Trader, In re

• Decision Date: 13 September 1974
• Docket Number: Nos. 29,54,32,s. 29
• Citation: 272 Md. 364,325 A.2d 398
• Parties: In the Matter of Richard Lee TRADER. STATE of Maryland v. Emmit W. STOKES. In the Matter of Roger FAULKNER. In the Matter of Calvin THOMAS.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 364

272 Md. 364

325 A.2d 398

In the Matter of Richard Lee TRADER STATE of Maryland v. Emmit W. STOKES In the Matter of Roger FAULKNER In the Matter of Calvin THOMAS.

Nos. 29, 32, 54.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 13, 1974.

Gary Melick, Gilbert Rosenthal, Asst. Attys. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, Richard R. Cooper, State's Attys., Howard B. Merker and William M. Monfried, Asst. State's Attys. for Baltimore City, Baltimore, Basil Wadkovsky, Asst. State's Atty. for Kent County, Chestertown, on the brief) for the State.

Michael S. Elder, Baltimore (Peter S. Smith, Baltimore, on the brief) for Stokes and Faulkner.

Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender (Alfred J. O'Ferrall, III, Deputy Public Defender and Geraldine Kenney Sweeney, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief) for Trader.

Floyd L. Parks, Assigned Public Defender, Chestertown (John W. Sause, Jr., Dist. Public Defender, Centreville, on the brief) for Thomas.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH DIGGES, LEVINE and O'DONNELL, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

Proceedings involving offenses committed by juveniles in Maryland are presently governed by one of two statutes, depending upon the locality where the offenses is committed. Maryland Code (1974) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article §§ 3-801 through 3-842 is a public general law and sets forth the substantive law and procedures governing juvenile proceedings in Baltimore City and all of the counties of the State except Montgomery County. ¹ Courts Article §§ 4-501 through 4-530 is a public local law governing juvenile proceedings in Montgomery County. Thus, a juvenile who commits an offense in Montgomery County, regardless of his place of residence, is subject to the Montgomery County juvenile law; a juvenile who commits an offense in Baltimore City or in any county of the State other than Montgomery County, regardless of his place of residence, is subject to the public general law. Although the purposes and underlying philosophy of the two laws are in substance the same, and while the substantive and procedural aspects of each law are generally comparable, substantial differences exist between the two laws in the treatment of juveniles. It is the difference in treatment afforded juveniles under these statutes which has given rise to the instant appeals, each of which presents the question whether the statutory treatment afforded juveniles accused of committing offenses in jurisdictions other than Montgomery County violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

The public general law provides that the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Division of Juvenile Causes) and the circuit court of each county except Montgomery County shall have exclusive jurisdiction over a child alleged to be delinquent. Section 3-808(4) exempts from that jurisdiction:

'(4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have committed the crime of robbery with a deadly weaspon, unless an order removing the proceeding to the juvenile court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27.' ²

Section 3-816 of the public general law, which provides that the court may waive its juvenile jurisdiction, states in pertinent part:

'(b) Limitations.-Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, jurisdiction may only be waived on:

(1) A child 14 years old or older; or

(2) A child who has not reached his 14th birthday, and who is charged with committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or life imprisonment.'

'(e) Procedure when jurisdiction waived.-If the jurisdiction is waived, the court may order the child or minor held for trial under the regular procedures of the court which would have jurisdiction over the offense if committed by an adult.'

Section 3-817 of the public general law declares an order of the court waiving its juvenile jurisdiction to be interlocutory (and hence not reviewable on appeal until after final judgment has been entered in the criminal proceeding).

The Montgomery County juvenile law vests the District Court of Maryland with exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile causes. Unlike the circuit courts operating under the public general law in effect outside of Montgomery County, the District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction in cases involving juveniles 16 years or older alleged to have committed robbery with a deadly weapon. The provisions limiting the court's right to waive its juvenile jurisdiction also differ from those in effect under the public general law. Section 4-506 of the Montgomery County juvenile law provides: '(a) Conditions.-After a fulll investigation, the court may waive jurisdiction if:

(1) A child 16 years old or older is charged with committing an act which would amount to a misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult; or

(2) A child under the age of 14 is charged with committing an act which would be punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed by an adult.

'(b) Prosecution after waiver.-If the court waives jurisdiction under this section, he shall order the child proceeded against as an adult.'

There is no provision in the Montgomery County law, as there is in the public general law, declaring that an order of the court waiving juvenile jurisdiction is interlocutory.

II Matter of Trader

Petitions were filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Division of Juvenile Causes), alleging that appellee Trader was a delinquent child. The court waived its jurisdiction and ordered Trader held for action under regular criminal procedures. Trader noted an appeal from the waiver order to the Court of Special Appeals. Subsequently, he was indicated by the Baltimore City Grand Jury for crimes of arson and related offenses. The Criminal Court of Baltimore (Liss, J.) granted Trader's motion to dismiss the indictments; it held that the provisions of § 3-817, declaring an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction to be interlocutory and therefore not immediately appealable, were 'so vague and indefinite' and 'so repugnant to the original jurisdiction plan for juvenile proceedings' as to be unconstitutional and void. The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals from the order dismissing the indictments; that appeal was consolidated with Trader's earlier appeal from the order waiving juvenile jurisdiction. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictments and affirmed the order waiving juvenile jurisdiction. Matter of Trader, 20 Md.App. 1, 315 A.2d 528 (1974). In so concluding, the court held that § 3-817 of the public general law violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for reasons and on constitutional grounds neither raised below nor argued by the parties on appeal. Chief Judge Orth, in his opinion for the court, noted that under the Montgomery County law, unlike the public general law, an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction was final and, as such, immediately appealable. The court then stated:

'(I)n Montgomery County a child alleged to be delinquent may have the juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction reviewed on appeal before action under the regular procedure that would follow if the acts it is claimed he committed were committed by an adult, but in all other parts of the State such a child, subject only to the waiver order being valid on its face is prosecuted for criminal conduct as an adult without the right first to have the validity of the waiver by the juvenile court determined under appellate procedures. The unfavorable position of the child without the boundaries of Montgomery County is obvious.

'Although, in Maryland, appellate jurisdiction is at the largess of the General Assembly, a state not being required by the federal constitution to provide the right of appellate review, when the right is given, a person is protected from invidious discriminations with respect thereto or from improper denials thereof by the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution. (citations and footnote omitted) We think that the unfavorable position with respect to the immediate right of appeal from a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction of a child in other parts of the State as compared to a child in Montgomery County amounts to prejudice of constitutional dimension.' 20 Md.App. at 7-8, 315 A.2d at 532.

In articulating its reasons for concluding that § 3-817 was unconstitutional, the court said, 20 Md.App. at 8-10, 315 A.2d at 533 (footnotes omitted):

"The Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such rather than between areas.' Salsburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551, 74 S.Ct. 280, 283, 98 L.Ed. 281. 'It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances.' State of Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31, 25 L.Ed. 989. Prior to the enactment of ch. 773, Acts 1973 (now § 3-817), all children within that class of persons consisting of children alleged alleged to be delinquent enjoyed the same protection of the laws-they all had the right to an immediate appeal from an order of a juvenile court waiver its jurisdiction over them to a court with criminal jurisdiction. The statute, however, leaving the right to the members of the class in Montgomery County, denied the right as to members of the class in the rest of the State. We think that . . . § 3-817 is in contravention of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and is invalid with respect to the waiver order being interlocutory.

'The general rule is that 'A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584, 55 S.Ct. 538, 540, 79 L.Ed. 1970. We cannot...