Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, Civ. No. 90-1374 (JP).

• Citation: 749 F. Supp. 376
• Decision Date: 25 October 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 90-1374 (JP).
• Parties: TRAILER MARINE TRANSPORT CORP., Plaintiff, v. Carmen M. RIVERA VAZQUEZ, Esq., Executive Director of the Automobile Accident Compensation Administration of Puerto Rico ("AACA"), et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

749 F. Supp. 376

TRAILER MARINE TRANSPORT CORP., Plaintiff, v. Carmen M. RIVERA VAZQUEZ, Esq., Executive Director of the Automobile Accident Compensation Administration of Puerto Rico ("AACA"), et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 90-1374 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 25, 1990.

Nicolás Jiménez Torres, Jiménez, Graffam & Lausell, San Juan, P.R., for plaintiff.

Carlos Del Valle Cruz, Ramírez & Ramírez, Hato Rey, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

The Court has before it defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and based upon the Burford abstention doctrine. Plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the transportation of goods by sea. The plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Puerto Rico Law 26 (amendment to 9 L.P. R.A. § 2064 (1976)), which provides for the assessment by the Automobile Accident Compensation Administration (AACA), of a special premium upon van trailer vehicles engaged in maritime transportation. These van trailers enter the island on a temporary basis. Plaintiff claims that the special premium is unconstitutional because it obstructs the flow of interstate commerce, and because the imposed premium amounts bear no rational relation to the use of trailers upon Puerto Rico's roads and highways. Plaintiff requests a judgment declaring Law 26 unconstitutional on its face. Plaintiff also requests a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the AACA Administrators from enforcing Law 26. Federal jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), as the action arises under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, Law 26 is rationally related to the Commonwealth's health and safety policy goals underlying the Automobile Accident Social Protection Act, 9 L.P. R.A. § 2051 et seq., which Law 26 amends. Defendants further contend that Law 26 is a health and safety regulation consistent with the Commerce Clause. Alternatively, the defendants claim that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit against AACA (and its employees) as a government controlled agency. In addition, defendants allege that the Burford abstention doctrine warrants the abstention of the Court in this case.

For the reasons stated below, we grant the defendants' motion in part and dismiss the complaint pursuant to the Burford abstention doctrine.¹

I. THE FACTS

The Automobile Accident Social Protection Act (the Act), 9 P.R. Laws Ann. § 2051 et seq. (Supp.1988) is social legislation with the purpose of creating a compulsory system for the compensation of automobile accident victims, irrespective of fault. This social legislation is implemented by AACA, and financed through the payment of registration fees by all vehicle owners. In 1989 the legislature enacted an amendment to the Act which provided for the assessment of a reduced fee upon trailers that would be in Puerto Rico for less than thirty days. H.R. 741, Act 27, Dec. 12, 1989 amendment to 9 L.P.R.A. § 2064 (1976). Rather than pay the regular annual $35.00 premium, the amendment permits transitory trailers to instead pay $15.00 for each chassis that is brought into Puerto Rico for less than a thirty-day period.

Plaintiff claims that the special premium burdens ocean carriers like itself, which utilize roll-on-roll-off vessels, rather than lift-on-lift-off vessels. The plaintiff's roll-on-roll-off method of carrying trailers introduces into Puerto Rico a chassis² for each container it carries, because the plaintiff has no chassis permanently located in Puerto Rico.

In contrast, lift-on-lift-off vessels carry containers without a chassis, which would transform the vessel into a trailer. Large shore-based cranes lift the containers off the vessel and place them on a shore-based chassis where the container is coupled and secured to form a trailer. The trailers are placed in the yard to await delivery to the ultimate consignee. When the trailer is returned, the operation is reversed and the crane lifts the container off the chassis and loads it on board the vessel, leaving the chassis behind. The regular $35.00 annual AACA premium is paid for each chassis permanently established in Puerto Rico.

