Township of Holly v. Holly Disposal, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 93794,No. 119028,93794,119028
• Parties: TOWNSHIP OF HOLLY, a Michigan municipal corporation, Township of Grand Blanc, a Michigan municipal corporation, City of Grand Blanc, a Michigan municipal corporation, City of Burton, a Michigan municipal corporation, and Mt. Holly Ski Area, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOLLY DISPOSAL, INC., a Michigan corporation, and William H. Leoni, Sr., Individually, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees, and Michigan Department of Natural Resources a/k/a Natural Resources Commission, Howard A. Tanner or his successor Ronald Skook, Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Defendants. COA
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 753

487 N.W.2d 753

440 Mich. 891

TOWNSHIP OF HOLLY, a Michigan municipal corporation,

Township of Grand Blanc, a Michigan municipal corporation,

City of Grand Blanc, a Michigan municipal corporation, City

of Burton, a Michigan municipal corporation, and Mt. Holly

Ski Area, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOLLY DISPOSAL, INC., a Michigan corporation, and William H.

Leoni, Sr., Individually, Jointly and Severally,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

Michigan Department of Natural Resources a/k/a Natural

Resources Commission, Howard A. Tanner or his

successor Ronald Skook, Director of the

Michigan Department of Natural

Resources, Defendants.

No. 93794.

COA No. 119028.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 7, 1992.

ORDER

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal and the motion to reinstate injunctive relief are considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(F)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the judgments of the Court of Appeals, 189 Mich.App. 581, 473 N.W.2d 778, and we GRANT, in part, the motion to reinstate injunctive relief. The granting of injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the trial court, although the decision must not be arbitrary and must be based on the facts of the particular case. Roy v. Chevrolet Motor Car Company, 262 Mich. 663, 668, 247 N.W. 774 (1933). On the record presented here, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we REINSTATE the judgment of the Oakland Circuit Court, except insofar as the judgment precluded the Department of Natural Resources from considering a future application from the defendants to operate a landfill at the site in question. The defendants may file such a future application, and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources may act upon it, provided that all statutory and administrative requirements are satisfied, including the requirement of proper notice.

LEVIN, J., dissents and states as follows:

I would deny or grant leave to appeal. I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required. ¹ In the instant case, as indicated in the peremptory order, factual and legal assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.

Further, this Court's peremptory disposition does not comport with the requirements of Const. 1963, art. 6, Sec. 6, which requires that "[d]ecisions of the supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision...."

The order of peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals does not contain any statement of facts or an adequate statement of reasons for decision; the statement that "we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion" is conclusory, delphic, and inscrutable. The constitution requires a statement of facts and reasons that is scrutable. The departure from the constitutional requirement is apparent upon examination of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 189 Mich.App. 581, 473 N.W.2d 778 (1991), the substance of which is set forth in the syllabus:

"Holly Township and others filed complaints in the Oakland Circuit Court against the Department of Natural Resources, Holly Disposal, Inc., and William H. Leoni, Sr., challenging the issuance of a permit by the DNR to Holly Disposal and Leoni to construct and operate a solid waste landfill on the ground that notice of the application was never published in a newspaper and seeking relief. The court, Fred M. Mester, J., found that the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MCL 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528(201) et seq., had been violated and that the permit was not validly issued, and issued a permanent injunction barring Holly Disposal and Leoni from constructing or operating the landfill and the DNR from issuing a permit for the landfill. Holly Disposal and Leoni appealed.

"The Court of Appeals held:

"1. Neither the Michigan Environmental Protection Act nor the Solid Waste Management Act, MCL 299.401 et seq.; MSA 13.29(1) et seq., require the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.

"2. Because this was not an action for a declaratory judgment, the plaintiffs were not required to obtain a ruling from the appropriate administrative agency regarding the validity of the rules promulgated under the Solid Waste Management Act, pursuant to MCL 24.264; MSA 3.560(164), before having the validity of the rules determined by the trial court.

"3. There was a lack of substantial compliance with the notification provisions of the Solid Waste Management Act, and material prejudice resulted from the lack of notice. The permit therefore was not authorized by law and is invalid. Thus, the trial court never should have reached the issue whether a permanent injunction should have been issued. The permanent injunction must be vacated and the case remanded to the DNR for issuance of notice of the permit...