Towns v. Stannard

Decision Date20 December 2019
Docket Number1:16-cv-01545 (BKS/DJS)
Citation431 F.Supp.3d 44
Parties Ramel M. TOWNS , Plaintiff, v. New York State Trooper Theresa STANNARD , Investigator William Shea, Senior Investigator Karl Meybaum, Trooper Matthew Carniglia, and Trooper Timothy Mallory, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Lewis B. Oliver, Jr., Oliver Law Office, 156 Madison Avenue, Albany, New York 12202, for Plaintiff.

Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, Colleen D. Galligan, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ramel M. Towns brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that New York State Troopers Theresa Stannard, Matthew Carniglia, Timothy Mallory, Senior Investigator Karl Meybaum, and Investigator William Shea (collectively "Defendants"), violated his constitutional rights when they detained and searched him following a traffic stop on September 8, 2014 in Warren County, New York. (Dkt. No. 1).1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to illegal detention and unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1, Claims 1, 5, and 9).

Presently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 40, 41). Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. No. 40). Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claims for (1) illegal detention and (2) unlawful search and seizure. (Dkt. No. 41).

For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted as to the equal protection claim and otherwise denied, and Plaintiff's motion is denied.

II. FACTS2

A. The Traffic Stop

On September 8, 2014, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff and James Hairston, both African American, were traveling in a Pontiac Grand Am north along Interstate 87 ("the "Northway"), from the Bronx, New York to Burlington, Vermont (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶¶ 1–3; Dkt. No. 41-2, ¶ 1). While Plaintiff disputes Defendants' assertion that radar clocked the vehicle's speed at 80 mph, Plaintiff, who was in the passenger seat, concedes that the Pontiac "may have been a few miles [per hour] ... above the speed limit." (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 43-1, at 100–01). Defendant Stannard was parked "in a ‘very short U-turn’ between the north and southbound lanes" of the Northway. (Dkt. No. 43-2, at 24). Stannard was "probably twenty-five to thirty feet" from the Pontiac when she "pulled onto the northbound lanes of the Northway, caught up with the car, and pulled it over for speeding." (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 6). According to Plaintiff, considering the short distance and the daylight hours, the fact that Stannard was allegedly trained to "estimate the speed of passing cars without use of a radar or laser speed gun," she "would be able to determine the race or skin color of the occupants of a vehicle." (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 6). Stannard denies being "able to observe the race, ethnicity, or skin color of the occupants of the vehicle as it passed [her]." (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 7).

After Stannard pulled over the Pontiac, she asked Hairston for his license and registration. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 7). After Hairston provided his license, Stannard asked "where he was going." (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 9). Hairston replied that "he was driving [Plaintiff] up to Vermont," (Dkt. No. 43-2, at 32, 42), but that "[h]e did not know where in Vermont" and that "the passenger was telling him where to go." (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 9). Stannard "ran Hairston's license and registration and discovered that his license was suspended and that his registration had lapsed for lack of insurance." ( Id. ¶ 10). Stannard returned to the vehicle, "explained that [Hairston's] license was suspended," and advised Hairston that he would be arrested for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle and taken to court for arraignment. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 11).

Stannard then asked Plaintiff for his identification; Plaintiff, who did not have a driver's license, provided his "New York State issued Non-Driver Identification." (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶¶ 10–11). According to Stannard, approximately fifteen minutes had passed from when she "saw Hairston speeding" until she asked Plaintiff for identification. (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 14). During that time, she became suspicious that they might be engaged in some type of criminal activity because "[t]he driver and the passenger did not really know each other, the driver did not know where they were going in Vermont, they provided conflicting information and they seemed to have no purpose for their trip." ( Id. ¶ 14). Stannard asserts that Hairston and Plaintiff "exhibited suspicious behavior" because "Hairston was not a taxi driver or anything like that" and because driving from the Bronx to Vermont "is not really a quick trip." (Dkt. No. 43-2, at 42–43). Plaintiff disputes that there was any conflicting information provided and denies that they had provided no reason for their trip.3

Next, Stannard requested assistance from New York State Troopers. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 16). According to Stannard, she needed assistance to transport Plaintiff off the Northway while she transported Hairston to the barracks to be processed, because pedestrians are prohibited from walking along the highway. (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶¶ 16–17). While she waited for assistance, Stannard processed the tickets she issued to Hairston for his traffic infractions. (Dkt. No. 45-1 ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 18). Hairston and Plaintiff remained in the front seats of the vehicle. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 20).

