Townsend v. City of Chester, CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1023
Decision Date | 29 July 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-1023 |
Parties | DAVID TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHESTER, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff David Townsend, acting pro se, brings claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law, stemming from an allegedly unlawful search and arrest by Defendant Officer Bradley Waltman of the Chester Police Department. Officer Waltman and additional Defendant the City of Chester each move to dismiss the Complaint. For the following reasons, I will grant the City of Chester's Motion to Dismiss in its entirety, grant in part and deny in part Officer Waltman's Motion to Dismiss, and grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint as to certain of the dismissed claims.
The Complaint sets forth the following facts:1
Plaintiff now alleges that Officer Waltman initiated the criminal proceedings by falsely claiming, in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, that Plaintiff owned the marijuana and firearm, when in fact Officer Waltman did not know who actually owned these items. He also claims that OfficerWaltman has a long history of racially profiling young African-American males as criminals. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant City of Chester knew and allowed its officers to racially profile young African-American males as criminals and failed to properly train, discipline, and supervise its officers. (Id. ¶¶ 10-27.)
On August 8, 2017, Officer Waltman requested a search warrant to search for marijuana, drug proceeds, and/or other drug paraphernalia from a white 2000 Chevrolet Impala. In the Affidavit of Probable Cause, he alleged that members of the Chester Police Department were patrolling the Chester Apartments, an area known for extensive drug activity. While at the Chester Apartment area, Officer Waltman observed "a group of black males loitering around a white Chevrolet Impala that was backed into a parking space." As he approached the group one of the men All four windows to the vehicle were rolled down. (Waltman Mot., Ex. B.)
Officer Waltman exited his unmarked police vehicle and walked around the Chevrolet Impala, at which time he detected the smell of marijuana coming from the vehicle. There was also a bottle of liquor on the driver's seat. Around the same time, Officer Dougherty and his K-9 partner Mickey responded to the scene. Mickey did an open air sniff and signaled that there was illegal contraband in the car. The officers requested a tow truck to tow the Impala pending a search warrant. (Id.)
The Affidavit then states that Plaintiff, who was one of the males seen loitering around this vehicle, walked over to the officers stating, "that's my car, what's the problem." After Officer Waltman explained the current situation, Plaintiff quickly advised that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, who lets him drive the vehicle, and he "had it for the day." Plaintiff turned over the keys to the vehicle before it was towed. The officers later learned that the vehicle belonged to an Erin Walls. (Id.)
The Criminal Complaint against Plaintiff charged one count each of (1) person not to possess, use, etc. firearms, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105; (2) firearms not to be carried without a license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a); (3) receiving stolen property, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925; (4) knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance without authorization; and (5) drug possession, small amount. According to the Criminal Complaint, a search of the Impala revealed: a Pennsylvania state ACCESS card belonging to Plaintiff, a social security card belonging to Plaintiff, a piece of mail addressed to Plaintiff, a white Samsung Galaxy S5 cell phone, a silver Samsung Galaxy S8 cell phone, a clear zip lock bag containing seven small clear zip lock bags of marijuana, a knotted clear plastic bag containingeleven 25 auto bullets, and a black Phoenix Arms .25 cal. A.C.P. Model HP25A firearm containing eight rounds and one live round in the chamber. (Def. Waltman's Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C.)
On March 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed his federal Complaint alleging the following claims against Officer Waltman: false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, libel, slander per se, negligent performance of duties, a selective enforcement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, violation of rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiff further claims that the City of Chester is liable for negligent performance of duties, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Defendants each filed a Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed no response.3
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations omitted). "[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678-79 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. A complaint does not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 679.
The Court of Appeals has detailed a three-step process to determine whether a complaint meets the pleadings standard. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2014). First, the court outlines the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief. Id. at 365. Next, the court must "peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. Finally, the court "look[s] for well-pled factual allegations, assume[s] their veracity, and then 'determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The last step is "'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A pro se complaint should be "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., Pa., 599 F.2d 573, 575 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972)). The court must construe the facts stated in the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, even a pro se complaint must conform with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" or "naked assertions" that are devoid of "factualenhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or ...
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