Trantino v. New Jersey State Parole Bd.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1998
• Citation: 154 N.J. 19,711 A.2d 260
• Parties: Thomas TRANTINO, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD and New Jersey State Department of Corrections, Respondents and Cross-Appellants. Thomas TRANTINO, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Superintendent Donald E. Lewis and New Jersey State Department of Corrections, Respondents and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 19

154 N.J. 19

711 A.2d 260

Thomas TRANTINO, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD and New Jersey State

Department of Corrections, Respondents and

Cross-Appellants.

Thomas TRANTINO, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD, Superintendent Donald E.

Lewis and New Jersey State Department of

Corrections, Respondents and Cross-Appellants.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 6, 1997.

Decided May 15, 1998.

Roger A. Lowenstein for appellant and cross-respondent.

Howard J. McCoach, Deputy Attorney General, for respondents and cross-appellants (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti and Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel; Mr. McCoach, Jennifer L. Kleppe, Dianne M. Moratti and Andrew R. Sapolnick, Deputy Attorneys General, on the briefs).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

HANDLER, J.

This appeal, before us as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(2), concerns the criteria upon which inmates sentenced to prison terms under Title 2A, which has been repealed and superseded, are to be adjudged when seeking parole and whether those standards were properly applied to appellant, Thomas Trantino.

The basis for the appeal is the New Jersey State Parole Board's decision denying Thomas Trantino parole and deferring future parole eligibility for ten years. That decision was based on earlier administrative decisions relating to Trantino's parole status. One of those decisions rendered by the Parole Board granted Trantino parole conditioned on his transfer to a halfway house. The New Jersey State Department of Corrections (DOC), however, rejected the Parole Board's transfer request. That refusal led to the Parole Board's final decision denying parole.

The issues on appeal posed by the dissent are whether the evidence demonstrates that Trantino is fit for parole and, therefore, whether the Parole Board abused its discretion in denying parole. The appeal also presents issues raised by the State's petition for certification, see 150 N.J. 24, 695 A.2d 667 (1997) (granting certification), including the validity of the DOC's denial of Trantino's application for transfer to a halfway house.

The Appellate Division determined that the DOC's refusal to transfer Trantino to a halfway house was invalid, but that the Parole Board's subsequent denial of parole was based on sufficient evidence and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion. 296 N.J.Super. 437, 462-70, 687 A.2d 274 (1997). Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the DOC to reconsider its refusal to provide halfway house treatment. Id. at 471, 687 A.2d 274.

We affirm the Appellate Division judgment invalidating the DOC's decision refusing to provide halfway house treatment. We also set aside the judgment insofar as it sustains the Parole Board's final decision denying parole and fixing an extended future parole eligibility date. Although we concur in much of the analysis and reasoning set forth in the comprehensive opinion of Judge Stern, as well as that of the dissenting opinion of Judge Pressler, we do not find that the Parole Board's decision was based on a proper standard and supported by sufficient evidence and adequate findings of fact. In reaching that conclusion, we clarify the standard governing parole eligibility under the circumstances of this case, particularly the requirement of rehabilitation as a basis for parole. Our determination requires the Parole Board to reconsider the evidence. Accordingly, we modify the remand ordered by the Appellate Division and direct the Parole Board to redetermine Trantino's parole eligibility.

I

On August 23, 1964, Thomas Trantino was found guilty of one count of murder in the first degree and was subsequently sentenced to die. The circumstances surrounding not only this slaying, but also the contemporaneous murder of another victim, are detailed in State v. Trantino, 44 N.J. 358, 361-63, 209 A.2d 117 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993, 86 S.Ct. 573, 15 L.Ed.2d 479 (1966), reh'g denied, 383 U.S. 922, 86 S.Ct. 901, 15 L.Ed.2d 679 (1966).

Trantino remained on death row until 1972 when the New Jersey death penalty statute was declared unconstitutional. See State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 2849, 33 L.Ed.2d 766 (1972). His sentence was commuted to one term of life imprisonment, nunc pro tunc as of the date the death sentence was initially imposed.