Defendants Shea, Maybaum and Mallory arrived approximately 15 to 20 minutes after Stannard's request for assistance. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 19; Dkt. No. 40-6, ¶ 4). Stannard informed the responding officers that she had stopped the Pontiac for speeding and "discovered the driver's license was suspended" and "the vehicle registration had lapsed." (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 27). Shea approached Hairston, "asked him basic questions, such as where he was headed, and had the impression he was not truthful." (Dkt. No. 40-3, ¶ 8).4 Stannard and Shea arrested and searched Hairston. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30). Plaintiff remained in the passenger seat of the vehicle while Hairston was searched and arrested. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 31).

At this point, according to both Mallory and Plaintiff, Shea questioned Plaintiff about his trip. (Dkt. No. 40-6, ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 45-3, ¶ 10). Here, the parties' versions of events diverge. Plaintiff states that after he was questioned by Shea, "approximately 30-40 minutes after the traffic stop began," Shea ordered Mallory to "handcuff[ ] [Plaintiff] with [his] hands behind [his] back." (Dkt. No. 45-3, at ¶¶ 10–11). Plaintiff was then "removed from the [Pontiac], patted-down," and told to sit on the front of a trooper's car. (Dkt. No. 42-2, at 109). Plaintiff asserts that he remained handcuffed until his arrest at 1:48 p.m. (Dkt. No. 45-3, ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 61). Plaintiff asserts that the way in which he was handcuffed caused him "significant wrist and shoulder pain," and that his request to have his hands cuffed in front were denied, along with requests for water and to use the bathroom. (Dkt. No. 45-3, ¶ 19). According to Defendants, however, while Plaintiff was talking with Shea, he was outside, not in a car, and not handcuffed. (Dkt. No. 40-6, ¶¶ 9–10). The parties agree that Plaintiff was placed in Mallory's patrol car before the inventory search of the Pontiac but dispute whether he was handcuffed at that time. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 32; Dkt. No. 40-6, ¶ 10).

B. The Search of the Pontiac

Stannard and Shea conducted an inventory search of Hairston's Pontiac incident to Hairston's arrest and in anticipation of towing the car from the Northway. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 33).5 The inventory search occurred from approximately 11:15 a.m. until 12:05 p.m. ( Id. ). Defendants state that they found "marijuana shake" in the vehicle and detected the smell of marijuana during the inventory search. (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 23). Plaintiff disputes that shake was discovered; he cites to conflicting descriptions of where the shake was found and asserts that the Defendants failed to "collect, photograph, or otherwise document" the shake. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 34). During the inventory search Hairston was taken out of the patrol car for a second search, and Shea found a small baggie with marijuana in Hairston's mouth. (Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 24). According to Defendants, Hairston said that Plaintiff gave him the marijuana. (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 24).6

Plaintiff asserts that he "continued to be repeatedly searched by Defendants." (Dkt. No. 45-3, ¶ 15). Plaintiff claims that Defendants told Plaintiff that "they would take him to the hospital for an x-ray, and that they called a canine which would find whatever [he] was hiding." (Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff feared for his safety because of the officers' threats. (Id. ¶ 16). After being searched "for what seemed like the dozenth time," Plaintiff said something to the effect of, "again?" to which the trooper searching him responded by saying "it's not like it's because you're black." (Id. ¶ 17). While Plaintiff was being detained, he was never told he was free to leave and was never told he was under arrest. (Id. ¶ 20).

At approximately 12:00 p.m., Stannard requested a tow truck to have the vehicle removed from the Northway.7 (Dkt. No. 40-2, ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 45-1, ¶ 24). At some point, Stannard also called Carniglia, who "exclusively worked in narcotic and marijuana detection using a canine drug dog named Dale."8 (Dkt. No. 41-2, ¶ 9).9 When Carniglia arrived with Dale, he proceeded to use Dale to inspect the car for narcotics. (Dkt. No. 41-2, ¶¶ 21, 26). With Carniglia leading her, Dale...

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