Townsend v. Quern
| Decision Date | 28 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 68 C 2134.,68 C 2134. |
| Citation | 473 F. Supp. 193 |
| Parties | Georgia TOWNSEND et al., Plaintiffs, v. Arthur F. QUERN et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Michael R. Lefkow, James O. Latturner, Legal Assistance Foundation, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., for defendants; William A. Wenzel, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Motion for Notice to Class
This motion arises out of a class action brought by plaintiffs in 1968, challenging the validity of Article IV, § 4-1.1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967) ch. 23, § 4-1.1 and Illinois Public Aid regulation 150, promulgated thereunder. Section 4-1.1 provided that needy children who are deprived of parental support, are between eighteen and twenty-one years old and are in regular attendance in high school, vocational school or technical training school are eligible to receive aid to families with dependent children benefits (AFDC). Plaintiffs alleged that Section 4-1.1 was inconsistent with Section 406(a)(2) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(2), in its provision of AFDC benefits for children between 18 and 21 attending high school, vocational school and technical school, while excluding those in the same age group attending college. Plaintiffs challenged Section 4-1.1 as void under the supremacy and equal protection clauses.
The issues raised by defendants' objections to the pending motion must be considered in view of the procedural history of this case. On March 26, 1969, we denied defendants' motion to dismiss and strike, convened a three-judge court and granted the motion of plaintiffs Georgia Townsend and her daughter, Omega Minor, to intervene individually and as members of the class. Alexander v. Swank, 314 F.Supp. 1078 (N.D.Ill.1969). On April 30, 1970, the three-judge court dismissed this action, thereby upholding the policy of the Department of Public Aid under Section 4-1.1. Alexander v. Swank, 314 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D.Ill.1970). The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the three-judge court on December 20, 1971, holding that the Illinois policy was violative of the supremacy clause. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971). On January 7, 1972, the mandate of the Supreme Court was filed with this Court and on January 21, 1972, this Court entered an order granting plaintiffs prospective relief.
We were then left with the question of whether to order retroactive relief, in the form of an injunction requiring defendants to notify members of the plaintiff class that they are entitled to an AFDC grant for the period in which they were wrongfully denied benefits. On June 30, 1972, we rendered a Memorandum Opinion which held that plaintiffs were entitled to retroactive relief. Alexander v. Weaver, 345 F.Supp. 666 (N.D.Ill.1972). Retroactive relief was ordered in November 1972. Defendants mistakenly appealed the order to the Supreme Court. On May 29, 1973, the Supreme Court remanded the cause to this Court for a fresh judgment to enable defendants to properly bring their appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Edelman v. Townsend, 412 U.S. 914, 93 S.Ct. 2733, 37 L.Ed.2d 141 (1973). A new judgment was entered in July 1973, again ordering retroactive relief.
On March 25, 1974, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling in a similar case that retroactive relief was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The Supreme Court remanded Edelman to the District Court, Judge Will presiding, for further proceedings. On the basis of Edelman, the Court of Appeals reversed this Courts' award of retroactive relief in the case at bar. Townsend v. Edelman, 518 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1975). The ruling of the Court of Appeals was entered on June 2, 1975. On July 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate for thirty days, pending application by plaintiffs for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Plaintiffs did not apply for certiorari, the stay expired on August 1, 1975 and the mandate of the Court of Appeals was filed with this Court on September 5, 1975.
Meanwhile, on remand from Edelman v. Jordan, supra, Judge Will ordered the defendants in that case to give the plaintiff class members notice of their right to seek retroactive payment through state administrative procedures. Jordan v. Trainor, 405 F.Supp. 802 (N.D.Ill.1976). Judge Will stayed his order, however, pending appeal.
On September 10, 1976, shortly after Judge Will issued his order in Jordan v. Trainor, supra, plaintiffs filed the motion now pending in this case. Plaintiffs then sought essentially the same relief granted in Jordan, which is markedly similar to the case at bar in issues of remedy. Both cases share many of the same defendants. At that time, defendants did not contest plaintiffs' motion, but rather agreed with plaintiffs and this Court that a ruling should be deferred until the appeal of Judge Will's order was finally resolved.
In Jordan v. Trainor, 551 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1977), a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Judge Will's order. Rehearing en banc was granted on April 25, 1977 and on October 19, 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed the panel decision and affirmed the order of Judge Will, subject to certain modifications. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and on March 5, 1979, affirmed the en banc ruling of the Court of Appeals. Quern v. Jordan, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Jordan is currently pending before Judge Will on remand from the Supreme Court.
Pending before this Court is plaintiffs' motion of September 10, 1976, for notice to the class. Upon reviewing the most recent pronouncement from the Supreme Court in Quern v. Jordan, supra, and the Court of Appeals' 1975 ruling in the case at bar, we are now prepared to issue a decision on plaintiffs' motion, which we believe will set this case on the final leg of its long journey to resolution.
It is important to clarify exactly what form of notice to their class members plaintiffs now seek. Plaintiffs concede, as they must in light of Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1977) and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), that the form of notice contemplated by Judge Will (405 F.Supp. at 809-810) is violative of the Eleventh Amendment. On the other hand, there is no question that a modified form of that notice, as expressed by the Court of Appeals in its en banc opinion and by the Supreme Court in its affirmance, is constitutionally proper if ancillary to prospective relief.
Both Courts contemplate an order that contains no admission by the State of Illinois that each member of the plaintiff class was denied public benefits to which he or she was entitled. 563 F.2d at 875. In the words of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, the notice may simply inform "class members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue." 99 S.Ct. at 1149.
Although plaintiffs have submitted no draft of the notice they move this Court to order, plaintiffs concede that the notice must be fashioned within the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment, in accord with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Quern v. Jordan, supra. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs' motion for notice to the class is granted.
Essentially, defendants' objections to plaintiffs' motion for notice are threefold. Defendants first contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs' motion because the mandate of the Court of Appeals, filed with this Court on September 5, 1975, was the final resolution of this case. Second, defendants argue that plaintiffs are guilty of laches by filing their motion a year after the mandate of the Court of Appeals was filed in district court. Finally, defendants assert that to order notice to the members of the plaintiff class at this late date would work an unreasonable burden on defendants. Defendants ask that, should we determine that plaintiffs' motion is properly before us, we grant defendants sufficient time to muster evidence of the economic and administrative burdens that would result from notice relief.
Defendants first argue that this case was closed when the Court of Appeals reversed our order granting retroactive relief and the mandate of the Court of Appeals was filed with this Court on September 5, 1975. Essentially, defendants contend that the mandate of the Court of Appeals, reversing this Court's order without remanding the cause for further proceedings, was a "final decision" which "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the trial court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). Defendants, therefore, seek to bar further proceedings in this matter on the ground of res judicata.
Although defendants concede that the District Court in Jordan is presently considering granting relief similar to that which plaintiffs seek here, defendants point out two distinguishing factors between the procedural posture of that case and the case at bar. In Jordan, the Supreme Court reversed the order of retroactive relief and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. Edelman v. Jordan, supra. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals issued no instructions to the District Court when it reversed the order of the District Court, except to stay the mandate to allow plaintiffs to request review by the Supreme Court. Defendants contend that the reversal without remand in 518 F.2d 116 caused the Court of Appeals' decision to be the law of the case. Clark v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 328 F.2d...
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