Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
| Decision Date | 31 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10-11,103476,Docket Nos. 102845,s. 10-11 |
| Citation | 568 N.W.2d 64,455 Mich. 688 |
| Parties | Veronica TOWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Ted McCONNELL and Nancy McConnell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ROLLINS BURDICK HUNTER OF MICHIGAN, INCORPORATED, and Miller, Mason & Dickenson, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. Calender |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Donald J. Gasiorek and Patrick Burkett, Southfield, for Plaintiff-Appellant Town.
Pitt, Dowty & McGehee, P.C. by Michael L. Pitt, Royal Oak, for Plaintiffs-Appellees McConnell.
Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman by Thomas G. Kienbaum, Robert W. Powell, and Jennifer A. Zinn, Detroit, for Defendant-Appellee in Town.
Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman by Elizabeth Hardy and Julia Turner Baumhart, Bloomfield Hills, for Defendants-Appellants in McConnell.
Clark, Hill, P.L.C. by Duane L. Tarnacki and J. Walker Henry, Detroit, amicus curiae, for Michigan Manufacturers Association.
The issue presented in these consolidated cases is whether the plaintiffs, McConnell and Town, have presented sufficient evidence of age or sex discrimination to surmount a motion for summary disposition and a motion for a directed verdict, respectively. We conclude in both cases that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that discrimination had been a determining factor in their employers' decisions.
In July of 1988, Ted McConnell accepted a job as a sales representative with Rollins Burdick Hunter (RBH). RBH sold health insurance and provided insurance-related consulting services. At the time that he was hired, McConnell was fifty-five years old.
In January of 1989, the plaintiff was informed that he needed to improve his sales production. The plaintiff's next review was in September of 1989. Because the plaintiff's sales revenue had not significantly improved by that time, he was informed that if his revenue did not increase that "there will have to be some adjustment made." The plaintiff was unable to improve his production.
RBH discharged McConnell in January of 1990. At that time, the plaintiff was fifty- seven years old. The plaintiff brought suit against defendants RBH and Miller, Mason, and Dickenson, Inc., 1 alleging breach of employment contract, promissory estoppel, and age discrimination. The trial court granted summary disposition for the defendants on each of the plaintiff's claims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the decision of the trial court. The plaintiff then moved for a rehearing on the age discrimination claim which was granted. On rehearing, the Court affirmed, but remanded the case for trial of the plaintiff's age discrimination claim in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The defendants appealed that decision in this Court. We granted leave and consolidated this case with Town v. Michigan Bell.
Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Company
In 1980, Veronica Town sought a departmental transfer from her position of product-line manager with the Michigan Bell Telephone Company. She was interviewed by the assessment center and was offered a position. She turned it down, however, when she learned of the Assessment Center's schedule, which consisted of a four-day work week, with twelve-hour shifts. This schedule was unacceptable to her because she needed to be home in the evenings to care for her husband, who was suffering from severe health problems.
Instead, the plaintiff accepted a position as manager of market administrators. After one year, the plaintiff's supervisor notified her that she was being transferred to the Assessment Center because her position was being consolidated with that of another manager. The person who held the other position was leaving the company. A thirty-five-year-old male, James Aveck, assumed the consolidated position.
Still under the impression that the assessment center's schedule was incompatible with her husband's needs, the plaintiff resigned and accepted early retirement. The plaintiff was forty-nine years old at the time she resigned.
The plaintiff filed suit against Michigan Bell in 1983, alleging constructive discharge and age and sex discrimination. After removal to federal court, reinstatement in state circuit court, summary disposition motions, and mediation, the case was tried by a jury in April, 1991. At the close of the plaintiff's proofs, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, which was taken under advisement by the trial court. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, defendant renewed its motion for directed verdict, which the trial court granted.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict. Although it concluded that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged, it agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff had not proven that age was a determining factor in the defendant's decision. One judge dissented, arguing that the plaintiff had presented adequate evidence of discrimination by discrediting the defendant's explanation of its decision. Citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 2 the dissenting judge argued that, once the employer's explanation was discredited, the jury could, but was not required to, find that the real explanation for the employer's decision was discriminatory.
We granted leave to appeal and consolidated this case with McConnell v. Rollins Burdick Hunter.
A claim of age discrimination may be shown under ordinary principles of proof by the use of direct or indirect evidence. 3 Alternatively, many courts, including this one, 4 have used the prima facie test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green 5 as a framework for evaluating age-discrimination claims. Originally applied to cases of race discrimination, the test has been modified to accommodate cases of age and sex discrimination. 6
The modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie approach requires an employee to show that the employee was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer's adverse conduct.
The purpose of the prima facie test is to 1) remove the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the employer's action, 7 such as poor employee performance, and 2) to force the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. 8 Once the employer produces evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, even if that reason later turns out to be incredible, the presumption of discrimination evaporates. 9
After the employer has met its burden of production, the employee must proceed without the benefit of the earlier presumptions. However, elimination of the presumption does "not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case." 10 As the United States Supreme Court explained:
A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with the effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation.[ 11
Therefore, "the evidence and inferences that properly can be drawn from the evidence presented during the plaintiff's prima facie case may be considered in determining whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual." 12
Once the presumption drops out of the case, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination. Plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the discrimination was defendant's true motive in making the adverse employment decision. 13
To prevail, the employee must submit admissible evidence to prove that the employer's nondiscriminatory reason was not the true reason for the discharge and that the plaintiff's age was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. 14 Thus, the employee must prove that the employer's explanation was a pretext for discrimination. The proofs offered in support of the prima facie case may be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that the employer's stated reason is a pretext, as long as the evidence would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's decision had a discriminatory basis. 15 16
Ultimately, the plaintiff will have the burden of producing evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that proves that discrimination was a determining factor in the employer's decision. Although the majority decision in Hicks appeared to be unambiguous, "many readers have found it to be otherwise." 17
The effect of Hicks on employer-brought summary judgment motions has been a matter of particular debate. Some employers have argued that, in order to defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment, Hicks requires plaintiffs to offer substantial evidence both that the employer's articulated reason was false and that the employer's true reason was discriminatory---i.e., a "pretext-plus" standard. Some plaintiffs, on the other hand, have argued that once a prima facie case of discrimination is put forward, summary judgment for the...
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