Travelers Ins. Co. v. Corporex Properties, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 August 1992 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 91-110. |
Citation | 798 F. Supp. 423 |
Parties | The TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. CORPOREX PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
L. Clifford Craig, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff.
William R. Jacobs, Strauss & Troy, Covington, Ky., for defendant Corporex.
William R. Jacobs, Strauss & Troy, Covington, Ky., for defendant Terrae Tutela.
Larry Crigler, Burlington, Ky., for defendant Boone County.
Chris Gorman, Office of Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Ky., for defendant Com. of Ky.
In this diversity action, the mortgagee of commercial real estate seeks, among other things, foreclosure. The matter came before the court for hearing on the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and order of sale. Robert A. Winter, Jr., L. Clifford Craig, and Michael J. Zavatsky appeared on behalf of Travelers Insurance Company hereinafter Travelers. Martin C. Butler and William R. Jacobs appeared on behalf of the defendants, Corporex Properties, Inc. hereinafter Corporex, and Terrae Tutela Corporation hereinafter Terrae.
For the reasons set forth at the hearing on this matter and for the additional reasons set forth below, IT IS ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION BE GRANTED IN PART.
The material facts are undisputed. On September 12, 1985, Corporex and Travelers executed a Mortgage Note in the amount of $6,400,000 hereinafter Note, and a Mortgage Deed and Surety Agreement hereinafter Mortgage. The Note contains an acceleration clause for failure to make payments of interest or principal when due. The Mortgage contains a similar acceleration clause in addition to the remedy of foreclosure for failure to make payments when due or for other breaches enumerated in the Mortgage. Transfer of any or part of the mortgaged property without prior written consent of Travelers would constitute a default under the Mortgage and Note. Mortgage ¶¶ 14, 18; Note at 2-3. Finally, both documents contain "no waiver" provisions: that is, failure of Travelers to exercise any of its rights does not constitute a waiver of any continuing or future default. Mortgage ¶ 20; Note at 5. The Note is a nonrecourse instrument.
Beginning October 1, 1990, Corporex failed to pay monthly installments of principal, interest and late charges when due. By late 1990, Corporex approached Travelers in an attempt to discuss a "workout." From January until July the parties attempted to negotiate a workout, without success, and Travelers filed this action on July 12, 1991.
Corporex contends that Travelers engaged in certain "inequitable conduct" that may defeat Travelers' right to demand foreclosure. Corporex also argues that Travelers breached a duty to act reasonably and in good faith.
Corporex's argument derives from the premise that Travelers was under an obligation to reach an agreement on the terms of a workout. Corporex, however, cites no authority supporting this premise. A statutory duty applied to farm loans is the only circumstance in which a court has found any mention of an obligation on the part of the mortgagee to attempt to restructure. See, e.g., Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Debuf, 757 F.Supp. 1106, 1109 (D.Mont.1990). The statute and regulation relevant to those cases do not apply here.
Although it is recognized that implied in each contract is a covenant of "good faith and fair dealing," such a covenant does not preclude a party from enforcing the terms of the contract. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir.1985); Ranier v. Mount Sterling Nat'l Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ky.1991). It is not "inequitable" or a breach of good faith and fair dealing in a commercial setting for one party to act according to the express terms of a contract for which it bargained. Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. Western Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 983 (8th Cir.1991); Kham & Nates Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357-58 (7th Cir.1990).
Corporex cites two lines of cases discussing waiver, estoppel and inequitable conduct. The first line of cases holds that a mortgagee who repeatedly accepts late and/or partial payments is not entitled to accelerate the loan based on those payments. See, e.g., Karas v. Wasserman, 91 A.D.2d 812, 458 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (1982). These cases are inapplicable because there is no evidence that Travelers accepted such payments prior to issuing the letter of default and acceleration in January, 1991.
The second line of cases holds that a mortgagee may be estopped from pursuing a foreclosure either because its conduct was such that the mortgagor could have reasonably assumed that the mortgagee would not foreclose or because the mortgagee orally agreed to give the mortgagor time to negotiate a voluntary sale. E.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland (CF8) Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.1989) (applying New York law); First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Comprop Inv. Properties, Ltd., 752 F.Supp. 1568, 1575 (M.D.Fla.1990) (applying Florida law).
Without considering the viability of these doctrines under Kentucky law, it is clear that neither line of authorities applies to this case. It is undisputed that a private sale in lieu of foreclosure was not contemplated by the parties. Corporex wanted a restructuring, or "workout," of the loan; Corporex agreed, in writing, that Travelers was not waiving any rights in attempting to negotiate a workout; and Travelers accepted Corporex's interest payments during this period upon the express condition that the payments did not cure the breach and were not a waiver of Travelers' rights.
For example, a letter dated January 10, 1991, from John Bond, Vice President and Account Manager of Travelers, to William Butler, President and CEO of Corporex and Terrae, provides:
Butler Dep., Ex. 8. Butler signed the agreement on January 11, 1991.
Travelers' acceptance of partial interest payments was made expressly without a waiver of rights, and Corporex acknowledged the same. For example, in a letter to Butler dated January 17, 1991, Travelers' Regional Counsel acknowledged receipt of a payment of $54,400.97. The letter states in part:
On June 10, 1991, after negotiations had proven unsuccessful, Travelers sent a letter to Butler, which provides in part:
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