Traylor v. Hammond

• Decision Date: 18 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 3:12cv01625AWT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Sylvester TRAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Ulysses B. HAMMOND, Laura Newman, Jeremy Nakamara, Steward Smith, Denise Pelletier, Connecticut College, Tanya A. Bovee, Jackson Lewis LLP, City of New London, and Lawrence M. Keating, Defendants.

94 F.Supp.3d 203

Sylvester TRAYLOR, Plaintiff

v.Ulysses B. HAMMOND, Laura Newman, Jeremy Nakamara, Steward Smith, Denise Pelletier, Connecticut College, Tanya A. Bovee, Jackson Lewis LLP, City of New London, and Lawrence M. Keating, Defendants.

Civil No. 3:12cv01625AWT.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 18, 2015.

Sylvester Traylor, Quaker Hill, CT, pro se.

Joann D. Obi, Jody N. Cappello, Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP, Maciej A. Piatkowski, Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ALVIN W. THOMPSON, District Judge.

In the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 39), which is the operative complaint, plaintiff Sylvester Traylor asserts claims against defendants Ulysses B. Hammond, Steward Smith and Connecticut College (the “Connecticut College Defendants”); the City of New London and Sergeant Lawrence M. Keating (the “New London Defendants”); and Laura Newman and Jeremy Nakamara (the “Individual Defendants”) for defamation of character (Count One), municipal liability (Monell claim) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two), discriminatory practice in violation of the Constitution and statutes of Connecticut (Count Three), retaliation practice in violation of Section 1983 (Count Four), negligence (Count Five), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count Six), violations of, and conspiracy to violate, due process and equal protection guarantees under federal and state law (Count Seven), spoliation and destruction of evidence (Count Eight) and declaratory and injunctive relief (Count Nine).

The defendants have moved to dismiss each claim pending against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).¹ For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are being granted, except with respect to Count Seven, the claim under the Connecticut Constitution against defendants Lawrence M. Keating and the City of New London, which is being remanded to state court.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The Amended Complaint, “which [the court] must accept as true for purposes of testing its sufficiency,” alleges the following circumstances. Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 244 (2d Cir.1997).

On April 14, 2011, Traylor went to Connecticut College “with the intention of locating an artist who he wished to commission to make artistic renderings of his appearances before New London Superior Court” in an unrelated matter. (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) Traylor went to the Cummings Art Building, which he believed was open to the public based on information posted on Connecticut College's website, and spoke to three faculty members on the second level of the building. One of the faculty members he spoke with, Denise Pelletier, told Traylor that “someone, maybe on the third (3rd) level, might be able to do the [artwork].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 53.) Traylor proceeded to the third level where he heard loud music and saw two young children running from a doorway. Through the doorway, Traylor was able to see a nude woman, defendant Newman, who was posing for an artist. Traylor went through the doorway and directly to the artist, defendant Nakamara, to inquire about having him complete the courtroom sketches he sought. Newman did not cover-up or ask Traylor to leave. Traylor spoke with Nakamara for three to five minutes, gave Nakamara his phone number and then left, turning back to say “I'm sorry for interrupting your session! Have a nice day.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 53, 69, 93.)

As he walked back to his car, Traylor noticed a security officer “talking on what looked like a cell phone or radio.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) Once he was in his car, Traylor proceeded to the campus exit, but then decided to turn around. Traylor approached the security officer and asked “whether the security officer was looking for him because of his continual stare in Mr. Traylor's direction.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) The officer asked Traylor whether he had recently been on the third level of the Cummings Art Building and Traylor confirmed that he had and that he was there because he was looking for an artist to do some courtroom sketches. Traylor told the security officer that he had given Nakamara his name and telephone number.

At that point another security officer arrived. Traylor suggested that the first officer confirm his statement with Nakamara, and the officer agreed to do so. One or two minutes later, defendant Keating arrived. Keating is a City of New London police officer who was previously employed as a security guard at Connecticut College.

Traylor stepped out of his car, locked it, and began to walk towards Keating's police car. “[T]he Police officers started to yell at Mr. Traylor ‘Get back in your car! ! !’ ” (Am. Compl. ¶ 60.) Traylor turned and began walking back towards his car and reached into his pocket to retrieve his car keys. As he did so, one of the police officers approached Traylor from behind and began to frisk him. The officer, addressing Traylor by his first name, asked him whether he had any weapons, to which Traylor responded that he did not. Traylor further stated that he was on campus to hire an artist to do some artwork. The officer then looked in Traylor's car, saw a Coast Guard Academy bag and asked Traylor what he was doing with the bag. Traylor indicated that he was a veteran.

Keating handcuffed Traylor and made him sit on the curb behind his car where passersby were able to see him. Keating “interrogated [Traylor] while in handcuffs” and did not read Traylor his Miranda rights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 64.) The other officer also asked Traylor why he was on campus. Additionally, neither Keating nor the other officer asked Traylor for his driver's license and neither officer turned his microphone or “dash-cam” on during the incident with Traylor. (Am. Compl. ¶ 66, 147.)

After the security officer had confirmed Traylor's account with Newman and Nakamara, Keating and the security officers asked Traylor if he had “looked back” at Newman as he was exiting the room that she and Nakamara were in. (Am. Compl. ¶ 68.) Traylor stated that he had and that he had done so to see if Newman knew that “the door was wide open and that the open door allowed the General Public to view her.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 69.)

Keating directed the other police officer to issue Traylor a citation for trespassing. The police report associated with the incident reflects that Traylor had told Nakamara and Newman that he was looking for an artist to complete courtroom sketches for him, but Nakamara and Newman felt that Traylor was not being truthful.

Prior to going to Connecticut College on April 14, 2011, Traylor had filed complaints with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) against the City of New London.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’ ” Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 34 F.Supp.2d 130, 131 (D.Conn.1999), quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984). “The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.” United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Conn.1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683 ).

In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1993).

When considering the sufficiency of the allegations in a pro se complaint, the court applies “less stringent standards than [those applied to] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) ; see also Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 628–29 (2d Cir.1996). Furthermore, the court should interpret the plaintiff's complaint “to raise the strongest arguments [it] suggest[s].” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Traylor contends that the defendants' motions to dismiss are barred by collateral estoppel and the law of the case doctrine because the court already ruled on the defendants' arguments in its Order re Dismissal of Certain Claims and Scheduling (Doc. No. 28) (“Order re Dismissal”). (See ...