Transportation Plaza Associates v. Powers

• Decision Date: 05 May 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 12750-12752,s. 12750-12752
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TRANSPORTATION PLAZA ASSOCIATES v. Arthur B. POWERS, Commissioner of Transportation, et al.

Page 68

525 A.2d 68

203 Conn. 364

TRANSPORTATION PLAZA ASSOCIATES v. Arthur B. POWERS, Commissioner of Transportation, et al.

Nos. 12750-12752.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 4, 1987.

Decided May 5, 1987.

Mark S. Shipman, with whom were I. Milton Widem and, on the brief, Leonard M. Bieringer, Edith S. Rosen and Cindy S. Schwartz, for appellant-appellee (defendant City of Stamford).

Brewster Blackall, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellant-appellee (named defendant).

Joseph Adinolfi, Jr., with whom were Joseph C. Morelli and, on the brief, John D. Miletti, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, SANTANIELLO, DUPONT and F. HENNESSY, JJ.

DUPONT, Associate Justice.

The named defendant, Arthur B. Powers, commissioner of transportation (commissioner), took property known as the Stamford Railroad Station from the plaintiff, Transportation Plaza Associates (TPA), in an eminent domain proceeding and assessed damages in the amount of $3,230,000. TPA thereafter appealed to the Superior Court from that assessment. The case was referred to a panel of three state trial referees. See General Statutes §§ 52-434, 52-434a(b). At the commencement of the trial, the city of Stamford was allowed to intervene as a defendant. After a lengthy trial, the panel, sitting as the trial court, rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $6,500,000, plus appraisal fees and statutory interest. The defendants have appealed from that judgment and TPA has cross appealed. We find no error on the appeal or on the cross appeal.

The trial court's memorandum of decision contains an exhaustive discussion of the facts proved by TPA, as well as a discussion of the failure of the defendants to rebut those facts. The court made findings of facts, stated its conclusions, and discussed, in well reasoned terms, its review of the testimony of the appraisers of the parties and its reasons for its determination of the damages to be awarded to TPA. The court's decision is well-written and thorough in its analysis.

The factual background of this appeal is stated in the court's decision. The property condemned was acquired by TPA in 1968 and consists of two parcels of land, totalling 5.48 acres or 238,760 square feet. The parcels are divided by the east and westbound tracks of the Metro North railroad. In addition to the land itself, TPA owned the air rights above the railroad tracks, beginning at a level of forty-seven feet above the top of the rails, as well as the right to use an existing tunnel underneath a railroad right-of-way which connects the two parcels.

After acquiring the land, TPA engaged in a number of activities in preparation for its development. Between 1969 and 1971, TPA made four applications to the Stamford planning and zoning board, seeking changes to improve the zoning conditions governing the parcels. In 1971, the last application was granted, resulting in a change in the zoning regulations as they applied to the area, height and bulk of the buildings which could be located thereon. The change in zoning regulations allowed TPA to develop a maximum sized office complex of 966,978 square feet with a similar amount of square footage for parking. From 1972 to 1976, TPA conducted negotiations with the Connecticut department of transportation, rail division, in an attempt to obtain air rights beginning at a twenty-three foot level instead of the forty-seven foot level. These negotiations were not fruitful.

Between 1970 and 1980, prospective tenants contacted TPA concerning the construction of an office building. TPA conducted a design contest among several architectural firms in order to develop a set of plans for a structure which would be feasible on the site. In 1973 and in 1977, TPA retained architects who developed plans for an office building and a parking structure. In early 1980, TPA again retained architects to develop a plan which would demonstrate the highest and best use of the property.

TPA became aware in 1976 that the state wanted to develop the property as a central transportation center. In the 1977 session of the legislature, a special act was passed concerning the state's taking of the land which was never implemented, and in 1979, the legislature passed another special act empowering the state to acquire the property by eminent domain. In 1980, TPA brought an inverse condemnation action for damages, alleging a de facto taking of its property without compensation. The commissioner subsequently filed a notice of taking and statement of compensation, pursuant to an agreement with TPA that its action would be withdrawn. The commissioner based his statement of compensation on the assumption that the property taken was subject to an eighty foot right-of-way, which he claimed was depicted on a map referred to in the description of the property filed with his statement.

