Travis v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co., Docket Nos. 101028

Decision Date31 July 1996
Docket Number102147,Docket Nos. 101028,Nos. 1-2,s. 1-2
Citation551 N.W.2d 132,453 Mich. 149
PartiesAimee Sue TRAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DREIS AND KRUMP MANUFACTURING COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Defendant, and Greenville Wire Products Company, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellant. Stanislaw GOLEC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. METAL EXCHANGE CORPORATION, a Missouri corporation, Continental Aluminum Company, Clifford J. Meyer, Henry A. Szybowicz, Richard Rziemkowski, Bogdan J. Mazur, Defendants-Appellants. Calendar
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Law Offices of Jeffrey H. Feldman, P.C. by Paul L. Kaliszewski, Southfield, for plaintiff in Travis.

Kepes, Wine & McNeilage, P.C. by Carol A. McNeilage, Southfield, and (Paskin, Nagi & Baxter, P.C., of counsel by Jeannette A. Paskin and Daniel J. Seymour), Detroit, for plaintiff in Golec.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Robert E. Attmore, Grand Rapids, for defendant in Travis.

Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn by William D. Sargent, Russell S. Linden, and Cameron J. Evans, Detroit, for defendants in Golec.

Conklin, Benham, Ducey, Listman & Chuhran, P.C. by Martin L. Critchell, Detroit, for Amicus Curiae, Michigan Self-Insurers' Association.

Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett by Joseph J. Vogan, Grand Rapids, for Amicus Curiae, American Society of Employers.

Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. by Leonard B. Schwartz and Patrick Burkett, Southfield, for Amici Curiae, Michigan Association of Insurance Companies, the Amerisure Companies, and Michigan Chamber of Commerce.

Clark, Klein & Beaumont, P.L.C. by Dwight H. Vincent and J. Walker Henry, Detroit, for Amicus Curiae, Michigan Manufacturers Association.

BOYLE, Justice.

These consolidated cases involve the proper construction of the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.131(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(131)(1). The precise issues framed by the parties are (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiffs are sufficient as a matter of law to state a question for the jury regarding liability within the intentional tort exception of the WDCA, (2) whether it is a question for the court or the jury whether an intentional tort has been committed by an employer, and (3) the extent to which, if at all, plaintiff Stanislaw Golec may maintain his intentional tort claim against the individual coemployees.

We would hold that plaintiff Travis has presented facts insufficient to establish an intentional tort. While her employer was negligent and even reckless, the statute requires a specific intent to injure. Defendant Greenville Wire did not exhibit such an intent. On the other hand, plaintiff Golec has alleged facts sufficient to create an issue for the jury regarding whether supervisory personnel of defendant Metal Exchange Corporation possessed actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur, and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.

Regarding the second issue, it is a question of law for the court whether the facts as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaints are sufficient to constitute intentional torts. However, whether the facts alleged are in fact true is an issue for the jury. Regarding the third issue, which was only raised in Golec, we would hold that the claims against all the individual defendants except defendant Rziemkowski must be dismissed. Plaintiff Golec has shown that defendant Rziemkowski may have acted with the intent to injure. While the exclusive remedy for negligence of a coemployee is the WDCA, coemployees whose intentional acts cause injury are liable in tort to the injured coemployee.

Facts and Procedural History
I

Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co.

Plaintiff Aimee Sue Travis was employed by Greenville Wire Products Co. On March 30, 1989, after plaintiff worked for the company for about seven months, she was assigned to operate a press brake equipped with a die that formed refrigerator wires.

Plaintiff's supervisor, William J. Clarke, showed plaintiff how to operate the press. He instructed her that she was to place the wires into the die with her hands, push the palm buttons to cycle the press, then reach into the die space to remove the wires after they had been formed. The press was designed not to run unless the operator's hands were on the palm buttons. Clarke operated the press for a few cycles without incident to demonstrate to plaintiff how to do the job.

