selectmen responsible for this determination in the first instance, and to make it a prerequisite to any proceeding for the collection of the tax. The statute provides by whom and when it shall be made (G. L. 871, 3970), what it shall contain (G. L. 3970), to whom it shall be delivered (G. L. 881, 889) and the subsequent acts thereunder (G. L. 881 et seq., 890 et seq.). These provisions, in substance, have been part of our scheme of taxation for more than a century. While the necessity for a tax bill has never been...
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