Trapnell v. Hines
| Decision Date | 12 November 1920 |
| Docket Number | 2589. |
| Citation | 268 F. 504 |
| Parties | TRAPNELL v. HINES, Director General of Railroads. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Frank M. Hardenbrook and Charles M. Egan, both of Jersey City N.J., for plaintiff in error.
Parker Emery & Van Riper, of Newark, N.J. (Chauncey G. Parker and John M. Emery, both of Newark, N.J., of counsel), for defendant in error.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
The station of the Erie Railroad Company at Glen Ridge, New Jersey, stood on the right-hand side of Benson Avenue and on the farther side of the tracks in relation to the direction in which Trapnell was approaching it. When a block or more from the station, at the foot of the hill on the avenue Trapnell heard the crossing-bell signalling the approach of the train he proposed to take. On nearing the station, he saw the train pulling out. Thereupon, he ran to the middle of the street-crossing on the side opposite that of the station and boarded or attempted to board the train then moving at a speed variously estimated. Having a package in his right hand, he took hold the step-rail or grab-iron with his left hand, put his right foot on the first step, then his left foot on the second step, and was in the act of raising his right foot to the third step when the train gave a lurch which caused him to be thrown to the ground and to sustain the injury of which he complains in this action.
The plaintiff sued as a passenger. In his complaint he charged the defendant carrier with the duty so to operate his train as to avoid injury to his passengers, and alleged as a breach of that duty, that, after he had boarded the slowly moving train in safety, the defendant, negligently omitting to allow him reasonable time in which to secure a seat within the car, recklessly and negligently caused the train suddenly and violently to pitch and lurch forward
'at a time when the engineer in charge of the said train knew that passengers boarding said train had not been given reasonable time to procure seats within the body of the car.'
The defenses were lack of negligence on the part of the defendant, and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff both at common law and by force of a statute of New Jersey. Section 55, General Railroad Law, page 4245. Under this statute any person injured 'by jumping on * * * a car while in motion' is deemed to have contributed to his injury and is barred from recovery.
The issue of contributory negligence was sharply controverted by the plaintiff, first, on the theory that his injury was not sustained when boarding the train, but after he had boarded the train in safety; and second, on the inapplicability of the New Jersey law under his interpretation that it relates only to instances where a person jumped, not where a person stepped, on a moving train, within the definitions of the two words, the former denoting a bodily movement with both feet off the ground and the latter a movement with but one foot off the ground. The plaintiff further defended the countercharge of contributory negligence because of the unconstitutionality of the cited statute in that the legislature exceeded its powers and invaded the province of the judiciary in prescribing what shall be conclusive evidence of contributory negligence. United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 20 L.Ed. 519; 8 Cyc. 820, 821, 926, cases cited. The court entered judgment of non-suit on two grounds; because of contributory negligence established by force of the New Jersey statute,-- the constitutionality of which was inferentially sustained; and the lack of proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. This writ brings the judgment here for review.
We lay aside the questions of interpretation and constitutionality of the New Jersey Act and go directly to the question of the defendant's negligence. On the assumption-- most favorable to the plaintiff-- that the lurch of the train was the proximate cause of his injury, we inquire, first, what duty did the defendant owe the plaintiff? The duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff depended upon their relation one to the other at the time of the injury. If the plaintiff was a passenger on a train of the defendant carrier the defendant owed him the duty...
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Aschenbrenner v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co
...circumstances, because one seeking to board a moving train does not become a passenger until he reaches a place of safety. Trapnell v. Hines (C.C.A.) 268 F. 504, 506; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Cotter, 103 S.W. 279, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 679; Kentucky Highlands R. Co. v. Creal, 166 Ky. 469, 179 S......
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...168 U. S. 339, 18 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 491; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Price, 221 F. 848, 137 C. C. A. 406; Trapnell v. Hines, Director General of Railroads (C. C. A.) 268 F. 504; Laub v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 118 Mo. App. 488, 94 S. W. 550; Dore v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co., 97 Neb. 25......
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Fleming v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Co.
...circumstances, because one seeking to board a moving train does not become a passenger until he reaches a place of safety." Trapnell v. Hines (C. C. A.) 268 F. 504; Fels v. East St. Louis & S. Railway Co. (C. C. A.) 275 F. 881; Palmer v. Willamette Valley Southern R. Co., 88 Or. 322, 171 P.......
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United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Aschenbrenner
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