Trant v. Oklahoma

• Decision Date: 19 March 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV–10–555–C.
• Parties: Collie M. TRANT, Plaintiff, v. (1) State of OKLAHOMA; (2) Board of Medicolegal Investigations; (3) Office of the Chief Medical Examiner; (4) Dewayne Andrews, in his individual and official capacities; (5) Douglas Stewart, in his individual and official capacities; (6) Rocky McElvany, in his individual and official capacities; (7) C. Michael Ogle, in his individual and official capacities; (8) Charles Curtis, in his individual and official capacities; (9) Karlis Sloka, in his individual and official capacities; (10) Chris Ferguson, in his individual and official capacities; (11) Shanda McKenny, in her individual and official capacities; (12) Cherokee Ballard, in her individual and official capacities; (13) Sandra Balzer, in her individual and official capacities; (14) Tom Jordan, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

874 F.Supp.2d 1294

Collie M. TRANT, Plaintiff,

v.(1) State of OKLAHOMA; (2) Board of Medicolegal Investigations; (3) Office of the Chief Medical Examiner; (4) Dewayne Andrews, in his individual and official capacities; (5) Douglas Stewart, in his individual and official capacities; (6) Rocky McElvany, in his individual and official capacities; (7) C. Michael Ogle, in his individual and official capacities; (8) Charles Curtis, in his individual and official capacities; (9) Karlis Sloka, in his individual and official capacities; (10) Chris Ferguson, in his individual and official capacities; (11) Shanda McKenny, in her individual and official capacities; (12) Cherokee Ballard, in her individual and official capacities; (13) Sandra Balzer, in her individual and official capacities; (14) Tom Jordan, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Case No. CIV–10–555–C.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

March 19, 2012.

Carl D. Hughes, Hughes & Hughes, Edmond, OK, R. Scott Adams, Robert Warden Gray, Adams & Associates PC, Oklahoma City, OK, Plaintiff.

Kevin L. McClure, M. Daniel Weitman, Victoria D. Tindall, Attorney General's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBIN J. CAUTHRON, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Collie M. Trant brought the present suit seeking declaratory and monetary relief against fourteen Defendants, including the State of Oklahoma and members of the Board of Medicolegal Investigations (“Board”) in their individual and official capacities, under nineteen various causes of actions sounding in federal and state law. Plaintiff originally filed suit in state court, and thereafter Defendants removed to this Court asserting jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

This Court previously partially granted Defendants' First Motions to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth causes of actions, and remanded the remaining state-law actions to state district court.¹ Plaintiff appealed this Court's Order to the Tenth Circuit, which partially affirmed and reversed and remanded. Plaintiff concedes that his third, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and nineteenth causes of action are foreclosed by the Tenth Circuit's ruling. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff need not detail factual allegations in the complaint, but must provide the grounds of entitlement to relief, which entails more than labels and conclusions—“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. When considering a motion to dismiss, courts look to the complaint and those documents attached to or referred to in the complaint, accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences from the pleading in favor of the pleader. Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir.2008); Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2007). A court is not bound to accept as true a plaintiff's legal assertions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677–80, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50.

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

1. Plaintiff's Standing to Assert His First Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks the requisite standing to assert his first claim for declaratory judgment regarding the interrelation of authority between the Board and the Chief Medical Examiner (“CME”).² “The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government.... A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Constitutional standing is a threshold jurisdictional question. Injury, causation, and redressability are constitutional standing requirements that must be satisfied prior to adjudication by Article III courts.

