Travis v. Morgridge
Decision Date | 22 January 2013 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:12-CV-96 |
Parties | ERROL MARTELL TRAVIS, Plaintiff, v. MARVIN MORGRIDGE et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
On November 2, 2012, Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody issued a Report and Recommendation (R & R) (docket no. 65) recommending that this Court grant Defendant Marvin Morgridge's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 43) because Plaintiff, Errol Travis, failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. On November 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a timely Objection to the R & R, arguing, as he did in his Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, that he attempted to file a Step I grievance but the grievance coordinator failed to assign his grievance a unique identifying number and she "refused" to provide Plaintiff with a Step II or Step III grievance form (docket no. 48, Page ID 153). Because the Court finds that Defendant has failed to properly support his Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will reject the magistrate judge's R & R and remand Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for further consideration.
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thealleged events occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility (ICF). Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2011, around 6:00 p.m., Defendant sexually assaulted him by touching his penis during a shakedown of the prison food service building. When Plaintiff asked Defendant why he had inappropriately touched him, Defendant denied doing so. Plaintiff reported the incident to his work supervisor, Gary Haywood, on August 3, 2011, at 3 p.m. Haywood informed Plaintiff that there was nothing that Haywood could do about the incident, but stated that Plaintiff could file a grievance. The same day, as Plaintiff was leaving the food service building around 6:15 p.m., Defendant again allegedly touched Plaintiff's penis during a shakedown. Plaintiff states that he asked Defendant why he kept touching Plaintiff's penis, and in response, Defendant told Plaintiff to go sit down, which Plaintiff did. After Defendant finished the shakedown of the other prisoners, Defendant went to speak with Haywood about the incidents. When Defendant returned, he wrote a misconduct ticket for Plaintiff, claiming that Plaintiff had said, "If you touch me again, I'm going to fuck you up," which Plaintiff denies. Plaintiff was then taken to administrative segregation. On Aug. 12, 2001, Plaintiff informed his appellate attorney of the assault. Counsel sent him a letter containing information on how to file a complaint. On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the Michigan Office of Legislative Corrections Ombudsman, complaining that he had been sexually assaulted. On September 1, 2011, and again on September 12, 2011, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the ICF prison inspector, Goodson, complaining that Plaintiff had been sexually assaulted and requesting that the Michigan State Police pursue criminal prosecution of Defendant. On September 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Step I grievance. (Id., Ex. B2.) The Step I grievance form attached to Plaintiff's Complaint does not have a grievance identification number, nor is the bottom portion of the form—the area designated for an administrative response—completed. (See id.) Plaintiff allegesthat on September 28, 2011, the grievance coordinator, M. Breedlove, called Plaintiff out to the prison control center to discuss the Step I grievance Plaintiff filed on September 26, 2011. Breedlove told Plaintiff that she could not handle the grievance, but the deputy warden could do so. The same day, Plaintiff spoke with Deputy Warden Norwood, who had Plaintiff write a statement of facts. (Id., Ex. B3.) The following day, Inspector Goodson called Plaintiff out to speak about the complaint, and informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff's complaint and misconduct hearing packet would be attached to Plaintiff's September 26, 2011, grievance. Inspector Goodson also read Plaintiff a statement from Haywood, but Plaintiff was not provided a copy of the statement. On October 15, 2011, Plaintiff sent a kite to the grievance coordinator requesting a copy of the grievance hearing packet for the September 26, 2011, Step I grievance. (Id., Ex. B4.) Plaintiff stated in the kite that it was his second kite requesting that the grievance coordinator send him a grievance receipt for the September 26, 2011, Step I grievance. (Id.) He also noted that it had been two weeks without a response. (Id.) On October 20, 2011, Plaintiff also wrote to Deputy Warden Norwood requesting information on the status of his September 28, 2011, complaint. (Id., Ex. B5.) Plaintiff claims he never received a response to his Step I grievance. In January 2012, after learning that Plaintiff's "complaint and grievance came up missing," Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, specifically noting in his Complaint that he had made efforts to exhaust all his remedies. (Id., Page ID 7.)
When a party properly objects to any part of a magistrate judge's disposition, this Court must conduct a de novo review of the disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After a thorough review of the R & R, Plaintiff's objections, and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court concludes that the R & R should be rejected.
The R & R recommends that this Court grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmentbecause Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies through the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) grievance process. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rupert v. Daggett, 695 F.3d 417, 423 (2012) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2008)) (citations omitted). A moving party can satisfy its burden by showing that "the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case." Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). Once a moving party demonstrates that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the nonmoving party "must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial." Amini, 440 F.3d at 357 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2502, 2510 (1986)). While a moving party need only show that the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, see Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2000), a moving party with the burden of proof faces a "substantially higher hurdle." Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). "[W]here a moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden ofproof "must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it." Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quotation omitted). Therefore, summary judgment is "inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1552 (1999).
In this case, Defendant limits his summary judgment motion to the single issue of administrative exhaustion.1 A prisoner asserting an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with respect prison conditions is required by statute to exhaust all "administrative remedies as are available" to the prisoner before filing a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002). Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216, 127 S. Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Rather, the failure of a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the defendant bears the burden of establishing. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the requisite exhaustion is "proper exhaustion," defined as "compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006).
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