Town v. State

• Decision Date: 28 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. S–14–0231.,S–14–0231.
• Citation: 351 P.3d 257,2015 WY 78
• Parties: Christopher Michael TOWN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

351 P.3d 257

2015 WY 78

Christopher Michael TOWN, Appellant (Defendant)

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. S–14–0231.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 28, 2015.

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Olson.

Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Caitlin F. Young, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Young.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.

Opinion

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Appellant, Christopher Town, pled guilty to second degree murder, and was sentenced to serve 75 years to life in prison. He appeals, claiming the district court considered improper evidence in determining his sentence. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Appellant raises two issues:

1. Did plain error occur when statements were allowed during sentencing that were not proper victim impact statements?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing the State to present evidence at sentencing in violation of W.R.Cr.P. 32 ?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On October 3, 2013, the State filed an information charging Appellant with the first degree murder of his estranged wife. In the accompanying Affidavit of Probable Cause, a Cheyenne police detective stated that at approximately 9:00 p.m. on the previous night, a man called 911 and said he had shot and killed his wife. The police arrived at the residence and found Appellant outside. Inside, they discovered the body of Appellant's wife, Crystal Town, a firearm, and empty ammunition casings. A medical response team confirmed that Ms. Town was dead. Appellant remained outside with law enforcement personnel, and was overheard saying “I hurt my family,” and “I apologize for what I did.” Appellant was arrested and jailed.

[¶ 4] Police also located Appellant's ten-year-old daughter, M.T., outside of the residence. According to the affidavit, M.T. was interviewed at the police department. She told the officers she had been at the residence with Appellant, waiting for her mother to come get her. After arriving, Ms. Town and Appellant argued. M.T. said Appellant pulled a gun out of his pocket and shot her mother several times.

[¶ 5] The detective spoke with Appellant's mother shortly after the incident. She reported that Appellant was upset and frustrated by his ongoing divorce. She explained that Appellant wanted to get back together, while Ms. Town was moving forward with the divorce.

[¶ 6] At his arraignment, Appellant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness. Before trial, Appellant reached a plea agreement with the State. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of second degree murder and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of first degree murder. There was no agreement on a recommended sentence. When Appellant offered his guilty plea, the district court questioned him to ascertain a factual basis for the plea. Appellant explained: “Basically, my wife had come home to pick up our daughter. There was a heated discussion, argument; and I shot her.... I pulled out the pistol, and I shot her five times, four times.” The district court accepted the plea of guilty to the charge of second degree murder.

[¶ 7] At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it had reviewed the presentence report, which included several victim impact statements, and asked if Appellant had any objections to the contents of the report. Appellant said he did not. A friend of Appellant, Appellant's mother, and Appellant presented oral statements to the Court. A letter from Appellant's sister was read aloud. Six individuals provided verbal statements to the court during the State's presentation. The State also called a police detective as a witness. He provided additional information regarding the crime and, through him, the State introduced additional evidence. Appellant did not object to this procedure or any of the evidence presented. Appellant's counsel urged the Court to impose a sentence of 20 to 50 years. The State recommended a sentence of 75 years to life.¹

[¶ 8] In its remarks, the district court noted mitigating factors it had considered, including Appellant's “minimal criminal history,” and his acceptance of responsibility for the crime. It concluded, however, that “the aggravating factors in this case vastly outweigh the mitigating factors.” It observed that Appellant “took the life of a completely innocent victim for no apparent reason that the Court can see other than the fact that she had filed for a divorce against you.” Further, the district court stated,

[Y]ou committed this violent and brutal murder in front of your own daughter. She will certainly carry that horrible memory with her for the rest of her life, the recollection of seeing her own father firing multiple shots again and again into her mother as she either fell to or lay on the floor.

The damage that you have inflicted upon your own daughter, to this Court, is incomprehensible and is an extraordinarily aggravating factor in the Court's opinion.

The district court accepted the State's recommendation, and imposed a sentence of 75 years to life. Appellant challenges that decision in this appeal.

DISCUSSION

[¶ 9] In his first issue, Appellant contends that several persons who made statements on behalf of the State during the sentencing hearing do not meet the statutory definition of victims. He claims that the district court should not have considered these statements in determining his sentence. Appellant did not object to the statements during the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we review for plain error. Joreski v. State, 2012 WY 143, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 413, 416 (Wyo.2012).

To establish plain error, the appellant must show 1) the record clearly reflects the incident urged as error; 2) a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) that he was materially prejudiced by the denial of a substantial right. Causey v. State, 2009 WY 111, ¶ 18, 215 P.3d 287, 293 (Wyo.2009). Under the plain error standard of review, we reverse a district court's decision only if it is so plainly erroneous that the judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties failed to raise the issue. Id., ¶ 19, 215 P.3d at 293.

Masias v. State, 2010 WY 81, ¶ 20, 233 P.3d 944, 950 (Wyo.2010).

[¶ 10] The statute at issue, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–103, entitled “Submission of victim impact statement to sentencing court,” reads as follows:

(a) At any hearing to determine, correct or reduce a sentence, an identifiable victim of the crime may submit, orally, in writing or both, a victim impact statement to the court.

(b) Any victim impact statement submitted to the court pursuant to this section shall be among the factors considered by the court in determining the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant or in determining whether there should be a correction or reduction of sentence.

(c) Any failure to comply with the terms of this chapter shall not create a cause for appeal or reduction of sentence for the defendant, or a civil cause of action against any person by the defendant.

The term “victim” is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–101(a)(iii) to mean “an individual who has suffered direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as the result of the commission of a crime or a family member of a minor, incompetent person or a homicide victim.” The term “family member” is defined as “a spouse, child, sibling, parent or legal guardian of a victim.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–101(a)(ii).

[¶ 11] Appellant claims that seven of the persons who offered written or verbal victim impact statements during his sentencing hearing were not “victims,” largely on the basis that they did not meet the definition of a “family member.” He claims that it was plain error for the district court to consider these statements. The State counters that Appellant is overlooking part of the definition of victim: “an individual who has suffered direct or threatened physical, emotional or financial harm as the result of the commission of a crime.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–101(a)(iii). The State points out that, based on this part of the definition, we have previously recognized that non-family members may also qualify as victims if they suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm. Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 14 (Wyo.2000). The State then analyzes the statements challenged by Appellant, and asserts that six of the seven were from “victims” as defined by the statute.

[¶ 12] Both parties seem to accept the premise that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–103 limits the information that may be considered by a sentencing court. An analysis of the text of the statute indicates otherwise. It provides that a victim may give an impact statement to the court, then directs that the impact statement “shall be among the factors considered by the court in determining the sentence.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7–21–103(b). We have repeatedly found the word “shall” in a statute to be mandatory. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family Servs., 2007 WY 189, ¶ 5, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo.2007). Thus, the statute gives victims the right to provide an impact statement and mandates that the sentencing court must consider it. The statute does not, however, prohibit the court from considering statements from individuals who do not meet the statutory definition of victim. It does not limit the court's discretion to consider other relevant information when determining a sentence. Further, the directive of subsection (c) that “[a]ny failure to comply with the terms of this chapter shall not create a cause for appeal or reduction of sentence for the defendant” serves to confirm our conclusion that the purpose of this statute is to establish the rights of crime victims, not to protect convicted defendants.

[¶ 13] This conclusion is consistent with prior cases in which “[w]e have...