Trala v. Shea
| Decision Date | 22 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 71-1725-W. |
| Citation | 335 F. Supp. 81 |
| Parties | Linda Gruszecki TRALA v. Cyril E. SHEA, Jr., et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Michael Mone, Schneider & Reilly, Inc., Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Frederick Pillsbury, Springfield, Mass., for defendants.
August 23, 1971 plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Wesson Memorial Hospital and others alleging that the hospital caused her to suffer damage by the treatment it gave her during October 1964. September 17, 1971 Wesson Memorial Hospital answered denying liability.
On November 18, 1971 Wesson Memorial Hospital moved to amend its answer to add a fifth defense, alleging that "it is a public charity and therefore its liability, if any, in said cause of action shall not exceed the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000), exclusive of interest and costs." The following day the plaintiff noticed her opposition to the motion on the implied ground that there does not exist any partial immunity for a public charity such as is implied in the proposed fifth defense.
At the time that the defendant hospital allegedly inflicted injury upon the plaintiff and at the time plaintiff allegedly sustained her damages the law of Massachusetts gave immunity from tort liability to charitable institutions such as the defendant hospital. Colby v. Carney Hospital, 356 Mass. 527, 254 N.E.2d 407 (1969).
But plaintiff urges that the doctrine of Carney Hospital and earlier cases to the same effect does not apply to her because in the Carney Hospital case the Supreme Judicial Court stated, at p. 528, 254 N.E.2d at p. 408, "that the next time we are squarely confronted by a legal question respecting the charitable immunity doctrine it is our intention to abolish it." This court interprets that elliptical statement as abolishing the doctrine only with respect to complaints of injuries inflicted after December 23, 1969, the date of the Carney opinion. This court understands the Massachusetts court as having meant that its new doctrine would not be retrospective and thus deprive surprised charitable institutions of an adequate opportunity to insure themselves against a newly imposed liability.
Furthermore, apart from the aforesaid construction of the meaning of the obiter dictum in Carney, this court concludes that on general principles the Massachusetts courts would not permit this plaintiff to recover from this defendant upon the basis of facts which would not have warranted a recovery under clear past precedent, on which litigants may have relied, and which was overruled by the promulgation, after the events, of a new principle of law. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496, 88 S. Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d...
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Rosenthal v. Warren
...which hold the repeal to operate prospectively only. See Ricker v. Northeastern Univ., Mass., 279 N.E.2d 671 (1972); Trala v. Shea, 335 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mass.1971). The argument is not persuasive. This court is not giving retroactive effect to the legislative action. I do, however, deem the st......
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Perloff v. Symmes Hospital
...immunity from tort liability for those actions. Ricker v. Northeastern University, 361 Mass. 169, 279 N.E.2d 671 (1972); Trala v. Shea, 335 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mass.1971) (applying Massachusetts law). That the Massachusetts legislature abolished charitable immunity by statute in 1971, Mass.Gen.La......
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Ricker v. Northeastern University
...same position in a case decided by him prior to his certificate (dated January 10, 1972) in the present proceeding. See Trala v. Shea, 335 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mass.1971). The Legislature now has acted, after opportunity to consider all elements of the public interest. Statute 1971, c. 785, expres......