Trappman v. State

• Docket Number: SC2021-1479
• Decision Date: 08 February 2024
• Citation: Trappman v. State, 384 So.3d 742 (Fla. 2024)
• Parties: David William TRAPPMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

384 So.3d 742

David William TRAPPMAN, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC2021-1479

Supreme Court of Florida.

February 8, 2024

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions/Direct Conflict of Decisions, First District - Case No. 1D19-1883(Santa Rosa County)

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, Michael L. MacNamara, General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida, and Maria Ines Suber, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and David Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent

CANADY, J.

PetitionerDavid William Trappman was not cooperative when law enforcement officers came to his home to arrest his wife.As the officers were attempting to make the arrest, Trappman shoved an officer.After the officer shoved back, Trappman responded by siccing a pit bull on the officer.For shoving the officer, Trappman was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer.For siccing the dog on the officer, with the resulting bite and scarring of the officer’s leg, Trappman was convicted of aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer.

In Trappman’s appeal, the First District Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the protection against double jeopardy precluded his dual convictions and sentences.Trappman v. State, 325 So. 3d 944, 945(Fla. 1st DCA2021).The court concluded that although the two offenses occurred in one criminal episode, they were based on distinct acts for which multiple punishments could be imposed without a double jeopardy violation.Id. at 946.Recognizing that the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Olivard v. State, 831 So. 2d 823(Fla. 4th DCA2002), involved a similar fact pattern but reached a different result on the double jeopardy issue, the First District certified that its decision was in direct conflict with Olivard.Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 947.Based on the certified conflict, we decided to exercise jurisdiction.Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Because we agree with the First District that the shoving of the officer and the subsequent siccing of the dog on the officer were distinct criminal acts for which separate punishments were properly imposed, we approve the conclusion in Trappman that no double jeopardy violation occurred.And we disapprove Olivardas inconsistent with our reasoning here.

In explaining our decision, we first review the facts of the incident that resulted in the charges against Trappman and the First District’s disposition of Trappman’s appeal and compare that decision with the conflict decision.We then examine double jeopardy principles, focusing particularly on the multiple-punishment analytical framework set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306(1932).Next we turn to the Blockburger-inspired rule of construction regarding multiple punishments contained in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes(2017).Finally, we consider the arguments of the parties on the conflict issue and then analyze Trappman’s conduct, concluding that separate impulses resulting in distinct criminal acts justify Trappman’s dual convictions and sentences.

I.

As explained by the First District, officers arrived at Trappman’s home "to execute an arrest warrant for his wife."Trappman, 325 So. 3d at 945.

Once officers entered the home, [Trappman] was instructed to proceed back outside with his two dogs while the warrant on his wife was executed.At trial, officers testified that [Trappman] initially complied; however, once outside, he began to rile up the dogs by banging their heads together and yelling at them.He eventually reappeared in the doorway of the home holding both dogs by the collars and refused the officers’ orders to go back outside.Sergeant Bird—the victim of both batteries—testified that when he approached, [Trappman] reached out and shoved him with one hand.Sergeant Bird responded by driving [Trappman] towards the front door with both hands.[Trappman] then let go of a dog while exclaiming "dog up, dog up."The dog, a pit bull, leapt at Sergeant Bird and latched onto his leg, causing injury and subsequent scarring.

Id.Trappman was charged with battery of a law enforcement officer and aggravated battery of a law enforcement officer.¹

"The theory of the State’s case was that [Trappman] had initially committed battery by shoving Sergeant Bird, and that he separately committed aggravated battery by subsequently ‘siccing’ the dog on Bird."Id.Agreeing with the State, the First District held that Trappman’s acts of shoving a police officer and then siccing a dog on the officer were "distinct acts" rendering double jeopardy inapplicable, notwithstanding that the two acts "occurred over the course of approximately one minute" and "were part of a single criminal episode."Id. at 946.

The First District certified conflict with the decision of the Fourth District in Olivard.There, the defendant was convicted of battery (for hitting the victim) and aggravated battery (for biting off the victim’s ear).831 So. 2d at 824.The Fourth District reversed the lesser conviction, reasoning that the defendant’s "actions were within the course of one continuous episode attacking [the victim]."Id.The Fourth District, which did not discuss the notion of "distinct acts," viewed the defendant’s conduct as "a single act," and concluded that dual punishments for the greater offense of aggravated battery and the lesser included offense of battery could not be imposed for such a "single act."Id.

II.

[1] The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."Amend.V, U.S. Const.The protections of this federal constitutional provision are applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707(1969).In any event, the Florida Constitution contains a similar provision, which states that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.We have said "that our own double jeopardy clause in article I, section 9, Florida Constitution, which has endured in this state with only minor changes since the constitution of 1845, was intended to mirror [the] intention of those who framed the double jeop- ardy clause of the fifth amendment."Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 164(Fla.1987);see alsoTrotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 365(Fla.2002)("The scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the same in both the federal and Florida Constitutions.").

[2–4] The decisions of the United States Supreme Court"have recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense."Justs. of Bos. Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306-07, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311(1984)(citingIllinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228(1980)).²In applying each of the three guarantees, the essential determination is whether one charge against a defendant is for the "same offense" as another charge against that defendant.And for double jeopardy protection to apply, most succinctly put, the offenses must be "the same in law and in fact."Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 380, 26 S.Ct. 688, 50 L.Ed. 1057(1906)(quotingCommonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496, 502(Mass.1832));see alsoBoswell v. State, 20 Fla. 869, 875(1884)("In considering the identity of the offence, it must appear … that the offence charged in both cases was the same in law and in fact."(quotingRoby, 12 Pick. at 509)).

A.

[5] Here, the third guarantee—"against multiple punishments for the same offense"—is at issue.A framework for analyzing such multiple-punishment double jeopardy questions is laid out in Blockburger, which addresses the distinct questions of how to determine both whether offenses are the same "in fact" and whether they are the same "in law."The first inquiry addresses whether conduct transgressing a single prohibition is subject to multiple punishments, and the second is aimed at determining whether a single act transgressing more than one prohibition may be punished separately based on the violation of the separate prohibitions.

[6–8] Under Blockburger’s reasoning, multiple punishments for violations of a single criminal prohibition are permissible if the prohibition is aimed at singular acts—as opposed to a continuous offense or course of criminal conduct—and the defendant’s conduct involves separate acts stemming from "successive impulses."SeeBlockburger, 284 U.S. at 302, 52 S.Ct. 180(quotingWharton’s Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 34).³And multiple punishments for a single act that violates separate criminal prohibitions are permissible if the separate prohibitions each require proof of a fact not required to establish a violation of the other prohibition.Seeid. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180.

In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of three counts related to the illegal sale of morphine hydrochloride to the same purchaser.Id. at 301, 52 S.Ct. 180.One "count charged a sale on a specified day of ten grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package," while another "count charged a sale on the following day of eight grains of the drug not in or from the original stamped package."Id.The final "count charged the latter sale also as having been made not in pursuance of a written order of the purchaser as required by the statute,"Id.On review, the defendant first contended that the conduct on which the first two counts were predicated "constitute[d...