Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pondi-Salik

• Decision Date: 25 March 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16765)
• Citation: 817 A.2d 663,262 Conn. 746
• Parties: TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHELLE PONDI-SALIK
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

262 Conn. 746

817 A.2d 663

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. MICHELLE PONDI-SALIK

(SC 16765)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 9, 2002.

Officially released March 25, 2003.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz and Vertefeuille, Js. Paul E. Pollock, for the appellant (plaintiff).

William F. Gallagher, with whom were Harold L. Rosnick and, on the brief, Hugh D. Hughes, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The plaintiff, Travelers Insurance Company, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendant, Michelle Pondi-Salik. The defendant, a former state trooper who had been injured while on duty, filed an uninsured motorist claim with the plaintiff, which had issued an automobile insurance policy to the defendant's employer, the state of Connecticut. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that benefits paid or payable to the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 5-192p,¹ were not disability benefits but, rather, constituted retirement benefits, which were not deductible from the defendant's award of uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy at issue. We conclude that the benefits granted under § 5-192p are retirement benefits that should not be deducted from the award, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.²

The trial court's memorandum of decision sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "On December 1, 1988, Aetna Casualty [and] Surety Company issued an automobile insurance policy to the state of Connecticut (policy). The plaintiff . . . is the successor corporation to Aetna Casualty [and] Surety Company. The policy included a section for uninsured motorist coverage which provided that amounts paid thereunder are subject to a one million dollar limit and shall be reduced by amounts paid under workers' compensation, disability benefits or similar law. . . .

"On August 30, 1989, while operating a vehicle insured under the policy and acting in the performance of her duties as a Connecticut state trooper, the defendant... was injured in an automobile accident. As a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, the defendant recovered workers' compensation benefits and disability retirement benefits under . . . § 5-192p. It is undisputed that the defendant became disabled as a result of the injuries she incurred in the accident, that she was performing her duties as a state employee at the time of the accident and that she was what the state of Connecticut refers to as a tier II employee.³ "In accordance with General Statutes § 38a-336 and the terms of the policy, the defendant filed an uninsured motorist claim with the plaintiff. Pursuant to . . . § 38a-336 (c)⁴ and the policy,⁵ the claim was submitted to arbitration and was heard by a panel of three arbitrators. On October 30, 2000, the majority of the arbitrators found in favor of the defendant and awarded her $827,025.62. Specifically, the arbitrators stated: `We find the issues in favor of the [defendant], and find that [she] is entitled to gross damages of $2,224,540 comprised of $1,474,540 for economic damages and $750,000 in non-economic damages. We further find that the [defendant] was contributorily negligent in the amount of 10 [percent] and therefore reduce the gross award to $2,002,086. We find that the total uninsured motorist coverage is $1,000,000 and that amount should be reduced by $172,974.38 representing workers' compensation benefits received. We therefore find in favor of the [defendant] and award her the sum of $827,025.62, which is the balance of the uninsured motorist coverage.'. . . On the issue of the benefits the defendant is eligible to receive under . . . § 5-192p, the arbitrators found that such benefits are retirement benefits, as opposed to disability benefits, and thus should not be deducted from the amount awarded to the [defendant]." The trial court also noted that one of the arbitrators issued a dissenting opinion in which he concluded that the benefits awarded under § 5-192p were disability retirement benefits that should have been deducted from the amount due to the defendant pursuant to the policy.

"On November 16, 2000, the plaintiff filed an application to vacate the arbitration award and contend[ed] that the arbitrators erred in not deducting the benefits the defendant received under § 5-192p from the uninsured motorist benefits they awarded to her."⁶ The trial court affirmed the arbitrators' award, concluding that the benefits provided by § 5-192p are retirement benefits, not disability benefits, and, therefore, not deductible from the award pursuant to the terms of the policy. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly refused to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the award should have been reduced by the benefits the defendant had received pursuant to § 5-192p.⁷ The defendant responds that benefits provided under § 5-192p are retirement benefits, not disability benefits, and are not deductible from the uninsured motorist award under the policy. We agree with the defendant.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review that will govern our analysis of this issue. The standard of review for arbitration awards is determined by whether the arbitration was compulsory or voluntary.⁸ This court recognized the fundamental differences between voluntary and compulsory arbitration in American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 190-91, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). The court concluded therein that "where judicial review of compulsory arbitration proceedings required by [§ 38a-336 (c)] is undertaken . . . the reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of the interpretation and application of the law by the arbitrators. The court is not bound by the limitations contractually placed on the extent of its review as in voluntary arbitration proceedings." Id., 191. A reviewing court therefore must conduct a de novo review of the arbitrators' decision on coverage issues because such issues are subject to compulsory arbitration. Quigley-Dodd v. General Accident Ins. Co. of America, 256 Conn. 225, 234, 772 A.2d 577 (2001).

The threshold question of whether the benefits allowed pursuant to § 5-192p are retirement benefits or disability benefits presents a question of statutory interpretation. "[W]e now restate the process by which we interpret statutes as follows: The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Thus, this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity. Thus, we do not follow the plain meaning rule.

"In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.

"This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extratextual sources of meaning will have to be in order to yield a different meaning." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78, 816 A.2d 562 (2003).

The policy at issue in the present case provides that "[a]ny amount payable under this [uninsured motorist] coverage shall be reduced by . . . [a]ll sums paid or payable under any workers' compensation, disability benefits or similar law . . . ." Because the inclusion of such a provision in the policy was authorized by § 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, its propriety is not in dispute. We must decide whether the benefits provided to the defendant under § 5-192p are disability benefits or benefits received pursuant to a law similar to our workers' compensation or disability benefit statutes.

General Statutes § 5-192p (a) provides: "If a member of tier II, while in state service, becomes disabled as defined in subsection (b) of this section, prior to age sixty-five, he is eligible for disability retirement if the member has completed at least ten years of vested service. If a member of tier II, while in state service, becomes so disabled as a result of any injury received while in the performance of his duty as a state employee, he is eligible for disability retirement, regardless of his period of state service or his...