Travelers Indem. Co. v. Garcia

Decision Date28 October 2020
Docket NumberCASE NO. 8:19-cv-2911-T-24AAS
Citation497 F.Supp.3d 1218
Parties The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer GARCIA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David R. Garcia, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Jamie Combee Novaes, Matthew J. Lavisky, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff.

Lee Delton Gunn, IV, Scott A. Arthur, Gunn Law Group, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, United States District Judge

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company's Motion for Final Summary Judgment with supporting exhibits (Doc. 23) and Defendant Jennifer Garcia's, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David R. Garcia, cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with supporting exhibits (Doc. 24). The parties filed responses to each other's respective motions. (Docs. 29, 30). The Court, having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, finds that Plaintiff's motion is due to be granted and Defendant's motion is due to be denied for the reasons that follow.

I. STATEMENT OF CASE AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company ("Travelers") brought this action for declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, to resolve an insurance dispute with Defendant Jennifer Garcia ("the Estate"), as the personal representative of the estate of David R. Garcia ("Mr. Garcia"). Mr. Garcia was killed in an automobile collision on August 5, 2019. At the time, he was operating a 2019 Nissan NV 200 vehicle ("the vehicle" or "Mr. Garcia's vehicle") owned by Weintraub Inspections & Forensics, Inc. ("Weintraub"), on I-75 south in Hillsborough County, Florida. The vehicle was insured by Travelers under automobile policy BA-7344M580-18-GRP ("the Policy" or "the Travelers Policy").

The material facts of this case are not in dispute. The collision involving Mr. Garcia occurred at 2:30 p.m., near mile marker 261 on I-75 south, when he slowed his vehicle down and began to come to a stop due to a traffic backup. (See Doc. 23, Ex. A, Traffic Crash Report). The driver of a dump truck owned by S & S Site Prep, LLC that was traveling behind Mr. Garcia in the same lane failed to slow down in time and collided with Mr. Garcia's vehicle. (See id. ) The dump truck then overturned and landed on top of Mr. Garcia's vehicle, and Mr. Garcia died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the impact. (See id. ) The traffic backup that caused Mr. Garcia to slow down was the result of a collision that occurred five minutes earlier near mile marker 263 on I-75 south. (See Doc. 23, Ex. B, Traffic Crash Report).1 Neither Mr. Garcia nor his vehicle were "struck, contacted with, or physically impacted by" any vehicle involved in the collision that occurred near mile marker 263. (Doc. 23-4, Estate's Answer to Interrogatory #3; Doc. 23-5, Estate's Answer to Request for Admission #1).

The dump truck that collided with Mr. Garcia's vehicle was covered under an automobile insurance policy that did not afford sufficient liability coverage for the death of Mr. Garcia. The vehicles involved in the earlier collision were also underinsured. Therefore, the Estate submitted a claim for Mr. Garcia's death under the Travelers’ Policy, which contained uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage up to $1,000,000 for each "accident." (Doc. 1-1, p. 19).

In relevant part, the Policy provided as follows:

For purposes of UM coverage, it defined a covered "auto" as one owned by Weintraub (id. at 8, 21), and it provided that an "insured" included anyone occupying a covered "auto." (Id. at 41.)2

The Policy provided for UM coverage as follows:

A. Coverage
1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." The damages must result from "bodily injury" sustained by the "insured" caused by an "accident." The owner's or driver's liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle."

( Id. ). The Policy provided "Limits of Insurance" for each "Coverage." It specified that the amount listed is "the most we will pay for any one accident or loss." (Id. at 8). The Policy also provided:

D. Limit of Insurance
1. Regardless of the number of covered "autos", "insureds", premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the "accident", the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one "accident" is the limit of Uninsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations.

(Id. at 42).

Travelers paid the Estate $1,000,000 in UM benefits based upon a single "accident" having caused Mr. Garcia's death—the dump truck's collision with Mr. Garcia's vehicle. The Estate, however, contends that it is entitled to twice that amount of benefits because there were actually two "accidents" covered by the Policy. More specifically, the Estate takes the position that the collision that caused traffic to slow before the dump truck's collision with Mr. Garcia's vehicle was a separate "accident" and, thus, the Estate has demanded that Travelers pay it an additional $1,000,0000 (for a total of $2,000,000) in UM benefits for the death of Mr. Garcia.

Travelers denied the claim for additional UM benefits under the Policy and brought this one-count lawsuit against the Estate, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was only one "accident" that caused the death of Mr. Garcia and, thus, it has paid to the Estate the entirety of its obligation for UM benefits for a single "accident."

Both parties seek the entry of summary judgment in their favor, essentially asking the Court to decide whether Mr. Garcia's death was caused by one "accident," subject to a limit of $1,000,000, or by two "accidents," for which Travelers would be liable for $1,000,000 per accident.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Porter v. Ray , 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See id. (citation omitted). When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. (citation omitted). If the non-movant's response consists of nothing "more than a repetition of his conclusory allegations," summary judgment is not only proper, but required. Morris v. Ross , 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1981).

III. DISCUSSION
A. The Plain Meaning of the Policy

The issue before the Court is whether the death of Mr. Garcia was caused by one or two "accidents" for purposes of UM coverage under the Policy. To resolve this issue, the Court must first turn to the language in the Policy. Under Florida law, insurance contracts must be construed according to their plain meaning. Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005). And, "like other contracts, contracts of insurance should receive a construction that is reasonable, practical, sensible, and just." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mashburn , 15 So. 3d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). "[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect." Id. "In other words, a single policy provision should not be read in isolation and out of context, for the contract is to be construed according to its entire terms, as set forth in the policy and amplified by the policy application, endorsements, or riders." Id. "The terms of an insurance policy should be taken and understood in their ordinary sense and the policy should receive a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties—not a strained, forced or unrealistic construction." Ducksbury v. Progressive Express Ins. Co. , 211 So. 3d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). "If one interpretation, viewed with the other provisions of the contract and its general object and scope, would lead to an absurd conclusion, that interpretation must be abandoned and one more consistent with reason and probability adopted." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Milgen Dev., Inc. , 297 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ; accord AAA Life Ins. Co. v. Nicolas , 603 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). However, if the policy language is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations—one providing coverage, the other limiting coverage—the policy is ambiguous. Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 819 So. 2d 740, 744 (Fla. 2002). Ambiguous policy provisions are construed in favor of coverage and against the insurer. Id.

"When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning." Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co. , 162 So. 3d 183, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). "A provision is not ambiguous simply because it is complex or requires analysis." Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co. , 969 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 2007). "[C]ourts construe undefined policy terms according to the meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably give it." Owners Ins. Co. v. Berke , 6:17-cv11505-Orl-37TBS, 2018 WL 3850005, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2018).

An examination of the Policy at issue in this case reveals that it limited the amount that Travelers would pay under the UM coverage in four ways. First, it...

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