Train v. City of New York 8212 1377

Decision Date18 February 1975
Docket NumberNo. 73,73
PartiesRussell E. TRAIN, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Petitioner, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. —1377
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 provide a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution. Title II of these Amendments makes available federal financial assistance for municipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Section 207 of Title II authorizes the appropriation of 'not to exceed' specified amounts for each of three fiscal years, and § 205(a) provides that the '(s)ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to (§ 207) . . . shall be allotted by the Administrator' of the Environmental Protection Agency. The President directed the Administrator not to allot among the States § 207's maximum amounts but instead to allot no more than $2 billion of the $5 billion authorized for fiscal year 1973 and no more than $3 billion of the $6 billion authorized for fiscal year 1974; and the Administrator complied with this directive. Thereupon respondent city of New York brought this class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Administrator was obligated to allot to the States the full amounts authorized by § 207 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, and an order directing him to make those allotments. The District Court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 'the Act requires the Administrator to allot the full sums authorized to be appropriated in § 207.' Held: The 1972 Amendments do not permit the Administrator to allot to the States under § 205(a) less than the entire amounts authorized to be appropriated by § 207. Pp. 42-49.

(a) That § 205(a) directs the allotment of only 'sums'—not 'all sums' as originally provided when the legislation went to Conference—and that the Conference Committee added the 'not to exceed' qualifying language to § 207, which authorized the appropriation of specific amounts for the three fiscal years, show no congressional intention of giving the Executive discretionary con- trol over the rate of allotments under the Title II programs. The 'not to exceed' qualifying language in § 207 has meaning of its own apart from § 205(a), and reflects the realistic possibility that approved applications for grants from funds already allotted would not total the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated. And the word 'sums' has no different meaning and can be ascribed no different function in the context of § 205(a) than would the words 'all sums.' Pp. 42-46.

(b) The modified position taken by petitioner in this Court that §§ 205(a) and 207 merely give the Administrator discretion as to the timing of expenditures, not as to the ultimate amounts to be allotted and obligated, as was urged in the lower courts, does not alter this Court's conclusion. The Administrator's power to allot under § 205(a) extends only to 'sums' authorized to be appropriated under § 207, since, even assuming some sort of power in the Executive to control outlays under the Act, the legislative history indicates that the power to control was to be exercised at the obligation phase, rather than the allotment stage, of the process. Pp. 46-49.

D.C.Cir., 494 F.2d 1038, affirmed.

Sol. Gen. Robert H. Bork, for petitioner.

John R. Thompson, New York City, for respondents.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case poses certain questions concerning the proper construction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act7 Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. III) (1972 Act), which provide a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution. Section 2 of the 1972 Act, 86 Stat. 833, in adding Title II, §§ 201—212, to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281—1292 (1970 ed., Supp. III),1 makes available federal finan-

[Amicus Curiae Information from pages 36-37 intentionally omitted] cial assistance in the amount of 75% of the cost of municipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Under § 207, there is 'authorized to be appropriated' for these purposes 'not to exceed' $5 billion for fiscal year 1973, 'not to exceed' $6 billion for fiscal year 1974, and 'not to exceed' $7 billion for fiscal year 1975. Section 205(a) directs that '(s) ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to (§ 207)' for fiscal year 1973 be allotted 'not later than 30 days after October 18, 1972.' The '(s)ums authorized' for the later fiscal years 1974 and 1975 'shall be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized . . ..' From these allotted sums, § 201(g)(1) authorizes the Administrator 'to make grants to any . . . municipality . . . for the construction of publicly owned treatment works . . .,' pursuant to plans and specifications as required by § 203 and meeting the other requirements of the Act, including those of § 204. Section 203(a) specifies that the Administrator's approval of plans for a project 'shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the United States for the payment of its proportional contribution to such project.'2

The water pollution bill that became the 1972 Act was passed by Congress on October 4, 1972, but was vetoed by the President on October 17. Congress promptly overrode the veto. Thereupon the President, by letter dated November 22, 1972,3 directed the Administrator 'not (to) allot among the States the maximum amounts provided by section 207' and, instead, to allot '(n)o more than $2 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1974 . . ..'4 On December 8, the Administrator announced by regulation5 that in accordance with the President's letter he was allotting for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 'sums not to exceed $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively.'

This litigation, brought by the city of New York and similarly situated municipalities in the State of New York, followed immediately.6 The complaint sought judgment against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency declaring that he was obligated to allot to the States the full amounts authorized by § 207 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, as well as an order directing him to make those allotments. In May 1973, the District Court denied the Administrator's motion to dismiss and granted the cities' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that 'the Act requires the Administrator to allot the full sums authorized to be ap- propriated in § 207.' 161 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 131, 494 F.2d 1033, 1050 (1974).

Because of the differing views with respect to the proper construction of the Act between the federal courts in the District of Columbia in this case and those of the Fourth Circuit in Train v. Campaign Clean Water, 420 U.S. 136, 95 S.Ct. 847, 42 L.Ed.2d 82, we granted certiorari in both cases, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 557 (1974), and heard them together. The sole issue 7 before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the Administrator to allot to the States under § 205(a) less than the entire amounts authorized to be appropriated by § 207. We hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm the Court of Appeals.8

Section 205(a) provides that the '(s)ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to (§ 207) . . . shall be allotted by the Administrator.' Section 207 authorizes the appropriation of 'not to exceed' specified amounts for each of three fiscal years. The dispute in this case turns principally on the meaning of the foregoing language from the indicated sections of the Act.

The Administrator contends that § 205(a) directs the allotment of only 'sums'—not 'all sums'—authorized by § 207 to be appropriated and that the sums that must be allotted are merely sums that do not exceed the amounts specified in § 207 for each of the three fiscal years. In other words, it is argued that there is a maximum, but no minimum, on the amounts that must be allotted under § 205(a). This is necessarily the case, he insists, because the legislation, after initially passing the House and Senate in somewhat different form, was amended in Conference and the changes, which were adopted by both Houses were intended to provide wide discretion in the Executive to control the rate of spending under the Act.

The changes relied on by the Administrator, the so-called Harsha amendments, were two. First, § 205 of the House and Senate bills as they passed those Houses and went to Conference, directed that there be allotted 'all sums' authorized to be appropriated by § 207.9 The word 'all' was struck in Conference. Second, § 207 of the House bill authorized the appropriation of specific amounts for the three fiscal years. The Conference Committee inserted the qualifying words 'not to exceed' before each of the sums so specified.

The Administrator's arguments based on the statutory language and its legislative history are unpersuasive. Section 207 authorized appropriation of 'not to exceed' a specified sum for each of the three fiscal years. If the States failed to submit projects sufficient to require obligation, and hence the appropriation, of the entire amounts authorized, or if the Administrator, exercising whatever authority the Act might have given him to deny grants, refused to obligate these total amounts, § 207 would obviously permit appropriation of the lesser amounts. But if, for example, the full amount provided for 1973 was obligated by the Administrator in the course of approving plans and making grants for municipal contracts, § 207 plainly 'authorized' the appropriation of the entire $35 billion. If a sum of money is 'authorized' to be appropriated in the future by § 207,—then § 205(a) directs that an amount equal to that sum be allotted....

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