Townsend v. Townsend
Decision Date | 18 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 24484,24484 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | Paul J. TOWNSEND, III and John C. Broome, Appellants, v. Viola W. TOWNSEND and Providencia Townsend, Respondents. . Heard |
John C. Broome, of Broome & Broome, Columbia, for Appellants.
Deena Smith McRackan, Charleston, for Respondents.
In this action for reduction of his child support obligation, Appellant Paul Townsend ("Father") appeals the family court's denials of a motion for continuance and of a motion to disqualify herself as judge. The attorney who initially represented Father in the action below, Appellant John Broome ("Lawyer"), appeals the family court's rulings removing him as Father's counsel and granting attorney's fees in connection with a motion to reconsider Lawyer's removal from the case. We affirm.
Father brought this action against Respondent Viola Townsend ("Mother") for a reduction of his child support obligations. Father was represented by Lawyer. Mother counterclaimed for college support for her daughter Providencia ("Daughter"), who was attending the University of South Carolina. Daughter was later joined in the action.
A final hearing in the matter began on August 15, 1994. That day, the judge denied Father's motion for a continuance to complete discovery and his motion for the judge to recuse herself because of her childhood acquaintance with Mother. Later in the day, after learning Lawyer had served as guardian ad litem for Daughter in a custody proceeding a few years earlier, the judge on her own motion removed Lawyer as Father's counsel and stopped the hearing.
In October 1994, new counsel for Father was substituted with Lawyer's consent. In early December 1994, the hearing on the merits of the child support and college support action was held. Also in early December, Lawyer moved on his own behalf for reconsideration of the judge's order removing him from the case. The judge found Lawyer lacked standing to bring the motion. The judge also granted Mother attorney's fees, to be paid by Lawyer, for her expenses in defending the motion for reconsideration.
Attorney and Father both appeal.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Father argues the family court erred in denying his motion for a continuance of the August 15 hearing and in denying his motion for the judge to recuse herself. We find that A denial of a motion for disqualification of a judge is an interlocutory order not affecting the merits and, thus, is reviewable only on appeal from a final order. Rogers v. Wilkins, 275 S.C. 28, 267 S.E.2d 86 (1980). Father has not appealed from the final order; in fact, the Record contains no copy of the final order. Accordingly, we regard Father's appeal as interlocutory and need not reach this question. In any case, the judge conducted a full hearing on this issue. The Record contains no evidence of bias, so there is no substantive error here. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 319 S.C. 324, 461 S.E.2d 39 (1995) ( ); Rogers, 275 S.C. 28, 267 S.E.2d 86 ( ).
both these issues are procedurally barred. Furthermore, Father's arguments lack substantive merit.
Like an order denying a motion for disqualification of a judge, an order denying a motion for a continuance is an interlocutory order not affecting the merits and, thus, is not immediately appealable. E.g., Crout v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 278 S.C. 120, 293 S.E.2d 422 (1982). Therefore, we need not reach this issue. In any case, we will not set aside a judge's ruling on a motion for a continuance unless it clearly appears there was an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the movant. E.g., Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414 S.E.2d 144 (1992); Hudson v. Blanton, 282 S.C. 70, 316 S.E.2d 432 (Ct.App.1984). After the judge determined Lawyer should be removed from the case, the judge stopped the hearing. Although new counsel for Father was appointed in early October, the final hearing was held entirely anew in early December. Father's new counsel had ample time to complete any necessary discovery. The Record shows no prejudice.
Lawyer argues the family court judge erred in removing him from the case and in granting Wife attorney's fees in connection with Lawyer's motion to reconsider his removal as Father's counsel. We disagree.
After the family court ordered Lawyer to cease his representation of Father, Lawyer moved on his own behalf for reconsideration of the family court order. The family court denied Lawyer's motion, finding he lacked standing to challenge the order. Lawyer argues that his pecuniary interest in continuing to represent his client vested him with standing. We disagree.
To have standing, one must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit; i.e., one must be the "real party in interest." E.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 312 S.C. 454, 441 S.E.2d 325 (1994). A real party in interest is one who "has a real, actual, material or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as distinguished from one who has only a nominal, formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the action." Id. at 458, 441 S.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added).
