Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds v. Lubbock County

Citation60 S.W.3d 145
Parties(Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001) TRAMMEL'S LUBBOCK BAIL BONDS, GOMEZ BAIL BONDS, AND ALLSTATE BAIL BONDS, Appellants v. LUBBOCK COUNTY, Texas and Lubbock County Bail Bond Board, Appellees NO. 07-00-0035-CV
Decision Date22 February 2001
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Page 145

60 S.W.3d 145 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001)
TRAMMEL'S LUBBOCK BAIL BONDS, GOMEZ BAIL BONDS, AND ALLSTATE BAIL BONDS, Appellants
v.
LUBBOCK COUNTY, Texas and Lubbock County Bail Bond Board, Appellees
NO. 07-00-0035-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.
February 22, 2001
Rehearing Overruled March 29, 2001

FROM THE 72ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 93-543,876; HON. ERNIE B. ARMSTRONG, PRESIDING

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Copyrighted Material Omitted

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Before Boyd, C.J., and Quinn and Reavis, JJ.

This is an appeal from cross motions for summary judgment. We are asked to determine whether the trial court correctly granted those of Lubbock County (the County) and denied that of Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds, Gomez Bail Bonds, and Allstate Bail Bonds (collectively referred to as the Bail Bonds). The motions arose from a suit by the Bail Bonds against the County to recoup fees assessed by the latter upon the former. Furthermore, the trial court ruled, via summary judgment, that limitations precluded recovery by the Bail Bonds. We reverse.

Background

As previously mentioned, the dispute concerned the assessment by the County of a $10 "Bond Service Charge" upon bail bond companies within Lubbock County. The commissioners court for Lubbock County enacted the charge in 1985. However, the levy ended in 1992, after the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1992). Through the latter, the Texas Supreme Court held that "bond approval fees imposed on bondsmen by the El Paso County Commissioners Court and collected by the Sheriff [were] not authorized by any Texas Statute." Id. at 815. Only fees permitted by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure could be levied, and the one there involved was not such a fee. Id.

In June of 1993, Trammel's Lubbock Bail Bonds (Trammel) served notice upon the County of its claim to recoup fees which it asserted were wrongfully paid. The County failed to return the monies within the time specified by Trammel. Thus, the latter filed suit on August 11, 1993. Through amended pleadings, Gomez Bail Bonds (Gomez) and Allstate Bail Bonds (Allstate) joined in the proceeding as parties plaintiff. However, unlike Trammel, neither Gomez nor Allstate presented the County with written notice of their claims before entering the fray. This prompted the County to file a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. That is, the County asserted that neither Gomez nor Allstate could pursue their respective claims since they had not complied with "Texas Local Government Code Annotated § 81.04(1)(a) [sic]".1 Given this, dismissal was allegedly required.

In addition to its plea to the jurisdiction of the court, the county also had filed two motions for summary judgment. The first was against Trammel. Therein, it contended that limitations and the doctrine of laches barred recovery. The second motion concerned the allegations of Gomez and Allstate. With regard to those two businesses, it too urged limitations and laches. However, their purported failure to present the claim to the commissioners court was also mentioned as a ground warranting

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summary judgment.2 In turn, Trammel, Gomez, and Allstate moved for summary judgment against the County. Through their motion, they averred that they had proved their claims against the entity as a matter of law and that they were entitled to recover the fees which they had paid.

The record does not reflect that the trial court acted upon the County's plea to jurisdiction. Rather, it discloses that the court 1) granted summary judgment to the County against Gomez and Allstate and denied the latter two entities recovery against the County, 2) granted Trammel summary judgment against the County "to the extent that Plaintiff Trammel[] ... recover any fees paid to Lubbock County from June 17, 1991 through June 17, 1993" togther with pre and post judgment interest, and 3) denied "[a]ll other relief requests either by Plaintiffs or Defendant in this matter". Furthermore, in ruling as it did, the court expressly mentioned the ground upon which it relied. That ground was limitations. Nothing was said of laches or § 89.004(a) of the Local Government Code. From this summary judgment, Trammel, Gomez and Allstate appealed; the County did not.

