Townsend v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.

Decision Date27 March 2007
Docket NumberNo. 4:06-CV-486-A.,4:06-CV-486-A.
Citation481 F.Supp.2d 610
PartiesCharles Trent TOWNSEND, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

David M. Glenn, Law Office of David M. Glenn, Grapevine, TX, Timothy Bryan Smith, Law Office of Tim Smith, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiffs.

David Schulte, Steven Ray Baggett, Thompson & Knight, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

McBRYDE, District Judge.

On January 31, 2007, defendant, The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company ("Goodyear"), moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted by plaintiffs, Charles Trent Townsend and Jackie Townsend, individually, and as representatives of the estate of Trevor Townsend, deceased, ("plaintiffs"), in the above-captioned action. Having considered the motion, the response, the reply, the summary-judgment evidence, and the applicable legal authorities, the court concludes that the motion should be granted for the reasons stated below.

I. Plaintiffs' Claims

On May 31, 2006, plaintiffs filed their original petition in state court against Goodyear.1 Plaintiffs alleged Goodyear is liable for damages caused by injuries resulting in the death of Trevor Townsend ("Trevor") and sought recovery under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 71.001-12, 71.021 (Vernon 1997). Charles Trent Townsend and Jackie Townsend, who are the parents of Trevor, contend that Goodyear has liability because Trevor was not properly trained to perform the tire installation activities in which he was engaged when he was injured, and that the equipment he Was using to change tires, the procedure he used to change tires, and the supervision he received in his work were inadequate.

II. Background

The facts set forth below are undisputed in the summary judgment record:

A. Trevor's Accident

On October 14, 2004, Trevor was fatally injured in an accident at Prine, Inc. d/b/a Granbury Tire Center ("Prine"), his place of employment. Trevor's injuries were sustained while he was attempting to install tires, manufactured by Goodyear, on a customer's motor home. At the time of his accident, Trevor was 21 years old and had worked for Prine for three months. Prior to working for Prine, Trevor had no received no training on how to change tires on a motor home. While working for Prim, Trevor received assistance from a Prine employee in changing tires on a motor home on two occasions prior to his accident.

B. The Dealer Agreement and the License

In April of 2004, Prine and Goodyear entered into a Dealer Agreement (the "Dealer Agreement") under which Prine became a non-exclusive authorized dealer of Goodyear tires. The Dealer Agreement specifically stated that "Dealer acknowledges and agrees that it is an independent contractor and nothing contained herein shall be construed to constitute or deem either party as an agent, employee, representative, partner, joint venturer, or other associate of the other." App. in Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 67.

In addition to the Dealer Agreement, Goodyear and Prine were operating under a Goodyear Gemini Retail Marketing System and Service Mark License (the "License"). Id. at 5. The License enabled Prine to use Goodyear's "Gemini" Service mark in connection with certain "Licensed Services". Id. Such Licensed Services were listed in Exhibit D to the License.2

The License also contained a requirement that Prine have trained technicians performing the Licensed Services. The License provided that,

1. Licensee agrees that at all times during the effective term of this Agreement it will retain in its employment adequately trained automotive technicians to proficiently perform all of the automotive services identified in [Exhibit D] of this Agreement.

...

2. To facilitate its performance of licensed services under the [Gemini Service] Mark in accordance with Goodyear's standards, Licensee agrees that it will provide the following personnel training as outlined in (Exhibit E), as long as the Agreement is in force.

App. in Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 6.3 The License does not specifically require any training courses on safety or on any subject outside the scope of the Licensed Services, but it does provide that "[p]ersonnel standards and training requirements in addition to those outlined in this Article may be required as new automotive service needs become apparent." Id. at 6. The License does not mandate that Prine's technicians use Goodyear training courses, and it allows Prine to decide what training to provide its employees so long as the training met certain criteria.

The License states that Prine will satisfy general cleanliness standards and will "maintain adequate equipment, tools and trained personnel" to perform the Licensed Services. Id. at 5. Article VII of the License, entitled "Quality Standards", provides in pertinent part that:

It is understood that Goodyear shall at all times have the sole responsibility for determining whether or not its automotive service standards are being met. To facilitate Goodyear's evaluation of the quality of the automotive service work being performed by Licensee under the [Gemini Service] Mark, Goodyear's authorized representatives shall at all times have a right to make inspections and to observe the automotive service work performed by Licensee and its employees. Such inspections shall also confirm equipment requirements, equipment calibration, and availability of required service tools as well as verifying the capabilities of automotive technicians and their ability to use the required equipment. Licensee will cooperate with Goodyear's representatives to facilitate their inspections to assure that industry standards are being maintained.

Id. The License does not state that Goodyear would be in charge of Prine's daily activities with respect to the Licensed Services.

C. Goodyear's Involvement with Prine's Facilities

Goodyear was not involved in who Prine chose to hire, nor did Goodyear participate in Prine's training of its employees. Patrick Prine owned the premises on which Prine's business was conducted. Goodyear did not tell Prine what jacks or other equipment had to be used to change tires, and did not provide any equipment to be used to change tires at Prine's facility. Goodyear did not have any of its personnel present at Prine's facility to oversee any of the work done there.

The documents Trevor filled out and received when he began his employment with Prine showed that Prine was his employer. The paychecks that Trevor received for his work showed that his wages came from Prine. The only training and supervision Trevor received in relation to his job was from other Prine employees.

The Dealer Agreement and the License permitted Prine to display Goodyear signage, including the Gemini service logo, in connection with its promotion of products. Goodyear intended this advertising to be directed to the general public. Goodyear did not provide Trevor with any information intended to cause Trevor to believe that Goodyear was his employer or was somehow responsible for his training and safety with respect to his work activities.

III. The Motion for Summary Judgment

Goodyear maintains that plaintiffs' claims cannot survive summary judgment because: (1) Goodyear did not owe a duty to Trevor to exercise care for his safety, and (2) Goodyear is not vicariously liable for Prine's conduct. As to its duty ground, Goodyear maintains that there was no relationship between it and Trevor that would cause it to have an obligation to exercise care for Trevor's safety, that the doctrine of inherently dangerous activities does not apply, and that even if the doctrine did apply it would not create a duty on the part of Goodyear to exercise care for Trevor's safety. In support of its nonvicarious liability ground, Goodyear contends that Prine was not its agent for whose conduct it could be held liable and that the doctrine of apparent authority does not apply.

IV. Applicable Summary Judgment Principles

A party' is entitled to summary judgment on all or any part of a claim as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact and as to which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The movant may discharge this burden by pointing out the absence of evidence to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548; 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials of pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To meet this burden, the nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence support[s][its] claim[s]." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). An issue is material only if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Unsupported allegations, conclusory in nature, are insufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir.1984). "`Summary judgement, to be sure, may be appropriate,...

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