Trautt v. Keystone RV Co.

Decision Date05 August 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 2:19-cv-00342-RAJ
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
PartiesJOSEPH P. TRAUTT, Jr. and CATHERINE TRAUTT, Plaintiff, v. KEYSTONE RV COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Defendant.

HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES

ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for Order Striking Affirmative Defenses 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. Dkt. # 28. For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff Joseph Trautt bought a trailer manufactured by Defendant Keystone RV Company. Dkt. # 30 at 2. Three months later, on May 18, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that he lay on the convertible table/bed in the trailer and that it collapsed, causing him to fall and sustain injury. Id.

On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Snohomish County Superior Court (Dkt. # 1 at 1) under the Washington Product Liability Act, RCW 7.72 et seq., alleging that the injury was caused by a manufacturing defect in the convertible table/bed. Dkt. # 28 at 2. Defendant then removed the case to this Court on March 8, 2019 (id.) and filed an answer to the complaint asserting eight affirmative defenses on March 15, 2019 (Dkt. # 7).

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment requesting that the Court strike five of the asserted affirmative defenses as "lacking an evidentiary foundation or in the case of Affirmative Defense 1 (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), is a negative defense." Dkt. # 28 at 2. These defenses included the following:

1. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
. . .
3. Plaintiffs' claimed damages are the direct and proximate result of their own negligence or other fault.
. . .
5. If any loss or damage was suffered by Plaintiffs, which Keystone RV denies, then such loss was caused by or contributed to by the superseding, intervening and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities unknown to Keystone RV at this time, but over whom Keystone RV had no control, nor the right of control, all of which bar recovery from Keystone RV.
. . .
7. If Plaintiffs suffered damages as alleged in the Complaint, which damages Keystone RV specifically denies, such claimed damages did not result, directly or indirectly, from any act or omission of Keystone RV, but rather from the acts or omissions of persons and/or entities other than Keystone RV, for which acts or omissions Keystone RV is in no way liable, and plaintiffs, therefore, are not entitled to recover from Keystone RV.
8. Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages.

Id.

In its opposition to the motion, Defendant first argues that it is procedurally improper because Rule 12(f)—not Rule 56—governs the striking of affirmative defenses. Dkt. # 30 at 2. Defendant then argues that its affirmative defenses are "well-stated and supported by significant evidence." Id. at 3.

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets the initial burden, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). "The judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Before analyzing Defendant's defenses at issue, this Court must determine whether the motion for summary judgment to strike these defenses was procedurally proper. While there appears to be some dispute over whether a motion for partial summary judgment on affirmative defenses is a proper motion, this Court holds that it is. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 (D. Or. 2013) on reconsideration in part (Sept. 19, 2013), ("[A] motion that attacks the substance of defendant's affirmative defenses rather than the form of the pleading should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, allowing the court to consider facts outside the pleadings."); Furman v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 377 F. Supp. 37, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[A] motion to strike a defense is the equivalent of a motion for partial summary judgment."). But see, e.g., Kerzman v. NCH Corp., No. C05-1820JLR, 2007 WL 765202, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2007) ("[T]o claim insufficiency of defense should not be considered a request for judgment but more aptly a request to strike it from the pleading."); Seacoast Liquor Distributors v. Kips Bay Brewing Co., 8 F.R.D. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) ("[I]t is difficult to see how the elimination of this affirmative defense could lead to any judgment, summary or otherwise. It would merely narrow the area of dispute; and the Rules do not appear to contemplate the use of the summary judgment procedure in situations such as the present one.").

The plain language of Rule 56(a) allows parties to move for summary judgment on a "claim or defense." Based on this explicit language and supporting case law cited above, the Court construes this motion as one for summary judgment and addresses each defense in turn.

A. Affirmative Defense No. 1: Complaint fails to state a claim

This Court agrees with other district courts that "[f]ailure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [the plaintiff's] prima facie case." LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, 362 F. Supp. 3d 804, 818 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167,1174. (N.D. Cal. 2010)); see also Boldstar Tech., LLC v. Home Depot, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ("Failure to state a claim is a defect in the plaintiff's claim; it is not an additional set of facts that bars recovery notwithstanding the plaintiff's valid prima facie case."). In its response to the motion for summary judgment striking this defense, Defendant does not present any facts, but rather alleges that Plaintiff's complaint is defective for failing to include "a single allegation that the table/bed deviated from how it was designed." Dkt. # 30 at 3.

Even if the Court were to consider this defense, it would not stand. In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court "need not accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the plaintiffmust point to factual allegations that "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is "any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint" that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When considering this defense in the light most favorable to the Defendant, Defendant's argument fails. Under RCW 7.72.020, "[a] product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed." RCW 7.72.030(1). Plaintiff alleges that he sustained an injury that was proximately caused by a design defect of the Defendant-manufactured table/bed when it collapsed after he lay on it. Plaintiff alleges several design or manufacturing defects in his complaint, including "the use of particle board for the table top, the table top was too small, the table top has rounded (as opposed to a squared) edge, and the table seats were not adequately fastenedto the floor in a critical spot." Dkt. # 1-2 ¶ 3.6. While Defendant may dispute these allegations and ultimately prove that the design and manufacture of the table/bed were not the cause of Plaintiff's injury, the allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court grants...

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