Trail v. Christian

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TODD
• Citation: Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973)
• Decision Date: 07 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43528,43528
• Parties: Betty TRAIL, Appellant, v. Gilbert CHRISTIAN, d.b.a. Herr Schmidt Inn, Respondent.

Page 618

213 N.W.2d 618

298 Minn. 101

Betty TRAIL, Appellant, v. Gilbert CHRISTIAN, d.b.a. Herr Schmidt Inn, Respondent.

No. 43528.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 7, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Plaintiff challenges the common-law rule of nonliability of a vendor of intoxicants to innocent third persons injured by the tortious conduct of the vendee. We limit this opinion to fact situations disclosing commercial sales of statutorily defined nonintoxicating malt beverages to minors or intoxicated persons.

2. The common-law rule of nonliability of vendors of intoxicants is premised on the theory that the proximate cause of the negligent act was not the sale of intoxicants but their consumption. Minnesota has followed this rule and in addition has excluded vendors of nonintoxicating malt beverages as defined by statute (3.2 beer) from the provisions of our Civil Damage Act (Dram Shop Act), even though judicially recognizing that 3.2 beer can cause intoxication.

3. Many jurisdictions have rejected the common-law rule and we now hold that a common-law action of negligence will lie against a commercial vendor furnishing 3.2 beer to minors or intoxicated persons whose subsequent tortious negligent act causes injury to an innocent third party not a patron of the vendor. Prior inconsistent opinions are overruled.

4. We find no legislative preemption of the regulation of statutorily defined nonintoxicating beverages merely because of the legislature's failure to include 3.2 beer sales within the provisions of our Civil Damage Act.

5. Sales of intoxicants to minors or intoxicated persons in violation of statutory prohibitions are exceptions to the general rule that statutory violations do not differ from ordinary negligence. Such illegal sales constitute negligence per se, and the traditional common-law defenses are not available to the vendor.

6. This decision, except for the instant case, shall apply prospectively.

Robins, Meshbesher, Singer & Spence, and Ronald I. Meshbesher, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan, and Mary Jeanne Coyne, and O. C. Adamson II, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered en banc.

TODD, Justice.

Plaintiff, seriously injured as a result of an automobile accident, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against defendant tavern owner on the grounds that traditional principles of common law do not provide a cause of action against commercial vendors of intoxicants who, in violation of statutory prohibition, furnish or sell to one whose tortious conduct ultimately causes personal injury or property damage. We have determined that the common-law rule of nonliability of vendors of statutorily defined nonintoxicating malt beverages is unsound and should no longer control under the circumstances of this case. We reverse.

A detailed statement of the facts giving rise to the present litigation appears in a prior decision of this court involving other issues, Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 175 N.W.2d 916 (1970). Since this appeal is taken from a summary judgment, we consider the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Briefly summarized, those facts disclose that on August 14, 1965, defendant, owner and sole proprietor of a tavern known as the Herr Schmidt Inn, did sell, either personally or through his employees, 3.2 beer to Robert Ridlon, who at the time of the sale was allegedly intoxicated and only 20 years of age. ¹ After leaving defendant's premises, Ridlon proceeded to operate his automobile at speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour. Near the intersection of Highway No. 10 and Crooked Lake Boulevard in the city of Coon Rapids, at approximately 3:35 a.m., the vehicle driven by Ridlon collided with the rear portion of the automobile in which plaintiff, then 21 years of age, was a passenger. As a result of this collision, plaintiff's spine was severed, thereby rendering her an invalid for the remainder of her life.

1. Plaintiff, conceding that the sale of 3.2 beer does not give rise to a cause of action under our Civil Damage Act, ² commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act, claims she is entitled to recover from defendant under elementary principles of common-law negligence. Thus, plaintiff presents directly to this court the question of whether a common-law action grounded in negligence exists outside the scope of our Civil Damage Act against a commercial vendor who sells 3.2 beer in violation of our statutes prohibiting such sales to those already intoxicated ³ and to minors. ⁴

