Traylor v. State
| Decision Date | 16 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 70051,70051 |
| Citation | 596 So.2d 957 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly S42 John Edward TRAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender and Davis P. Gauldin, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Crim. Appeals, and Norma J. Mungenast and Bradford L. Thomas, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
We have for review Traylor v. State, 498 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), based on conflict with State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We approve the decision of the district court but disapprove its standard for harmless error.
Tina Nagy was found stabbed to death in her Jacksonville apartment on June 7, 1980. Traylor was charged by information with second-degree murder for the crime on June 11, but was not apprehended at that time. Debra Beason was found stabbed and strangled in Birmingham, Alabama, on August 5, 1980, and Traylor was arrested by Alabama police for the crime the next day under the name of Jason Riley. Traylor was charged in Alabama with the Beason murder and requested and received appointment of counsel on that charge at a preliminary hearing on August 18. Two days later, his lawyer told Traylor not to speak with police and instructed Alabama police not to talk to his client.
A computer check of Traylor's fingerprints revealed his true identity and showed that he was wanted in Florida for the Nagy murder. Detective Warren of the Jacksonville police flew to Birmingham to question him about the Florida crime. On August 22, Warren, who was never told that counsel had been appointed, initiated questioning of Traylor relative to both crimes after advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and obtaining a written waiver. During this session, Traylor confessed orally and in writing to the Florida murder and orally to the Alabama murder. He was tried and convicted of second-degree murder for the Alabama crime, Riley v. State, 501 So.2d 551 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), and was temporarily returned to Florida in March 1983 and charged by indictment with first-degree murder for the Nagy killing.
Prior to trial on the Florida offense, Traylor moved to suppress the confessions to both crimes, 1 claiming that the statements were obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination under both Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and of his right to counsel under both Article I, Section 16, Florida Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court denied the motion. The confessions were admitted into evidence at trial and the jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. The district court affirmed.
The district court made the following determinations. Under federal law Traylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached as to the Alabama crime, and counsel had been appointed on that charge. The confession to the crime was obtained through police-initiated questioning without the assistance of counsel and was thus unlawful. As to the confession to the Florida crime, Traylor's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at the time the Florida information was issued, but counsel had not been requested or appointed on that charge. Because the Miranda warning had been insufficient to inform Traylor of the availability of his Sixth Amendment right, this confession too was unlawfully obtained, but use of the confessions at trial was harmless error in light of other overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Traylor claims that the district court erred in finding that the use of the confessions was harmless. The State, on the other hand, contends that the district court erred in ruling that the confessions should have been suppressed.
The basic issue before us is whether the trial court erred in admitting the confessions, and, if so, whether the error was harmless. To be held admissible, the confessions must pass muster under both the state and federal constitutions. Consistent with federalist principles set forth below, we examine the confessions initially under our state Constitution; only if they pass muster here need we re-examine them under federal law. Before we apply our state law, however, we must first define its basic contours under Article I, Sections 9 and 16, Florida Constitution.
The courts of at least eleven states have chosen to interpret the self-incrimination provisions of their own state constitutions in a manner independent of the federal Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. 2 Under our federalist system of government, states may place more rigorous restraints on government intrusion than the federal charter imposes; they may not, however, place more restrictions on the fundamental rights of their citizens than the federal Constitution permits. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). 3 Federalist principles recognize that although some government intrusion into the life of the individual is inevitable, such intrusion is to be minimized. Government encroachment is thus restricted by both the federal and state constitution.
The federal Constitution secures a common degree of protection for the citizens of all fifty states, but the federal Court has wisely exercised restraint in construing the extent of this protection for several reasons. First, under our federalist system, many important decisions concerning basic freedoms have traditionally inhered in the states. Second, the federal Court's precedent is binding on all jurisdictions within the union; once it settles a matter, further experimentation with potentially rewarding alternative approaches in other jurisdictions is foreclosed. Third, federal precedent applies equally throughout fifty diverse and independent states; a ruling that may be suitable in one may be inappropriate in others. And fourth, the federal union embraces a multitude of localities; the Court oftentimes is simply unfamiliar with local problems, conditions and traditions. See generally San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
State courts do not suffer these prudential concerns to the same degree as the federal Court. First, unlike their federal counterparts, state courts and constitutions have traditionally served as the prime protectors of their citizens' basic freedoms. State constitutions were the initial and prime charters of individual rights throughout most of our nation's existence:
By 1776 most American citizens enjoyed guarantees against encroachment on their liberties by state governments because most of the original thirteen colonies had adopted constitutions with provisions protecting individual rights. The framers of the federal Bill of Rights, which the states adopted in 1791, naturally relied on these state provisions as sources for their document. The federal document sought to provide citizens with protections against interference by the federal government analogous to existing state constitutional protections against interference by state governments.
For the first one hundred and fifty years of our nation's existence, the origins of state constitutional provisions were of little import for federal constitutional jurisprudence. During this period the federal constitution and state constitutions operated independently in regulating the interaction between government and citizen. The federal Bill of Rights protected citizens only from actions of the federal government, while state constitutions limited only intrusive action by the states. Because state governments affected individuals far more frequently during this period than did the federal government, state constitutions were the primary documents protecting the liberties of the people from governmental interference.
Mary A. Crossley, Note, Miranda and the State Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 Vand.L.Rev. 1693, 1696 (1986) (footnotes omitted). State courts function daily as the prime arbiters of personal rights. 4 An assertive state court thus impinges on no traditional federal prerogative where basic rights are concerned.
Second, unlike the federal Court, a state court's decision construing its own constitution is controlling only as to courts within that state; the ruling will not stifle the development of alternative methods of constitutional analysis in other jurisdictions.
To stay experimentation ... is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel ... experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311, 52 S.Ct. 371, 386-87, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). And finally, no court is more sensitive or responsive to the needs of the diverse localities within a state, or the state as a whole, than that state's own high court. In any given state, the federal Constitution thus represents the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling. See Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 Rutgers L.Rev. 707, 709 (1983).
Federal and state bills of rights thus serve distinct but complementary purposes. The federal Bill of Rights facilitates political and philosophical homogeneity among the basically heterogeneous states by securing, as a uniform minimum, the highest common denominator of freedom that can prudently be administered throughout all fifty states. The state bills of rights, on the other hand,...
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