The extensive history of Trantino's record in prison and his continuing efforts to achieve parole are recapitulated in great detail in the opinions of Judges Stern and Pressler, and in the concurring opinion of Judge Humphreys. That history remains highly relevant to the issues on this appeal, namely, whether the Parole Board applied the proper standard governing the parole of an inmate sentenced under Title 2A and, further, whether there were adequate factual findings based on substantial evidence sufficient to support the Parole Board's determination denying parole.

In addressing the validity of the Parole Board's denial of parole, the judicial role concentrates on three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, i.e., did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors. Brady v. Department of Personnel, 149 N.J. 244, 256, 693 A.2d 466 (1997). Thus, we must first consider whether the Parole Board applied the correct legal standard for determining parole. See Beckworth v. State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 368, 301 A.2d 727 (1973) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (observing that "judicial review of Parole Board matters is limited to a consideration of whether guidelines and principles have been substantially satisfied, and ordinarily will not involve the review of the merits of the Parole Board decision"). Then, because the "question whether there is a substantial likelihood an inmate will commit another crime if released" is "essentially factual in nature," we "must determine whether the factual finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the whole record." State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J.Super. 534, 547, 540 A.2d 1334 (App.Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 649, 546 A.2d 558 (1988).

The standard of review is strongly influenced by the fact that the substantive principles governing parole do not confer a constitutional right or entitlement. State Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 208, 460 A.2d 103 (1983); In re Trantino Parole Application, 89 N.J. 347, 363 n. 5, 446 A.2d 104 (1982); accord Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463-64, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2464, 69 L.Ed.2d 158, 164 (1981); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 675 (1979). However, while there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz, supra, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d at 675, there is by statute a "protected expectation of parole in inmates who are eligible for parole," Byrne, supra, 93 N.J. at 206, 460 A.2d 103.

We recognize that Parole Board determinations are highly "individualized discretionary appraisals," Beckworth, supra, 62 N.J. at 359, 301 A.2d 727, and, therefore, Parole Board decisions should not be reversed by a court unless found to be arbitrary, Monks v. State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 242, 277 A.2d 193 (1971), or an abuse of discretion, State v. Lavelle, 54 N.J. 315, 322, 255 A.2d 223 (1969). Nevertheless, the inherent difficulty in gauging whether a parole determination constitutes an abuse of discretion does not engender a more exacting standard of judicial review than that applicable to other administrative agency decisions. See In re Hawley Parole Application, 98 N.J. 108, 112, 484 A.2d 684 (1984) (finding "no reason to exempt the Parole Board from the well-established principle" and generally accepted standard of review applicable to administrative agencies); Cestari, supra, 224 N.J.Super. at 548 n. 60, 540 A.2d 1334 ("reject[ing] the contention that a more restrictive standard of judicial review should apply to parole [decisions] than to other administrative agency decisions"); cf. 296 N.J.Super. at 470, 687 A.2d 274 (stating that court must "not upset [parole decisions] unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the Board has abused its discretion" (citation omitted)). Cognizant of this standard of review, we explain initially the criteria that govern parole in the circumstances of this case.

II

Trantino is serving a sentence imposed under Title 2A, the predecessor criminal statute to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, now codified under Title 2C. Title 2A and Title 2C have different approaches to sentencing that affect parole. Trantino Parole Application, supra, 89 N.J. at 370, 446 A.2d 104. Because a sentence of imprisonment imposed under Title 2C incorporates parole disqualification as a sentencing element, inmates serving such sentences "will have presumptively satisfied all punitive aspects of their sentences at the time they become eligible for parole." Ibid. In contradistinction, prison terms imposed under Title 2A did not expressly include parole disqualification, and consequently, "the punitive aspects of [the] sentences [of Title 2A inmates] will not necessarily have been fulfilled by the time parole eligibility has occurred." Ibid. For that reason, the determination of parole of a 2A inmate must take into account the punitive aspects of the sentence.

Even though punishment is a factor...