Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Melick

Citation65 F. 178
Decision Date03 December 1894
Docket Number482.
PartiesTRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD v. MELICK. [1]
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Charles Offutt, for plaintiff in error.

Allen W. Field and Edward P. Holmes, for defendant in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

The first question in this case is whether or not the court below should have instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in error. The Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., the plaintiff in error, insured by its written policy, Dr. Leonard H. Robbins, a physician of Lincoln, Neb., for a term of one year, against death that should result from 'bodily injuries effected during the term of this insurance, through external, violent, and accidental means alone, * * * independently of all other causes. ' The policy provided that:

'This insurance does not cover disappearances; nor suicide, sane or insane; * * * nor accident, nor death, * * * resulting wholly or partly * * * from * * * disease or bodily infirmity, hernia, fits, vertigo, sleepwalking, * * * intentional injuries (inflicted by the insured or any other person).'

Samuel M. Melick, the defendant in error, as administrator of the doctor's estate, brought this action on the policy, and recovered a judgment in the court below. In his petition the administrator alleged that the doctor died June 18, 1890, and that his death was caused by an accidental shot wound in his foot, which he inflicted upon himself June 1, 1890. The answer denied this allegation, and alleged that his death was caused by his cutting his own throat with a scalpel, and that it resulted from intentional self-inflicted injury. The reply denied these allegations of the answer.

There was evidence that the doctor accidentally sent a bullet through the fleshy portion of his foot, June 1, 1890; that the wound thus caused became very painful, confined him to his bed, caused a fever, and gradually reduced his strength until he died, June 18, 1890; that this gunshot would was just such an injury as would naturally produce tetanus or lockjaw; that the doctor and his physicians feared that disease from the first, and that they used chloral and chloroform to relieve the pain and ward off this disease; that in the early morning of June 18, 1890, while the deceased was alone in his room, he was seized with tetanus; that this disease causes the most excruciating pains that human beings ever suffer; that it is fatal in a vast majority of cases; that it produces spasms or convulsions, and sometimes causes death by a spasm of the larynx, which prevents the passage of air through the trachea to or from the lungs; that the doctor was found dead in his bed, June 18, 1890, with a scalpel in his right hand, and his trachea and both his jugular veins cut; that the tetanus was sufficient to produce the death, and the throat-cutting was sufficient to produce it. The administrator, who was not a physician, stated in his proofs of loss that the insured 'took a knife and cut his throat; all evidence shows that the conditions of his mind and his physical condition that prompted the suicide was caused by the shot wound'; and he testified that he thought the loss of blood from the cut produced the death, but he could not say positively. On the other hand, Dr. Shoemaker, who was the attending physician, testified that tetanus was the only cause that he should attribute the death to in this case; and Dr. Hatch, another physician, in answer to an inquiry for his opinion, said:

'Well, there was conclusive evidence that the man was in the embrace of tetanic spasms. It is impossible for mortal to tell, and no one but the recording angel will be able to tell. He was in the embrace of tetanic spasms. I think both. I think tetanic spasms and the cut,-- the two were present when breath left the body.'

Under this state of the evidence, it is assigned as error that the court below refused to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the insurance company; and it is contended that the question whether the shot wound which caused the tetanus, or the throat cutting, was the proximate cause of the death, was a question of law for the court.

In Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474, 476, Mr. Justice Strong, who, said:

'The true rule is that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. * * * In the nature of things, there is in every transaction a succession of events, more or less dependent upon those preceding; and it is the province of a jury to look at this succession of events or facts, and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably connected with each other by a continuous sequence, or are dissevered by new and independent agencies, and this must be determined in view of the circumstances existing at the time.'

This opinion of the supreme court is a complete answer to the contention of the plaintiff in error here. Railway Co. v. Callaghan, 6 C.C.A. 205, 208, 56 F. 988.

It is urged that this question was for the court, and that the court was bound to declare that the cutting was the proximate efficient cause of the death in this case, because the evidence was uncontradicted that the cutting was later in time than the shot wound, and was sufficient to cause the death. This position might be maintained if the cutting was not itself produced by the shot would not have occurred as soon from the tetanus in the absence of the cutting. But the argument begs the primary question in the case,-- whether the cutting was a cause of the death at all. If it neither caused nor hastened the death of the insured, then it was in no sense a cause of it; and, however new or sufficient it may have been to have caused it, it could not relieve the insurance company from a death whose sole cause was the accidental injury. This question was peculiarly one of fact. The insurance company had agreed to pay the promised indemnity for any death that resulted from the accidental shot wound alone. The question was, what did in fact cause the death,-- the shot wound, the cutting, or both? Nor would this case be withdrawn from the effect of this rule if the evidence upon this question was undisputed, for the question is always for the jury where a given state of facts is such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon it. It is only when all reasonable men, fairly exercising their judgments, must draw the same conclusion from an admitted state of facts, that it becomes the duty of the court to withdraw a question of fact from the jury. Railway Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417, 12 Sup.Ct. 679; Railway Co. v. Jarvi, 10 U.S.App. 439, 450, 451, 3 C.C.A. 433, 437, 438, and 53 F. 65; Fuel Co. v. Danielson, 12 U.S.App. 688, 6 C.C.A. 636, and 57 F. 915; Railroad Co. v. Kelley's Adm'rs, 10 U.S.App. 537, 544, 3 C.C.A. 589, 593, and 53 F. 459; Railway Co. v. Ellis, 10 U.S.App. 640, 644, 4 C.C.A. 454, 456, and 54 F. 481. But the evidence in this case was not undisputed. One witness testified that he thought the cutting was the cause of the death, another that tetanus was, and a third that it was both. It was at least doubtful what answer ought to be given to the question upon the evidence. It was by no means clear that no reasonable man could fairly draw the conclusion that the shot wound, and not the cutting, was the cause of the death; and the request to withdraw the case from the jury was properly denied.

A special verdict was rendered by the jury, and it is assigned as error that the court below rendered judgment thereon for the defendant in error. Before entering upon the discussion of this assignment, let us consider what findings were necessary to sustain the claims of the respective parties to this litigation. The administrator had alleged that the shot wound was the cause of the death, and the burden of proof was upon him to establish that fact. The insurance company had denied this averment, and had alleged that the death was caused by the suicidal throat cutting; and the administrator had denied this allegation. That the death was caused by suicide, or self-inflicted injuries, or resulted from any of the excepted causes named in the policy, was matter of defense, and the burden of proof was upon the insurance company to establish it. Again, where it is doubtful from the facts of a case whether a death was caused by accidental injuries or by the suicidal act of the deceased, a presumption of law arises that the accident, and not the suicidal act, was the cause. Mallory v. Insurance Co., 47 N.Y. 52; Cronkhite v. Insurance Co. (Wis.) 43 N.W. 731, 732; Insurance Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661, 667, 8 Sup.Ct. 1360.

The only finding, then, requisite to sustain the administrator's case here was that the shot wound caused the death. It was not incumbent upon him to obtain a finding that the cut pleaded by the insurance company did not cause it; that was the necessary legal effect of a finding that the shot wound did cause it, in the absence of any further finding as to the cause of the death. On the other hand, it should either prevent a finding that the shot wound was the cause of the death, or procure an affirmative finding that it was caused wholly or partly by a suicidal act or intentional self-inflicted injury. In this state of the case, the court submitted to the jury three findings upon this question, and instructed them to return those which stated the facts as they found them. The three proposed findings were:

'(10) We find that the pistol-shot wound received by the said Leonard H. Robbins, on the 1st day of June, 1890, was an accident, and one insured against in said policy of insurance; and that said pistol-shot wound
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