Treadway v. City of Rockford

• Decision Date: 23 March 1962
• Docket Number: No. 36751,36751
• Citation: Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill.2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. 1962)
• Parties: Ray TREADWAY et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF ROCKFORD et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 219

182 N.E.2d 219

24 Ill.2d 488

Ray TREADWAY et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF ROCKFORD et al., Appellees.

No. 36751.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 23, 1962.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1962.

Berry & Simmons, Rockford, for appellants.

Brown, Connolly & Paddock, Rockford, for Lakewood Subdivision Co.

William E. Collins, Corp. Counsel, Rockford, for City of Rockford (David S. Paddock, Kenneth F. Ritz and William E. Collins, Rockford, of counsel).

HERSHEY, Chef Justice.

This is a suit to declare invalid an ordinance of the city of Rockford rezoning certain property from a residential to a business classification, and to enjoin the construction of a shopping center thereon. The plaintiffs, an adjoining property owner and nearby neighbors, attack the substance of the ordinance as unreasonable and unconstitutional and also contend the ordiance is invalid because of a failure to follow the requisite procedural steps in its enactment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants but included in its order a number of conditions and restrictions not included in the ordinance. Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and defendants have filed a cross appeal, contending that the additional restrictions imposed by the trial court are erroneous and should be stricken.

The trial judge certified that the case involves the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance as applied to the property in question, but he did not certify that in his opinion the public interest requires a direct appeal. Although the certificate is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on direct the case is properly before us because a constitutional question is involved. See Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 19 Ill.2d 487, 167 N.E.2d 401; La Salle National Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65.

Three questions are raised on appeal: (1) whether the amendatory ordinance was validly enacted; (2) whether the amendatory ordinance is unreasonable and unconstitutional; (3) whether the trial court erred in incorporating in its order conditions and restrictions not included in the ordinance. A purely logical procedure suggests that these questions should be considered in the order stated, since disposition of the first might make it unnecessary to consider the other two, and disposition of the second might render consideration of the third superfluous. Under the somewhat unusual circumstances of this case, however, resulting from the approach of the trial judge to zoning questions, the issues involved may be dealt with more expeditiously and understandably by considering the questions in reverse order.

The amending ordinance rezoned the property from a residential classification to local business, subject to a covenant on the part of the property owner as to the nature of the improvements to be constructed. The judgment of the trial court, although finding the ordinance 'valid and reasonable as applied to the subject property * * * insofar as it allows the use of said property for shopping center purposes,' imposed further conditions and limitations in addition to those provided by the ordinance. In addition, the judgment order provided that the court should retain jurisdiction until the terms of its order have been fully complied with 'and from time to time thereafter for supervision and control.' Some of the conditions imposed in the order were included in the covenant which was, in effect, incorporated by reference in the ordinance, but others went well beyond the restrictions of the ordinance and regulated such matters as the height of the lighting and the diameter of the trees to be planted.

The defendants, on cross appeal, contend that the trial court committed error in imposing restrictions and directions not included in the ordinance and in retaining jurisdiction for continued supervision and control. Plaintiffs, although contending that the trial court erred in holding the ordinance valid, argue that the court had authority to impose the conditions and directions in question and cite, in support of this authority, our decisions in Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406, and Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 19 Ill.2d 487, 167 N.E.2d 401.

The trial judge apparently interpreted our decisions in Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406, and in three other cases decided the same day, Franklin v. Village of Franklin Park, 19 Ill.2d 381, 167 N.E.2d 195; Nelson v. City of Rockford, 19 Ill.2d 410, 167 N.E.2d 219, and Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford v. County of Winnebago, 19 Ill.2d 487, 167 N.E.2d 401, as sanctioning the type of order entered in the present case. In each of these cases, the trial court had found a zoning ordinance unreasonable in its application to specific property, and the question was whether the court was limited to declaring the ordinance invalid as applied to the property, thus leaving the property unzoned, or could frame its decree with reference to the record to permit the property owner to proceed with the proposed use giving rise to the litigation without throwing the property open to other uses not involved in the litigation. The ratio decidendi of these cases was fully set forth in our opinion in the Sinclair Pipe Line Co. case. There we pointed out that a rigid adherence to the approach in La Salle National Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill.2d 253, 122 N.E.2d 519, under which the necessary effect of a decision declaring a zoning ordinance invalid would be to leave the property unzoned, might result in two equally undesirable consequences, (1) that the municipality might rezone the property to another classification still excluding the use proposed thus making further litigation necessary to test the validity of the new classification, or (2) that a decree induced by evidence depicting a particular use in a highly favorable light would not restrict the property owner to that use, and he might thereafter use the property for an entirely different purpose. We held that, under these circumstances, it was 'appropriate for the court to avoid these difficulties by framing its decree with reference to the record before it' and that, in a case where the record was shaped in terms of a specific contemplated use, the relief awarded 'may guarantee that the owner will be allowed to proceed with that use without further litigation and that he will not proceed with a different use.' 19 Ill.2d 370, 378-379, 167 N.E.2d 406, 411.

The situation upon which our decision in Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406, was predicated does not exist in the instant case, nor are the difficulties inherent in that situation present. The ordinance here under attack is an amendment rezoning the property from a residential to a local business classification. If the court finds the amendment valid, the property is zoned in accordance with the amendment. If the court holds the amendment invalid, the property is still subject to the original zoning classification. In neither event can the effect of a decision in this case be to leave the property unzoned. The reasons justifying the type of decree involved in the Sinclair Pipe Line Co. case are absent in this case, and the trial judge was without authority to impose restrictions in addition to those imposed by the municipality.

If it were clear that the trial court had in fact upheld the validity of the ordinance, and if, after a review of the record, we were to conclude that the trial court had properly so held, then the error of the trial court in imposing the additional restrictions could be cured by striking the offending portions of the order. We cannot, however, assume that the trial court would have held the ordinance reasonable and valid in the absence of the additional restrictions which he apparently deemed it necessary to impose. Indeed, the record is replete with statements of the trial judge indicative of...