Here, Plaintiff claims that his authority as CME was infringed upon by Defendants' violation of his statutorily enumerated powers. Plaintiff does not explicitly state in his Amended Complaint what relief he seeks, but in his responsive brief he states that “[t]he First Cause of Action does not seek the reinstatement of Plaintiff.... [T]he First Cause of Action would only involve declaring the CME's authority to conduct the administration of his office and injunctive relief precluding any further direct involvement (as opposed to oversight) in the administration of the office.” (Pl.'s Br., Dkt. No. 92, at 12 n. 3.) Plaintiff goes on to state that he

acknowledge[s] that an “existing” controversy as to Plaintiff's authority only exists if he is reinstated pursuant to one of the other causes of action. That is, absent reinstatement, the dispute over Plaintiff's authority [does] not exist[ ]. Accordingly, the viability of the Declaratory Judgment claim to determine his authority is dependent upon the Court determining [that] Plaintiff should be reinstated and [that] Defendants should be precluded from interfering with his authority.

( Id. at 13–14 n. 4.) Beyond being reinstated at some future date and facing further “wrongful interference” by the Board, Plaintiff has not established how “any decision from this court will redress an injury to him.” United States v. Wilson, 445 Fed.Appx. 141, 144 (10th Cir.2011); Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.2003) (“ ‘Plaintiff[ ] must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome in order to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions.’ ” ( quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). Plaintiff has not established that he has suffered from an actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Plaintiff's argument that one day he may be reinstated as the CME and again suffer intrusion by the Board is too speculative to satisfy the constitutional standing requirements. “[T]he entry of a declaratory judgment in [Plaintiff's] favor would amount to nothing more than a declaration that he was wronged, and would have no effect on [Defendants'] behavior towards him.” Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's first cause of action is dismissed.³

2. Defendants Named in Official Capacities

Initially, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's first cause of action for naming them in their official capacities, which they claim is prohibited under Oklahoma law. Defendants argue that because the first nine causes of action only seek reinstatement of Plaintiff as CME, Defendants Jordan, Balzer, Ballard, and McKenny should be dismissed as they are not current members of the Board—the only entity with the authority to reinstate Plaintiff as CME.

But only Plaintiff's fourth claim explicitly seeks reinstatement. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 38, at 36 (Plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants “have a non-discretionary duty to return Plaintiff to his position with all the emoluments of his position until a lawful vote is taken to terminate Plaintiff from his position.”).) In his second claim, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants willfully violated the Open Meeting Act (“OMA”) and, therefore, that actions taken in those violative meetings are void. Plaintiff's sixth and eighth claims seek declaratory judgment that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under the Oklahoma Constitution.

Accordingly, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's first nine causes of action must be dismissed because Defendants Jordan, Balzer, Ballard, and McKenny are not Board members applies only to Plaintiff's fourth claim and is valid. 63 Okla. Stat. § 934 (“The Board of Medicolegal Investigations shall appoint a Chief Medical Examiner....”). Because only members of the Board have authority over appointment of the CME and the above-referenced Defendants are not Board members, they should be dismissed as to Plaintiff's fourth claim.⁴

Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's last three causes of action, all asserted under the Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), cannot be asserted against state employees in their official capacities. 51 Okla. Stat. § 163(C). Therefore, Defendants assert that all claims against Defendants Balzer, Ballard, Jordan, and McKenney should be dismissed.

Under Oklahoma law, tort claims against governmental officers acting in their official capacities are the same as claims against the entity the officers represent. Pellegrino v. State ex rel. Cameron Univ., 2003 OK 2, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 535, 537 (“A suit against a governmental officer in his or her ‘official capacity’ is the same as a suit against the entity that the officer represents, and is an attempt to impose liability upon that entity.”); Shephard v. CompSource Okla., 2009 OK 25, 209 P.3d 288;Turner v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Grady, 1993 OK CIV APP 125, ¶ 10, 858 P.2d 1288, 1289–90 (“The Tort Claims Act is the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity in Oklahoma, and our Supreme Court has determined the Legislature, by the Act, specifically abrogated any previously existing common law or statutory right of recovery for torts coming within the Act.”).

After reading Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, he asserts his claims arising under the GTCA only against the State of Oklahoma, not individual Defendants in their official capacities. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 38, at 53 (“This cause of action is brought...