At the outset, we note that this appeal invites discussion of numerous fields of common-law liability outside the scope of our Civil Damage Act, but we decline to pass upon them at this time. Instead, we limit this opinion to sales of 3.2 beer to minors or those already intoxicated and the ensuing civil liability of the commercial vendor whose sale under these circumstances results in injuries to an innocent third party not a patron of the vendor. ⁵

2. Defendant argues that no common-law action exists against those selling or furnishing intoxicating beverages to an individual who, as a result of thereby being intoxicated, negligently or tortiously causes personal injury to an innocent third party. This common-law rule of nonliability was premised on the theory that the proximate cause of the negligence was not the vendor's act of selling or furnishing the intoxicating beverages but their consumption by the customer-tortfeasor. ⁶

Defendant, in his argument before the trial court and this court, insists that this jurisdiction has steadfastly adhered to the common-law rule of nonliability and cites Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609 (1955), and Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955), in support of his contention. Each of those cases, however, involves actions brought under our Civil Damage Act with the specific issue of common-law negligence not before this court. In the Beck case, we noted that an action under our Civil Damage Act was not dependent upon a finding of negligence; it was purely a statutory action unrelated to the common law. It was only in dictum that this court added the following (245 Minn. 34, 70 N.W.2d 891):

'* * * The cases are overwhelmingly to the effect that there is no cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the vendee.'

The Beck case, however, was decided almost two decades ago, and, although this statement may well have reflected the status of such litigation in the various states at that time, the noticeable trend of recent decisions suggests that no longer is the common-law rule of nonliability being uniformly and summarily accepted as controlling. ⁷

In considering the availability of such a common-law remedy to the plaintiff, it must be kept in mind under Minnesota statutes malt beverages containing not less than 1/2 of 1 percent alcohol by volume or more than 3.2 percent alcohol by weight are defined as nonintoxicating malt liquor. ⁸ In Beck v. Groe, Supra, a complete history of this legislation is outlined. We there held that, based on the legislative history, 3.2 beer could not be classed as an intoxicating beverage under the Dram Shop Act. That issue is not involved in this case as no claim is being made under the Dram Shop Act. We further note that it appears that by adopting the Civil Damage Act the legislature has preempted the subject of remedies available for wrongs arising from improper sales of statutorily defined intoxicating beverages.

We pointed out in Trail v. Village of Elk River, 286 Minn. 380, 388, 175 N.W.2d 916, 921:

'The issue in Beck was whether the sale of 3.2 beer to a person was actionable, not whether sale of admittedly intoxicating liquor to a person rendered intoxicated by the consumption of 3.2 beer is actionable. The legislature, as we have noted, for purposes of Sale of certain liquids, has drawn a line classifying those beverages which contain more than 3.2 percent of alcohol by weight as intoxicating. It is improper to apply this classification in determining whether a person can become intoxicated on certain liquids because the original distinction was not made on the basis of a legislative assumption, either informal or after consideration of empirical evidence, that people who consume liquids with less than a 3.2 percent alcoholic content cannot become intoxicated. Nor did the laws regulating the sale of alcohol necessitate such a study. The purposes of the laws prohibiting the sale of certain beverages would not be advanced by transposing their definitions to this situation, and the purpose of the Civil Damage Act would be defeated if this were done. However, when a person becomes in fact inebriated--and counsel for respondent Elk River admitted on oral argument that one can become in fact intoxicated by drinking 3.2 beer--those provisions of our laws which prohibit further sale of intoxicating liquor to him are applicable.'

Thus, we have judicially recognized the reality that a person can become intoxicated by consuming 3.2 beer, and for purposes of this appeal, we must assume that at trial plaintiff will be able to establish the fact that Ridlon was a minor or was intoxicated, or both, as plaintiff alleged in her complaint, and that defendant did serve him 3.2 beer. We have already recognized the fact that intoxicated persons, because of their unpredictable behavior, may injure others. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital, 236 Minn. 384, 389, 53 N.W.2d 17, 20 (1952).

The early case of Swinfin v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345, 34 N.W. 22 (1887), lends support to the proposition that Minnesota has traditionally followed the common-law rule. There, the defendants furnished intoxicating liquor to an 18-year-old who subsequently attacked an innocent third party, and the court held that the defendants were not liable for the injuries since the furnishing of...