Town of Winchester v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations

Citation402 A.2d 332,175 Conn. 349
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date11 July 1978
Parties, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3146 TOWN OF WINCHESTER v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS.

Russell L. Post, Jr., Avon, with whom was O. Bradford Griffin, Jr., Litchfield, for appellant (plaintiff).

William R. Darcy, Gen. Counsel, Wethersfield, for appellee (defendant).

Before COTTER, LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and HEALEY, JJ.

HEALEY, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing an appeal by the town of Winchester from a decision of the Connecticut state board of labor relations.

This case was initiated as a result of charges filed by the National Association of Municipal Employees, a division of local 208 of the National Association of Government Employees, hereinafter the union, alleging that the town, having recognized the union as the collective bargaining representative of Armand Sartirana, the town's only paid fireman, violated state law by refusing to bargain with the union and by eliminating Sartirana's position. Sartirana is the sole member of the bargaining unit involved in this case.

The town has filed twenty numbered assignments of error, many of which are interrelated. Substantively, these assignments come down to three basic claims which are advanced as constituting reversible error. They are: (1) that one employee cannot constitute an appropriate unit, either logically or under applicable guiding decisions, (2) that the town did not violate the law when its town manager withdrew from negotiations with reference to Sartirana, the fire department employee involved, because under the charter the fire department was not under the town manager's supervision and (3) that the town did not violate the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA) by eliminating the one paid position in the otherwise all volunteer fire department after the union sought to bargain on behalf of Sartirana, the incumbent in that position.

We first take up that claim that involved the question of whether a single employee unit is an appropriate unit. This assignment is essentially that the town has no obligation under the law to bargain with the union if there is only one employee in the "bargaining unit," since bargaining cannot be collective where there is only one employee. The town specifically asserts that the Superior Court erred in holding that "(w)hile federal courts have consistently held that bargaining with a one-man unit is improper, under the Municipal Employee Relations Act, §§ 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, of the General Statutes, a one-man unit is an appropriate unit for collective bargaining." It is the town's position that one employee cannot constitute an appropriate bargaining unit, "either logically or under applicable guiding decisions."

The findings of the board disclose the following facts which are necessary for us to set out to discuss and decide this assignment of error: The town is a "municipal employer" within the meaning of the Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes §§ 7-467 7-477. The union is an "employee organization" within the meaning of the MERA. The town has a fire department manned largely by volunteers, some 130 in number, headed by a chief and deputy chiefs. Under the town charter the town manager is directly in charge of most departments, but the board of selectmen is in charge of the administration of the fire department. For over twenty-five years prior to 1975 there had been a paid daytime driver who responded to all still alarms and some others, and who had other duties including custodial duties. This paid driver was appointed by the selectmen upon recommendation by the chief and his deputies. In 1971 the incumbent paid driver contemplated retirement and at that time Sartirana was and had been a volunteer fireman for a number of years. Sartirana asked the chief and others to recommend him for the job. They did so and the selectmen appointed Sartirana to the job at an annual salary of $7400, which was paid by the town. In 1975 his salary was $10,117. Early in 1974 Sartirana joined the union. On May 18, 1974, the union filed a representation petition with the defendant board. The negotiations between Dennis Moore, the town manager, and the union began in February, 1975. The board agent held an informal conference with Moore and a representative of the union. As a result of this conference, Moore signed an agreement recognizing the union and agreeing to negotiate with it for a unit consisting only of Sartirana, the paid driver. On June 27, 1975, counsel for the town issued his opinion concerning the town manager's authority to recognize the union as bargaining representative for Sartirana. His opinion was that the town manager could not, on his own authority, bind the town in any agreement affecting the fire department and that, therefore, the "Recognition Agreement" was not an agreement binding on the town. The town manager forthwith terminated negotiations with the union.

Thereafter, the selectmen voted to eliminate the paid driver's position which was held by Sartirana. This action of the selectmen was preceded by certain events referred to by the board, which need not be set out here on this assignment of error but which will be referred to below. An appeal was taken from this action to the defendant board which ordered the town to reinstate the position of paid driver, to reinstate Sartirana to that position, to reimburse him for his losses and to resume negotiations with the union.

We must determine whether one employee constitutes an "appropriate" bargaining unit under the Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act. 1 The town claims that we should reverse the trial court and hold that such a bargaining unit is not permitted, and it points to federal law which, it argues, requires that result. On the other hand, the board, while recognizing the state of the federal law, argues that such a bargaining unit is " appropriate" and states that federal precedent should not be followed here. The facts relating to this assignment of error are not in issue. The Superior Court held that "under the Municipal Employee Relations Act, §§ 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, of the General Statutes, a one-man unit is an appropriate unit for collective bargaining." It is this conclusion of law we are to review. While the conclusion reached by the trial court is to be tested by the finding it cannot stand if it is legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or if it involves some erroneous rule of law applicable to the case. Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 55, 364 A.2d 194; Sea Beach Assn., Inc. v. Water Resources Commission, 164 Conn. 90, 93, 318 A.2d 115.

"The Connecticut Municipal Employee Relations Act, like the Connecticut Labor

Relations Act originally enacted in 1945, is closely patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which a comparison of the two acts clearly demonstrates." Windsor v. Windsor Police Department Employees Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 536, 227 A.2d 65, 68. This court has stated that it is for this reason that "the judicial interpretation frequently accorded the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own act." Imperial Laundry, Inc. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 142 Conn. 457, 460, 115 A.2d 439, 441; Windsor v. Windsor Police Department Employees Assn., Inc., supra. In speaking of the similarity of language that exists between the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161; the Connecticut State Labor Relations Act and the MERA, we have often noted that the language of these three is essentially the same: "(T)he judicial interpretation frequently accorded the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own acts." West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 579, 295 A.2d 526, 534, and cases cited.

Turning to the relevant portion of the NLRA and MERA, we find language that is essentially the same. This is apparent from an examination of 29 U.S.C. § 157 2 and General Statutes § 7-468 3 which are concerned with the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively. Language which is essentially the same is also disclosed from an examination of 29 U.S.C. § 159 4 and General Statutes § 7-471 5 where those sections set out the power of the respective boards to decide the unit "appropriate" for the purposes of collective bargaining. "Legislative intent is found not in what the legislature meant to say but in the meaning of what it did say." Dana-Robin Corporation v. Common Council, 166 Conn. 207, 221, 348 A.2d 560, 567; Schwab v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 479, 482, 226 A.2d 506. No word in a statute should be treated as superfluous. Levin-Townsend Computer Corporation v. Hartford, 166 Conn. 405, 409, 349 A.2d 853. "(N)o part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant or unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment." Charlton Press, Inc. v. Sullivan, 153 Conn. 103, 109, 214 A.2d 354, 357. "In construing a statute a court considers its legislative history, language, purpose and the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Delinks v. McGowan, 148 Conn. 614, 618, 173 A.2d 488; Cassidy v. Tait, 140 Conn. 156, 160, 98 A.2d 808." State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 91n, 347 A.2d 61, 67. In the federal sector it has been said that the purpose of the NLRA is to seek the peaceful adjustment of labor-management disputes as a substitute for industrial strife and the promotion of industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409. This is also the essential thrust of our State Labor Relations Act and the MERA.

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