Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC

• Decision Date: 31 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. 12–1152.,12–1152.
• Citation: 699 F.3d 19
• Parties: Lawrence TRAINOR, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. HEI HOSPITALITY, LLC et al., Defendants, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

699 F.3d 19

Lawrence TRAINOR, Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.HEI HOSPITALITY, LLC et al., Defendants, Appellants.

No. 12–1152.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Sept. 12, 2012.

Decided Oct. 31, 2012.

Lynn A. Kappelman, with whom Lisa J. Damon, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., James M. Hlawek and Seyfarth Shaw LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Gary M. Feldman, with whom Davis, Malm & D'Agostine, P.C. was on brief, for appellee.

Before HOWARD, RIPPLE ^* and SELYA, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

A time worn proverb teaches that “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.” Much the same dynamic can be in play when, as in this case, a corporation abruptly cashiers a member of senior management who believes that he deserves better.

In this instance the denouement prompted a suit for age discrimination and retaliation. After a protracted trial, the jury found the employer guilty of retaliation and returned a seven-figure verdict in the employee's favor. The district court allowed the liability finding to stand; trimmed the damages but doubled what remained; refused to grant either judgment notwithstanding the verdict or an unconditional new trial; and awarded the prevailing plaintiff attorneys' fees and an equitable remedy. The employer appeals.

After careful consideration of a scumbled record, we conclude that the sum awarded for emotional distress damages, even after the district court's remittitur, remains grossly excessive. We order a further remittitur. This order, in turn, affects the outcome of the doubling of damages undertaken by the district court. In all other respects, we reject the employer's challenges. The tale follows.

I. BACKGROUND

We rehearse the facts as the jury supportably could have found them, guided by the tenet that “when the losing party protests the sufficiency of the evidence, the court of appeals must take both the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most hospitable to the jury's verdict.” Casillas–Díaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 79 (1st Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff-appellee Lawrence Trainor, then 59 years of age, was enticed to join HEI Hospitality, LLC in the fall of 2006 after a long and distinguished career in hospitality management.¹ The plaintiff was recruited by HEI's chief operating officer, Ted Darnall, to become HEI's senior vice-president for acquisitions and transitions (SVP). Above and beyond assisting with acquiring and transitioning new hotel properties into HEI's sphere of influence, the plaintiff also recruited and mentored general managers, developed a “playbook” to organize integration strategies, and worked with “priority” hotels.

The terms of HEI's initial offer required the plaintiff to relocate to Norwalk, Connecticut (where HEI maintains its headquarters). The plaintiff balked at this requirement, however, and argued against a move from his home in Marshfield, Massachusetts because of his wife's health. A compromise was reached: the plaintiff would spend Mondays (and any other days on which his presence was needed) in Norwalk and travel from Marshfield to the properties that demanded his attention during the balance of the week.

The company's hierarchs were consistently pleased with the plaintiff's management style and overall job performance: he received rave reviews from the chief executive officer Gary Mendell, Darnall, and the senior vice-president for human resources Nigel Hurst. Storm clouds began to gather in the fall of 2008, when rumors began about the possibility of restructuring the executive team. After Brian Meyer was brought in as senior vice-president of operations, top-echelon executives received an adjuration about a perceived need to relocate to Norwalk.

In November, Darnall offered the plaintiff a choice: relocate to Norwalk or assume the general manager's position at a hotel located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. HEI claims that the relocation was necessary because it intended to promote the plaintiff to a regional senior vice-president position. But the plaintiff was never actually offered such a position (or so the jury could have found).

During the next two weeks, the plaintiff had follow-up conversations with both Darnall and Hurst and learned that the demotion to general manager would be accompanied by a substantial cut in salary and a discontinuance of his participation in HEI's company-sponsored investment funds (described in more detail infra ). Dismayed by this turn of events, the plaintiff engaged counsel. His lawyer wrote to Mendell on December 4, expressing the plaintiff's disappointment with the recent developments at HEI. The letter made clear that the plaintiff was both reluctant to relocate and distressed by the prospect of being shifted to a lower-level position. Of particular pertinence for present purposes, the letter suggested that age discrimination was the driving force behind HEI's planned restructuring and the plaintiff's threatened demotion. Upon receiving this missive, Mendell—by his own admission—was “surprised,” was “frustrated,” and “wasn't happy.” He regarded the age discrimination claim as “preposterous.”

