Townes v. Murray
| Decision Date | 26 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-4008,93-4008 |
| Citation | 68 F.3d 840 |
| Parties | Richard TOWNES, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edward W. MURRAY, Director, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge PHILLIPS wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER joined. Judge LUTTIG wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
In this habeas proceeding, Richard Townes, Jr. makes several constitutional attacks on his conviction and death sentence for the murder of Virginia Goebel in 1985. His primary claims are that the trial court erred by not conducting an inquiry, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), to determine his competence to represent himself during the sentencing phase of his trial, and, that in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), his sentencing was constitutionally infirm. He also challenges several procedural rulings of the district court leading to that court's dismissal of his habeas petition. We find no error in that dismissal and affirm.
The facts surrounding Virginia Goebel's murder, and Richard Townes's arrest and prosecution for it, are recounted in detail in the published decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987), cert. denied, Townes v. Virginia, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988). To put Townes's claims in context, a brief synopsis of the facts and procedural history is needed.
Sometime during the early morning hours of April 14, 1985, Virginia Goebel, a night shift cashier at a Virginia Beach convenience store, was murdered. The last person other than her murderer to see Goebel alive was Dorothy Moore, a regular customer who on that morning entered the store around 2:00 a.m. As she walked to the rear of the store Moore noticed a man standing "in the back corner ... just watching." After Goebel reassured her that everything was okay, Moore made her purchase and exited. As she drove away, she noticed that the man watched her departure.
Just before 5:00 a.m. Goebel's body, felled by a .45 caliber bullet, was discovered face down behind the counter in a pool of blood. The exact time of death could not be determined.
Evidence implicating Townes came primarily from three sources. First, a state firearms expert determined that an empty shell casing found next to the victim's body matched empty casings from a gun traceable to Townes. Second, customer Moore, although delaying a month before contacting police, did positively identify Townes via photos and a line-up as the man she had seen in the convenience store on the night of Goebel's murder. Finally, inculpating evidence came from Townes's cellmate at the Virginia Beach jail. According to the fellow prisoner, Townes admitted murdering Goebel.
Townes was indicted and tried by the Commonwealth of Virginia for capital murder, as well as robbery and use of a firearm while committing robbery. He was initially represented by the Office of the Public Defender. When the public defender withdrew from the case, the trial court appointed two other attorneys to represent Townes. Subsequently, Townes moved to dismiss the court-appointed counsel, and invoked his right to self-representation guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
The state trial court conducted an extensive and thorough Faretta inquiry to determine if Townes was competent to represent himself. Ultimately, and reluctantly, the court agreed to grant Townes's request and allowed him to proceed pro se. From April 22, 1986, through May 5, 1986, Townes represented himself at his trial to a jury in the Circuit Court, City of Virginia Beach. On May 5, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
Later the same day, a separate sentencing hearing on the murder charge was conducted. The sentencing jury returned a verdict imposing the death penalty based on its finding beyond a reasonable doubt of "a probability that Townes would commit criminal acts of violence which would constitute a continuing serious threat to society"--a "future dangerousness" finding under the Virginia Code. Secs. 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C). On July 15, 1986, the trial judge confirmed the jury verdict and sentenced Townes to death.
Townes appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, raising numerous claims. That court upheld his conviction and sentence and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 362 S.E.2d 650 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988). Townes then sought post-conviction relief by a state habeas proceeding. His petition was dismissed by the trial court, Townes v. Sielaff, Circuit Court No. CL88-2669/F-50028; his petition for appeal was refused by the Supreme Court of Virginia, Townes v. Sielaff, Record No. 901526 (March 20, 1991), and the Supreme Court of the United States again denied certiorari. Townes v. Murray, 502 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 311, 116 L.Ed.2d 253 (1991).
Townes then brought this action for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, challenging on constitutional grounds both his conviction and his death sentence. His principal challenges were to imposition of the death sentence and involved two different aspects of the sentencing phase of his state court trial.
The first consisted of a set of separate but confusedly interrelated claims respecting his alleged incapacity effectively to represent himself and/or his competency to stand trial, in that phase. Specifically, he claimed that the state trial court (1) failed adequately in conducting its pre-trial Faretta inquiry to advise him of the special perils of self-representation at the capital sentencing phase of his trial, if that were reached; (2) failed to conduct a separate Faretta inquiry incident to his self-representation at the sentencing phase, which renewed inquiry was required either as a matter of general Sixth Amendment right in all capital cases or because, in this particular case, Townes suffered an evident loss of capacity for self-representation following return of the jury's guilty verdict; and (3) failed to conduct a competency hearing prior to the sentencing phase of his trial despite his evident loss of legal competency following the jury's guilty verdict.
Townes's second challenge to imposition of the death sentence was a claim that the state trial court violated his right to due process by refusing to instruct the jury of his ineligibility for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment.
Townes's challenges to his conviction included claims of unduly suggestive identification procedures; denial of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution, specifically a post-arrest "lineup"; Brady violations by the withholding of exculpatory evidence; and a plethora of unsupported claims of trial court error.
A magistrate judge considered all the claims asserted in Townes's habeas petition, conducted an evidentiary hearing on the incompetency to stand trial at sentencing claim, and allowed discovery in connection with Townes's Brady claim. He then recommended that all the claims be dismissed on alternative procedural default, Teague "new rule," and merits grounds.
The district court, reviewing the magistrate judge's Report on objections filed by Townes, made de novo findings respecting certain portions objected to, adopted the findings and recommendations in the Report, and dismissed the petition. Preliminarily, the court rejected objections that the magistrate judge erroneously denied discovery of relevant material respecting his Brady claim, and that the magistrate judge should have recused himself for manifest bias, then rejected various objections to the magistrate judge's recommendations for denial of Townes's various constitutional claims respecting the conduct of his state trial.
This appeal followed.
Townes's principal constitutional claims concern his sentencing. He first makes a cluster of related claims concerning the alleged inadequacy of the trial court's Faretta inquiry, and of the trial court's efforts to ascertain his competence both to represent himself, and even to assist in his representation, at sentencing. And, he makes a separate claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by refusing to inform the jury that he would be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole if spared a death sentence. We address the issues raised by these separate claims in turn.
As we have noted, Townes's related Faretta and "competence" claims assert two distinct violations of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and a third related violation of his due process right to a fair trial. First, Townes claims constitutional error in the trial court's failure, during its pre-trial Faretta inquiry, specifically to apprise Townes of the special perils of self-representation he would face during the capital-sentencing phase if convicted. Second, he claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were again violated when the trial court failed to conduct a separate Faretta inquiry after his conviction but...
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