In Bailey, two attorneys represented a wife in divorce proceedings. The family court approved a divorce settlement between the husband and wife, but shortly thereafter, the husband brought an action for relief from the divorce settlement order. Eventually, the woman discharged her two attorneys and retained different counsel. The husband and wife then entered into a different agreement "restructuring" the prior agreement. The family court approved this new agreement.
The wife's former attorneys then moved the family court to reconsider its approval of the new agreement on the ground that the husband and wife's failure to give the attorneys notice of the agreement substantially prejudiced the attorneys' interest in collecting their fees. The family court allowed the attorneys to intervene, but this Court reversed. The Court found that "the real interest lies in the parties in the divorce Bailey controls here. The present lawsuit concerns the rights and responsibilities of Mother, Father, and Daughter as pertains to child support and college support. The real interest that is implicated by the judge's removal of Lawyer as Father's counsel is Father's interest in having the attorney of his choice, not Lawyer's interest in making more money. Father was quite free to move for reconsideration of the family court's order removing Lawyer. He did not. Lawyer has no independent right to do so; therefore, the family court correctly found Lawyer lacks standing to challenge his removal.
action" and that the attorneys' interest in protection of their fee was "peripheral" and "not the real interest at stake." Id.
Additionally, Lawyer signed a form consenting to the substitution of other counsel. Given his consent to the substitution, we cannot see how Lawyer can now complain about his removal from the case.
Lawyer had served as Daughter's guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding a few years prior to Father's bringing this action for reduction of child support. The family court judge found that Lawyer's service as Daughter's guardian ad litem created a conflict of interest that prevented Lawyer from representing Father in this action.
Lawyer argues the family court erred in holding he had a conflict of interest and in removing him as Father's counsel. Although, as noted above, Lawyer lacks standing to make this argument, we reach the issue in order to clarify for the Bench and Bar some of the ethical and other responsibilities of attorney guardians ad litem in the context of custody or support actions. 1 We find Lawyer had a conflict of interest in representing Father after having served as Daughter's guardian ad litem in a custody case. Accordingly, the family court's ruling on Lawyer's removal was correct.
Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR, provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.
Lawyer argues this rule is inapplicable for two reasons: (1) there is no attorney-client relationship between a child and the child's guardian ad litem; and (2) the present action, which concerns child support and college support, is not "substantially related" to the custody action in which Attorney served as guardian ad litem for Daughter.
Lawyer is technically correct that guardians ad litem do not have attorney-client relationships with the children whose best interests they seek to protect. See, e.g., Jennings v. Dargan, 308 S.C. 317, 417 S.E.2d 646 (Ct.App.1992) (). Nevertheless, a guardian ad litem's ultimate responsibility is to assist the Court in protecting the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Shainwald v. Shainwald, 302 S.C. 453, 395 S.E.2d 441 (Ct.App.1990). The ways in which a guardian ad litem accomplishes that ultimate responsibility will vary depending on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Generally, however, a guardian ad litem must perform two distinct functions: (1) ascertaining the best...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hagood v. Sommerville
...liability and damages in personal injury case is not immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right); Townsend v. Townsend, 323 S.C. 309, 312, 474 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1996) (denial of motions for disqualification of a judge and for a continuance are interlocutory orders not affecting ......
-
Baird v. Charleston County, 24885.
...of the lawsuit, i.e., one must be a real party in interest.7 Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 478 S.E.2d 841 (1996); Townsend v. Townsend, 323 S.C. 309, 474 S.E.2d 424 (1996). A real party in interest is one with a real, material, or substantial interest. Anchor Point Inc. v. Shoals Sewer Co.......
-
In re L.H., 17–240
...to the children in a custody action could not subsequently represent the father in a proceeding to reduce his child support. 323 S.C. 309, 474 S.E.2d 424 (1996). The court concluded that the two matters were substantially related; that despite the lawyer's contention that he did not use any......
-
Moore v. Moore
...of the order. Accordingly, Husband was not prejudiced by going forward with the emergency hearing. Townsend v. Townsend, 323 S.C. 309, 313, 474 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1996) (finding appellate court will not set aside a court's ruling on a motion for a continuance unless it clearly appears there w......