Trapp v. Kimpel, Case No. 3:13-cv-18
| Decision Date | 23 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-18 |
| Parties | WILLIAM L. TRAPP, Plaintiff, v. DEAN KIMPEL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (Docs. 11, 20, 25, 25, 40).1 Plaintiff filed memoranda opposing each Motion. (Docs. 23, 37, 36, 35, 45). Defendants filed reply memoranda. (Docs. 26, 42, 43, 44, 46). In addition to these pending Motions to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting an extension to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to Ohio Rule Civ. P. 10 (Doc. 2) and leave to conduct pre-preliminary pretrial conference discovery (Doc. 3). Defendant Stevenson moved to stay discovery pending resolution of the pending Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 28). All of these Motions are now ripe for decision by the Court.
For purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court must: (1) view the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M&G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009); Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff's Complaint consists of approximately twenty-three pages of allegations setting forth eighteen purported causes of action against fourteen identified Defendants and other unidentified, John and Jane Doe Defendants. (Doc. 1). The allegations establish that Plaintiff's brother, Greg Trapp, was shot to death at a home the brothers shared in Shelby County, Ohio on or about May 18, 1998. (Doc. 1, PAGEID 6). Investigators purportedly identified Plaintiff as a suspect shortly after the murder, but Plaintiff contends insufficient evidence supported a criminal charge against Plaintiff at that time. (Doc. 1, PAGEID 7). After a year, the investigation into Greg Trapp's murder went cold and nobody was charged with the murder. (Doc. 1, PAGEID 7).
Plaintiff alleges that, at some point in 2011, Defendants Kimpel and Stevenson reopened the murder investigation, with the approval of DeWine, together with cold case investigators, Kincaid, Wertz, Fry, Henry, Schemmel and Schlageter. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the investigation targeted him and an individual named Vance Short, a friend or acquaintance of Plaintiff, despite the fact that the past investigation revealed "a dearth of evidence that he participated in any criminal activity[.]" (Id.) Ultimately, both Plaintiff and Short were indicted for murder.
On or about January 27, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested following his indictment on murder charges and remained detained until all charges against him were dismissed, without prejudice, on January 9, 2012. (Doc. 1, PAGEID 8-9; Doc. 20, PAGEID 100-103).
Short plead guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. (Id.)
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiff allegedly suffers from physical and mental disabilities, including amputation of both legs, severe kidney disease, among other non-specified disabilities. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered the loss of one leg in 2004 and the loss of his other leg in 2005. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered great medical injury and extensive exacerbation of his kidney condition during his detention because of the deliberate use of an improper diet and/or the deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs for his serious medical conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants" decided to incarcerate him for the purpose of obtaining an advantage in his prosecution by requiring him to talk on recorded lines and be subjected to the stress, emotional distress, and anxiety caused by detainment, especially long term, and the additional pain and suffering, and further disability caused by his physical conditions, in order to increase the pressure to admit, confess, and/or cooperate. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges various claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1988, as well as state law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, medical negligence, wrongful incarceration, malicious prosecution,abuse of process, false imprisonment, defamation, improper investigation and requests for declaratory relief. (Doc. 1). Each Defendant moves to dismiss the claims asserted on a number of grounds, including arguments that the allegations fail to meet the pleading standard of a "short and plain statement" required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). (Docs. 23, 37, 36, 35, 45). Plaintiff acknowledges that the Complaint, filed January 22, 2013, was drafted in haste and, in a footnote on the first page of the Complaint, represented an intent to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 upon completion of an investigation. (Doc. 1, PAGEID 1). To date, Plaintiff has not sought to amend his pleadings pursuant to Rule 15, though Plaintiff does request an opportunity to remedy any pleading deficiencies the Court should find. (Doc. 23, PAGEID 135; Doc. 35, PAGEID 240; Doc. 36, PAGEID 252; Doc. 37, PAGEID 291; Doc. 45, PAGEID 413-414).
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, in determining a motion to dismiss, "courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id.
Accordingly, in order "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is plausible where "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).
Courts considering Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in addition to well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, may also consider "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint[.]" Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.
"To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Waters v. City of Morristown, Tenn., 242 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2001)). "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken "'under color of" state law." Rowe v. State of Tennessee, 609 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1979).
To prevail under § 1985, Plaintiff must prove:
"(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Claims under § 1985(3) require that "[t]he acts which are alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of equal protection must be the result of class-based discrimination." Id. (citation omitted).2 The language of § 1986 "makes actionable the failure to prevent 'any of the wrongs conspired to be done' under § 1985[,]" and therefore, "[a] § 1986 claim is 'dependent upon theexistence of a valid § 1985 cause of action.'" Irons v. City of Bolivar, 897 F.Supp.2d 665, 670 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (citing Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir.1984)). Plaintiff alleges no class-based discrimination and omits any argument regarding such claims from his memoranda. Accordingly, these purported claims are dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiff purports to assert claims pursuant to §§ 1987 and 1988. However, "[o]n its face, § 1987 does not authorize a private right of action." Carpenter v. Ashby, 351 Fed. Appx. 684, 687 (3rd Cir. 2009). Further, § 1988 does not provide a private right of action. Id. (citing Moor v. County of Alameda, ...
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