Tracy v. SSM Cardinal Glennon Children's Hosp.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:15-CV-1513 CAS,4:15-CV-1513 CAS |
| Parties | RACHEL TRACY, individually and in her capacity as next friend of D.T., an infant, Plaintiffs, v. SSM CARDINAL GLENNON CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on motions to dismiss plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint ("complaint") filed by defendants (1) SSM Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital, Dr. Ayoob Ali, and Dr. Mohamad Al-Hosni (collectively the "Hospital defendants"); (2) Brian Kinkade, in his official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, Children's Division; and (3) Samuel Dotson, III, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department of the City of St. Louis. Plaintiffs oppose the motions and they are fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motions to dismiss. Because all federal claims will be dismissed and there is no other basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining state law claim and will dismiss it without prejudice.
According to the complaint, this action Complaint ¶ 1 (Doc. 59).1
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts state law claims for false imprisonment against defendants SSM Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital, Dr. Ali, Dr. Al-Hosni, and Amy Meyer in Count I; for medical malpractice against the Hospital, Dr. Ali and Dr. Al-Hosni in Count II; and federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for violations of plaintiffs' due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution and conspiracy to violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights, against the Hospital, Dr. Ali and Dr. Al-Hosni, Samuel Dotson, III, and Brian Kinkade in Count III. Plaintiffs seek both monetary damages and prospective injunctive relief.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plaintiffs "must include sufficient factual information to provide the 'grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires plaintiffs to plead"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that "actual proof of those facts is improbable," id. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint does not apply to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Although legal conclusions can provide the framework for a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, "a civil rights complaint must contain facts which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be conclusory." Gregory v. Dillard's, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Hospital defendants move to dismiss Count II, which asserts a state law claim for medical malpractice, on the basis that plaintiffs have failed to submit an affidavit based on the opinion of a legally qualified health-care provider certifying the merits of their case within 90 days of the filing of the complaint, as required by § 538.225, Mo. Rev. Stat. (2000). The Hospital defendants assert that dismissal without prejudice is required as a result of this failure, citing § 538.225 and Howard v. SSM St. Charles Clinic Medical Group, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) .
Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that the statute does not apply unless (1) the relationship of the parties is that of health care provider and recipient, and (2) the "true claim" relates only to the provision of health care services, citing St. John's Regional Health Center, Inc. v. Windler, 847 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Plaintiffs state without citation to any supporting authority that because they allege D.T. was ready for discharge on December 27, 2013 but was held in the hospital thereafter for other reasons, the relationship of the parties was not that of health care provider and patient, so the first part of the test is not met. Plaintiffs also assert that their medical malpractice claim does not relate only to provision of medical services, as they allege D.T. was ready for discharge but was restrained not to receive medically necessary care, but so he could be removed from his parents' home.2 Finally, plaintiffs assert in the alternative that the Court has discretion to allow a medical malpractice action to proceed without the statutory affidavit upon a showing of good cause. Plaintiffs do not make any attempt to articulate facts relevant to a showing of good cause, however.
Section § 538.225, Mo. Rev. Stat., requires the timely submission of an affidavit based on the opinion of a legally qualified health-care provider certifying the merits of the plaintiff's case. "The language of section 538.225 unambiguously requires: (1) plaintiffs to file an affidavit in medical negligence cases; and (2) trial courts to dismiss without prejudice any such action if theaffidavit is not filed." Lang v. Goldsworthy, 470 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (cited case omitted).
The Windler case, cited by plaintiffs, demonstrates that plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim must be dismissed for failure to file the § 538.225 affidavit. In Windler, the hospital sued for the cost of medical and hospital care rendered. 847 S.W.3d at 170. Windler counterclaimed for false imprisonment, alleging that the hospital detained her against her will and kept her imprisoned in its psychiatric hospital through threats and force. Id. The hospital moved to dismiss Windler's counterclaim for failure to file the § 538.225 affidavit and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Windler argued the affidavit was not required because her intentional tort claim did not require that she show a duty and breach of the standard of care that a reasonably prudent and careful health care provider would have provided under similar circumstances, but rather she only needed to prove that the hospital intentionally restrained her against her will. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, stating it was implicit in the counterclaim that the hospital was acting in its capacity as a health care provider when the alleged unlawful imprisonment occurred, and concluding that despite the plaintiff's characterization of her claim as false imprisonment, her "true claim" required the affidavit "because the basis for the alleged false imprisonment was the incorrect—or totally absent—medical determination that she needed to be confined." Id. at 171.
In the present case, the complaint includes detailed allegations of the medical treatment services the Hospital defendants rendered to D.T., and expressly asserts a claim for medical malpractice in Count II. This count alleges that the Hospital defendants "failed to meet the applicable standard of care" by (1) hindering plaintiff Rachel Tracy from providing nurture, nourishment and physical care to D.T.; (2) refusing to send D.T. home with monitoring equipment and imposing a restriction on D.T.'s discharge that was beyond the applicable standard of care; and(3) making false accusations against Rachel Tracy to child welfare authorities knowing that the conduct alleged did not constitute child abuse or neglect under any Illinois or Missouri statute or regulation. Complaint ¶¶ 112, 113, 115.
Count II clearly alleges the existence of a relationship between the Hospital defendants and D.T. of healthcare providers and recipient. Plaintiffs' argument that the healthcare provider-recipient relationship ended on the date they allege D.T. was ready to be discharged is both unsupported by any authority and unpersuasive. Because Count II raises issues as to whether healthcare providers failed to meet the applicable standard of care, § 538.225 applies and a healthcare affidavit is required.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Windler on the basis of a footnote that states:
We need not decide whether, in the absence of a health care relationship, or if a health care relationship exists but other activities are involved, a claimant must file the affidavit. To illustrate, if Windler had alleged that while visiting in the hospital she had been...
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