Plaintiff conducts business in Puerto Rico solely with the trailers that are transitorily brought aboard its barges. Because the plaintiff does not have a number of chassises permanently located on the island, it introduces into Puerto Rico a chassis for each container it carries. Plaintiff's trailers are carried aboard a roll-on-roll-off barge. Upon arrival of a barge in Puerto Rico, the trailers are rolled off of the barge by a tractor and are parked in a marshalling yard. Within a matter of a few hours or a few days, the trailers are then picked up by a trucker for final delivery to the ultimate consignee. Once the cargo is unloaded from the container, the trailers are then returned to the plaintiff's terminal for return voyage to the United States. The tractors used to haul and deliver the trailers are locally based vehicles, which upon their registration are licensed and provided with license plates by the Commonwealth authorities. The plaintiff does not own most of the trailers it carries. In the instances in which the plaintiff owns the trailer, it pays Maine state registration fees, but does not pay no-fault insurance, because Maine does not subject trailers to the same fees as its other motor vehicles. Plaintiff must pay the $15.00 premium for a thirty-day stay, or choose to pay the $35.00 premium for the entire year. The non-owned trailers have their home-state registration fees and ACCA fees paid by their respective owners.³

II. BURFORD ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

The Burford abstention doctrine delineates circumstances in which a federal court should decline to hear a case of which it has jurisdiction, in order to avoid needless conflict with the states. Such an abstention is warranted if a federal court will come into conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943), was an action in which Sun Oil attacked the validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting Burford a permit to drill four wells on a small plot of land in the East Texas oil field. Rule 37 of the Commission specified certain minimum spacing between wells but also allowed the commission to make exceptions where necessary to prevent waste or to prevent the confiscation of property. Burford's permit had been granted such an exception. The Court noted that Texas had provided a system of thorough judicial review in the state courts. The power given the courts in review were such that "the Texas courts are working partners with the Railroad Commission in the business of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry." Burford 319 U.S. at 326, 63 S.Ct. at 1103. To allow federal courts also to review commission ordes could only lead to "delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the State policy". Id. at 327, 63 S.Ct. at 1104.

The First Circuit has interpreted the Burford abstention doctrine as being appropriate for claims which seek individualized review of fact-specific regulatory decision making, but not for claims which attack a statute on its face. See Bath Memorial Hosp. v. Maine Health Care Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir.1988). In Bath Memorial Hosp., the hospital brought an action raising constitutional and statutory challenges to the Maine Health Care Finance Act provisions which regulate hospital charges. The Bath Memorial Hosp. court viewed the case before it as the polar opposite to Burford, because the plaintiffs were not seeking an individualized review of cost specific regulatory decision making, but instead were attacking the statute as written. When a statute is constitutionally attacked on its face, the involvement of the federal court does not interfere significantly with the workings of a lawful state system as was the threat in Burford.

III. THE AACA REGULATORY SYSTEM

In the instant case, the plaintiff professes to mount a constitutional attack upon the face of the AACA statute. Yet, in its complaint, the plaintiff states that it:

will have no quarrel with the challenged premium if the defendants fix a yearly premium on each trailer plaintiff introduces into Puerto Rico which is equivalent to the premium fixed against its competitors in proportion to the degree that each carrier's trailers utilize Puerto Rico's highways and other resources. Plaintiff will have no quarrel with the challenged premium if it fixed on any rational basis.

In effect, the plaintiff is challenging the manner in which the statute is implemented by the AACA Board of Directors, not the constitutionality of the statute itself. As long as the AACA Board insures that the plaintiff will be assessed the same fees as its competitors, then the plaintiff has no complaint. The provision of the statute which is at issue simply states:

The amendment gives a new option to van trailer vehicles engaged in maritime transportation for bringing cargo into Puerto Rico from abroad and that enter the island on a temporary basis. These may now opt to pay a special premium for their brief stay on the island, instead of the regular annual premium, regardless of whether they are registered. The Administration's Board will fix the special premium, based on the number of times the vehicles enter Puerto Rico. The Administration will establish a mechanism for making the payments. Even though the fees will be paid in the Internal Revenue Offices of the Department of the Treasury, the Administration will establish a mechanism for making the payments.

H.R. 741, Act 27, Dec. 12, 198...