The plaintiff had some incidental communication with Hurst regarding the December 4 letter. Thereafter, he met face-to-face with Mendell, who told him for the first time that his position had been eliminated. This discussion left only the Cambridge job on the table; Mendell made no mention of the regional senior vice-president position that HEI ostensibly intended to offer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff began to negotiate the terms of the lesser position and requested that HEI maintain his current salary, allow him to continue to participate in all the company-sponsored investment funds, and keep him involved in a certain number of acquisitions per year. Mendell countered by offering, among other things, to increase the salary figure to $200,000 (still appreciably below the salary then being paid to the plaintiff) and to permit the plaintiff to vest in two of HEI's three investment funds.

On December 20, the plaintiff's lawyer wrote to Mendell expressing dissatisfaction with the counter-proposal and reiterating the plaintiff's earlier requests. In a telephone conversation nine days later, Mendell told the plaintiff that he was “pissed.” Seeking to reach common ground, the plaintiff asked Mendell to give him a written offer anent the new position. Mendell furnished a written offer later that day, but the offer did not address any of the plaintiff's demands. It did, however, include a stipulation that the offer be accepted in writing by January 2, 2009.

On Tuesday, December 30, the plaintiff notified a phalanx of HEI officials, including Darnall and Hurst, that he would be working remotely that week and taking vacation the following week. In response, Darnall extended good wishes for the plaintiff's vacation and stated that he would call in the next few days.

On January 2, 2009, the plaintiff filed a charge of age discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The plaintiff's lawyer forwarded a copy of the charge to Mendell. His transmittal letter indicated that the plaintiff remained “amenable” to working out a solution with HEI. Mendell received the letter (including the copy of the MCAD charge) on January 2. Three hours after he received these materials, Mendell fired the plaintiff via e-mail. The e-mail explained that the offer of the Cambridge position expired on January 2 and his current position no longer existed. Mendell concedes that he did not even read the details of the age discrimination charge before cashiering the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, after exhausting administrative remedies, filed suit in federal district court alleging that HEI had both discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of applicable federal and state law. Specifically, the plaintiff invoked the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623, and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4.

After extensive pretrial discovery, an eight-day trial ensued. The jury returned a special verdict in which it found HEI liable for retaliation (but not for age discrimination) and awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in back pay, $750,000 in front pay, and $1,000,000 for emotional distress. Since the jury determined that HEI had knowingly violated state law, the court entered an order doubling the plaintiff's damages. See Trainor v. HEI Hosp'y, LLC ( Trainor I ), No. 09–10349, 2011 WL 1670234 (D.Mass. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9).

HEI responded to the verdict and the multiplication order with a flood of motions. These included motions seeking alternative relief: judgment as a matter of law, a series of remittiturs, an unconditional new trial, and vacation of the order for double damages. For his part, the plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys' fees and renewed an earlier request for an injunction allowing his continued participation and vesting in certain HEI-sponsored investment funds. The district court denied HEI's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, refused to remit the awards of either front or back pay, cut the award of emotional distress damages in half, adhered to its earlier ruling that double damages were appropriate, and allowed the motion for attorneys' fees. See Trainor v. HEI Hosp'y, LLC ( Trainor II ), No. 09–10349, 2012 WL 119597 (D.Mass. Jan. 13, 2012). In a separate order, the court granted the request for equitable relief. See Trainor v. HEI Hosp'y, LLC ( Trainor III ), No. 09–10349, 2012 WL 113384 (D.Mass. Jan. 13, 2012). This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

We subdivide our analysis into seven segments, which in the aggregate address all of HEI's myriad claims of error.

A. Liability.

We start with the district court's denial of HEI's motion for judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). This inquiry engenders de novo review. See Casillas–Díaz, 463 F.3d at 80...