Standard of Review

The standard applicable to reviewing appeals from cross motions for summary judgments is well-settled. We opt not to reiterate it but rather cite the parties to National Cas. Co. v. Lane Exp., Inc., 998 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, writ denied) for its explanation. Furthermore, that the trial court expressed the grounds upon which it relied does not restrict our review to that ground. We may consider other grounds preserved for review by the movant even though the trial court did not mention them. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996).

Application of Standard

Again, the trial court relied upon the statute of limitations in ruling as it did. Furthermore, each party represents to this court that the applicable limitations period is two years from the date the chose-in-action accrued. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.003(a) (Vernon 1986) (stating that one has two years after the day the cause of action accrues to bring suit); Bowles v. Clipp, 920 S.W.2d 752, 760 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, writ denied) (applying §16.003 to circumstances like that at bar). However, dispute arises about the date on which the claims accrued. According to the County, that occurred when the fees were paid. On the other hand, the Bail Bonds assert that the claims accrued once the county commissioners court rejected them after presentation via § 89.004 of the Local Government Code. We agree with the Bail Bonds for the following reasons.

Years ago, through City of Taylor v. Hodges, 186 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1945), the Texas Supreme Court was asked to address the affect, if any, the predecessor to §89.004(a) had upon the accrual of a cause of action against a county. At that time, the applicable statute provided that "[n]o county shall be sued unless the claim upon which suit is founded shall have first been presented to the commissioners court for allowance, and such court shall have neglected or refused to audit and allow the same, or any part

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thereof."3 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1573 (Vernon 1925); City of Taylor v. Hodges, 186 S.W.2d at 63; Jones County v. Moore, 4 S.W.2d 289, 292-93 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1928, writ ref'd.). Furthermore, in Taylor, the commissioners court did not reject the City's claim until the summer of 1943. Given this and the wording of art. 1573, the Supreme Court held that "the right of the City to sue accrued and limitations began to run from that date", i.e., the date on which the commissioners court rejected the demand. Id. at 63-64. In so holding, the court expressly relied upon the decision of Jones County v. Moore, supra. The latter also dealt with art. 1573 and its affect upon the accrual of a cause of action against a county. Furthermore, in determining when a cause of action accrued, the Jones County court defined cause of action as the "right to institute suit." Jones County v. Moore, 4 S.W.2d at 293. And, because art. 1573 barred initiation of the suit until the claim was rejected, it concluded that the chose-in-action did not accrue until the claim was presented to and rejected by the commissioners court. Id. at 293. It was this holding that the Supreme Court not only acknowledged but adopted in Taylor.

So, what we have before us is a decision by the Texas Supreme Court involving the application of a statute identical to § 89.004(a) of the Local Government Code. In applying that statute, we have the same court of last resort for Texas declaring that a cause of action against a county does not accrue for purposes of limitations until the claim is presented to and rejected by the county commissioners court. Moreover, that court has neither expressly rejected or modified the portion of Taylor applicable at bar since it rendered Taylor. Consequently, we must conclude that Taylor remains valid and binding authority in this state.4

Next, the record discloses that Trammel presented its claim to the County in June of 1993 and that the claim went unpaid by the date specified in the demand letter, i.e., July 17, 1993.5 So, as per Taylor, the claim against the County did not accrue until it was purportedly rejected on July 17, 1993. Furthermore, since Trammel sued the County 25 days after the claim accrued, that is, on August 11, 1993, and since August 11, 1993 is a date well within two years of July 17, 1993, it

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cannot be said that limitations bars the action.

Nor can it be said that the claims of Gomez and Allstate are time barred. Indeed, the record discloses that when they joined Trammel's suit, they had yet to present their claims to the County. The claims having yet to be presented, it cannot be said that the County had rejected them. Because the County had yet to reject them, they had yet to accrue. City of Taylor v. Hodges, supra. And, because they had yet to accrue they certainly could not have been untimely when joined in the Trammel action. In sum, limitations did not bar the Bail Bonds from pursuing their suit against the County. Since the trial court held otherwise, it erred. Yet, that does not end our inquiry for the County sought summary judgment on other grounds. And, to the extent that those other grounds could warrant summary judgment, we must consider them as well. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, supra. The first which we consider is the doctrine of laches.

According to the County, laches prevented each claimant from proceeding irrespective of whether limitations ran. Though related, laches and the expiration of limitations are two distinct theories. Admittedly, at the heart of each lies the concept of time and its lapse. Yet, laches come into play even...

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