Trautt v. Keystone RV Co.
Decision Date | 05 August 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-00342-RAJ |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Parties | JOSEPH P. TRAUTT, Jr. and CATHERINE TRAUTT, Plaintiff, v. KEYSTONE RV COMPANY, an Indiana corporation, Defendant. |
HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment for Order Striking Affirmative Defenses 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. Dkt. # 28. For the reasons below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
On February 15, 2017, Plaintiff Joseph Trautt bought a trailer manufactured by Defendant Keystone RV Company. Dkt. # 30 at 2. Three months later, on May 18, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that he lay on the convertible table/bed in the trailer and that it collapsed, causing him to fall and sustain injury. Id.
On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Snohomish County Superior Court (Dkt. # 1 at 1) under the Washington Product Liability Act, RCW 7.72 et seq., alleging that the injury was caused by a manufacturing defect in the convertible table/bed. Dkt. # 28 at 2. Defendant then removed the case to this Court on March 8, 2019 (id.) and filed an answer to the complaint asserting eight affirmative defenses on March 15, 2019 (Dkt. # 7).
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment requesting that the Court strike five of the asserted affirmative defenses as "lacking an evidentiary foundation or in the case of Affirmative Defense 1 (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), is a negative defense." Dkt. # 28 at 2. These defenses included the following:
In its opposition to the motion, Defendant first argues that it is procedurally improper because Rule 12(f)—not Rule 56—governs the striking of affirmative defenses. Dkt. # 30 at 2. Defendant then argues that its affirmative defenses are "well-stated and supported by significant evidence." Id. at 3.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets the initial burden, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). "The judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Before analyzing Defendant's defenses at issue, this Court must determine whether the motion for summary judgment to strike these defenses was procedurally proper. While there appears to be some dispute over whether a motion for partial summary judgment on affirmative defenses is a proper motion, this Court holds that it is. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 (D. Or. 2013) on reconsideration in part (Sept. 19, 2013), ("[A] motion that attacks the substance of defendant's affirmative defenses rather than the form of the pleading should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, allowing the court to consider facts outside the pleadings."); Furman v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 377 F. Supp. 37, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (). But see, e.g., Kerzman v. NCH Corp., No. C05-1820JLR, 2007 WL 765202, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2007) (); Seacoast Liquor Distributors v. Kips Bay Brewing Co., 8 F.R.D. 74, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) () .
The plain language of Rule 56(a) allows parties to move for summary judgment on a "claim or defense." Based on this explicit language and supporting case law cited above, the Court construes this motion as one for summary judgment and addresses each defense in turn.
This Court agrees with other district courts that "[f]ailure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [the plaintiff's] prima facie case." LL B Sheet 1, LLC v. Loskutoff, 362 F. Supp. 3d 804, 818 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Barnes v. AT & T Pension Ben. Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167,1174. (N.D. Cal. 2010)); see also Boldstar Tech., LLC v. Home Depot, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (). In its response to the motion for summary judgment striking this defense, Defendant does not present any facts, but rather alleges that Plaintiff's complaint is defective for failing to include "a single allegation that the table/bed deviated from how it was designed." Dkt. # 30 at 3.
Even if the Court were to consider this defense, it would not stand. In considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must assume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court "need not accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the plaintiffmust point to factual allegations that "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is "any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint" that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When considering this defense in the light most favorable to the Defendant, Defendant's argument fails. Under RCW 7.72.020, "[a] product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed." RCW 7.72.030(1). Plaintiff alleges that he sustained an injury that was proximately caused by a design defect of the Defendant-manufactured table/bed when it collapsed after he lay on it. Plaintiff alleges several design or manufacturing defects in his complaint, including "the use of particle board for the table top, the table top was too small, the table top has rounded (as opposed to a squared) edge, and the table seats were not adequately fastenedto the floor in a critical spot." Dkt. # 1-2 ¶ 3.6. While Defendant may dispute these allegations and ultimately prove that the design and manufacture of the table/bed were not the cause of Plaintiff's injury, the allegations state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court grants...
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