The defendants claim that the trial court erred in its reassessment of the amount of compensation to be paid to TPA because it: (1) exceeded the scope of its jurisdictional reference pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-132 and 52-434a; (2) found that there was a reasonable probability that TPA could have erected a particular structure on the land as the highest and best use of the land but for the condemnation; and (3) concluded that an eighty foot wide right-of-way did not exist on the property. ¹ TPA's cross appeal claims that the court, in arriving at its determination of value, twice deducted the sum of $1,000,000 for special costs from the fair market value of the property.

I

The defendants, in their first claim of error, assert that a trial court consisting of state trial referees may not consider title issues, absent a specific reference to do so, because the consideration of such issues exceeds the scope of its jurisdictional reference pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-132 and 52-434a. ² They therefore claim that the trial court was without jurisdiction to determine that an eighty foot right-of-way did not exist on TPA's property. ³

The trial court consisted of state trial referees who have the same powers as judges of the Superior Court. General Statutes § 52-434 provides that "[t]he superior court may refer any civil, nonjury case ... in which the issues have been closed to ... a state referee who shall have and exercise the powers of the superior court in respect to trial, judgment and appeal in the case." General Statutes § 52-434a(b) specifically provides for the appointment of three state trial referees by the chief court administrator in condemnation proceedings in which damages exceed $200,000. These referees "shall have and may exercise with respect to any civil matter ... the same powers and jurisdiction as does a judge of the court from which the proceedings were referred." General Statutes § 52-434a(a).

The defendants argue that General Statutes § 8-132 limits the jurisdiction of the trial court to a revision of the statement of compensation. The defendants interpret § 8-132 as meaning that state trial referees, absent a more specific statutory reference, may revise a statement of compensation only as to the amount of damages assessed, but not as to the description of the property taken.

The condemnation proceeding was filed by the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 8-129, which requires the taking authority to determine the compensation to be paid and to file a statement of compensation. Section 8-129 further requires that the statement of compensation contain a description of the property to be taken by eminent domain. Section 8-132 specifically enables persons claiming to be aggrieved by the statement of compensation to obtain a review of such statement. This statute does not limit the review afforded to the plaintiff to merely the amount of damages assessed, but rather extends such a review to the entire statement of compensation. Since the statement of compensation contains a description of the real estate, it would be a strange and strained interpretation of § 8-132 to consider it as standing in isolation from § 8-129 and therefore as being unrelated to the description of the land condemned. A description of land, of necessity, encompasses the precise amount of land involved. It is difficult to understand how a panel of state trial referees could revise a statement of compensation without first determining, if necessary, the precise amount of land taken. In any condemnation proceeding involving the assessment of damages, one of the main issues that must necessarily be resolved by the court is the amount of land taken. See Kelly v. Waterbury, 108 Conn. 205, 207, 143 A. 96 (1928). Moreover, § 8-132 requires the referees, in reviewing the statement of compensation, to view the property. A parcel of land cannot be viewed without ascertaining its boundaries. Finally, § 8-132 empowers the trial referees, after hearing the parties and viewing the property, to revise such statement in any manner as they deem proper. This broad power afforded to the referees clearly includes the power to revise the description of the property.

The defendant city represented to the court that if the issues of title and damages were bifurcated, it would be willing to have the same court listen to both issues. Accordingly, it was not harmed by the same court listening to the entire case at once.

The defendants also argue that the court should first have obtained a specific reference in order to determine questions of title. This argument ignores the fact that the court already had all the powers and jurisdiction of the superior court, ignores a reasonable interpretation of §§ 8-129 and 8-132, and ignores existing case law. Several cases, expressly or implicitly, indicate that title questions may be considered at the same trial in which the assessment of damages is reviewed. Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation, 180...