While plaintiff had used the press one time previously, she had never been required to place her hands in the die space of this press or any other machine. After plaintiff operated the press for about an hour, the press "double cycled," that is, it cycled without plaintiff pressing the palm buttons. This was the only time the press had double cycled while plaintiff was operating it. Unfortunately, plaintiff's hands were in the die space when the press double cycled, and she was unable to remove her hands before the die came down. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries to her hands, including the amputation of both of her fifth fingers.

Unbeknownst to plaintiff, the press had been malfunctioning for approximately one month. Clarke testified in his deposition that maintenance employees had been adjusting the exterior mechanisms of the press, which would temporarily correct the problem sometimes for one to two weeks, and sometimes only for a day or two. Clarke testified that, except in plaintiff's case, each time the press double cycled, the operator was able to identify the problem, avoid injury, and report it to Clarke. At that time, the press would be shut down until further adjustments could be made that corrected the problem. Clarke opined that because the press cycled so slowly, an operator could avoid injury even when it was double cycling.

Rodney King, Greenville Wire's tool room supervisor, testified in his deposition that he learned the day before plaintiff's injury that the press was double cycling again when another press operator refused to run it for that reason. King believed that the problem was such that exterior adjustments could not correct it. King concluded that the press had to be torn down in order to properly repair it, and consequently advised Clarke to shut it down. Clarke refused to do so, King testified, because Clarke believed that would take too long and the parts would have to be sent out.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in Montcalm Circuit Court against both Dreis and Krump, the manufacturer of the press, and Greenville Wire, her employer. Regarding defendant Greenville Wire, plaintiff alleged that her employer knew the press was double cycling and thus posed a risk of amputation, yet required her to work in the face of that known danger. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant failed to warn her that the press was double cycling.

Greenville Wire moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), contending that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. § 418.131(1); M.S.A. § 17.237(131)(1), because she had failed to establish a prima facie case of the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that the facts as alleged by plaintiff failed to show that defendant had the requisite specific intent, or that it knew an injury was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 207 Mich.App. 1, 523 N.W.2d 818 (1994). It determined that plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to constitute an intentional tort. It reasoned that Clarke had been informed that the press was double cycling, that it was dangerous, and that someone would be hurt if it was run. Clarke failed to shut down the machine in order to make the proper repairs because doing so would take too long and the machine was needed to produce parts. 207 Mich.App. at 7, 523 N.W.2d 818. Further, Clarke assigned plaintiff, a relative novice, to the press without informing her of its tendency to double cycle. Accordingly, it remanded the matter to the trial court. Id.

II

Golec v. Metal Exchange Corp.

Plaintiff Stanislaw Golec worked for defendant Metal Exchange Corporation, doing business as Continental Aluminum Company, an aluminum smelting factory. Plaintiff had returned to work for defendant Metal Exchange Corporation in early December, 1988, after an eighteen-month disability leave. After his return, plaintiff worked first as a packer then as a furnace loader. On the night of December 27-28, 1988, plaintiff was assigned to load furnace number two with scrap metal. Plaintiff used a tractor equipped with a bucket to scoop the scrap from a pile on the floor and place it into the furnace.

Normally, the furnace operators used a John Deere tractor equipped with a plexiglass splash guard when loading the furnace with scrap, however that vehicle was out of service. Instead, plaintiff used a tractor without a splash guard. Plaintiff was wearing no protective clothing except a helmet and mask and alleged in his complaint that he was not provided with other protective clothing.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware that the scrap was damp and that aerosol cans were present in the scrap, and that scrap that is wet or that contains closed aerosol cans could lead to an explosion if placed in the furnace. Defendants contended that its employees were instructed to examine the scrap for aerosol cans before loading it into the furnace, and were also instructed on how to safely load damp scrap into the furnace. The defense also asserted that plaintiff failed to follow these instructions. Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that he was instructed to load wet scrap slowly, and it would "melt." However, contrary to the defendants' assertions, plaintiff testified that he was not told to separate closed aerosol cans from the scrap pile.

At about 11:00 p.m., a minor explosion...

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