Treat v. Civil Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac Gmc Inc., Civil No. 1:08cv173

• Decision Date: 30 April 2010
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:08cv173
• Citation: 710 F.Supp.2d 777
• Parties: Jill L. TREAT, Cody W. Treat and Tiffany L. Johnson, Plaintiffs, v. Civil TOM KELLEY BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC., d/b/a Kelley Superstore, Kelley Automotive Group, Inc., and Daniel Henderson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

710 F.Supp.2d 777

Jill L. TREAT, Cody W. Treat and Tiffany L. Johnson, Plaintiffs,

v.Civil TOM KELLEY BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC., d/b/a Kelley Superstore, Kelley Automotive Group, Inc., and Daniel Henderson, Defendants.

Civil No. 1:08cv173.

United States District Court,

N.D. Indiana,

Fort Wayne Division.

April 30, 2010.

Jack R. Rochyby, Sara C. Rochyby, Rochyby Law Office, Fort Wayne, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Bonnie L. Martin, Brandon M. Shelton, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Indianapolis, IN, for Robert D. Moreland, Steven L. Jackson, Baker & Daniels, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. d/b/a Kelley Superstore and Tom Kelley Automotive Group, Inc., (collectively "the Kelley Defendants"), on December 4, 2009. The plaintiff, Jill Treat ("Ms. Treat"), filed her response on January 18, 2010, to which the Kelley Defendants replied on February 4, 2010.

Also before the court is a "Motion to Strike Evidentiary Submissions of Plaintiff Jill Treat" filed by the Kelley Defendants on February 4, 2010. Ms. Treat responded to the motion on February 18, 2010, towhich the Kelley Defendants replied on February 25, 2010.

For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment and the motion to strike will both be granted.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, Rule 56(c) is not a requirement that the moving party negate his opponent's claim. Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir.1990). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the directed verdict standard under Rule 50(a), which requires the court to grant a directed verdict where there can be but one reasonable conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not sufficient to successfully oppose summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. In Re Matter of Wildman, 859 F.2d 553, 557 (7th Cir.1988); Klein v. Ryan, 847 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir.1988); Valentine v. Joliet Township High School District No. 204, 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). No genuine issue for trial exists "where the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

Initially, Rule 56 requires the moving party to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify those portions of the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), but reliance on the pleadings alone is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988); Guenin v. Sendra Corp., 700 F.Supp. 973, 974 (N.D.Ind.1988); Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983).

So that the district court may readily determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, under Local Rule 56.1, the moving party is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Material Facts" supported by appropriate citation to the record to which the moving party contends no genuine issues exist. In addition, the non-movant is obligated to file with the court a "Statement of Genuine Issues" supported by appropriate citation to the record outlining all material facts to which the non-movant contends exist that must be litigated. See, Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918 (7th Cir.1994). In ruling on a summary judgment motion the court accepts as true the non-moving party's evidence, draws all legitimate inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and does not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Furthermore, in determining the motion for summary judgment, the court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are controverted in the "Statement of Genuine Issues" filed in opposition to the motion. L.R. 56.1

Substantive law determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not preclude summary judgment even when they are in dispute. Id. The issue of fact must be genuine. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). To establish a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; First National Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1411 (7th Cir.1988). The non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A summary judgment determination is essentially an inquiry as to "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Finally, the court notes that, "[i]t is a gratuitous cruelty to parties and their witnesses to put them through the emotional ordeal of a trial when the outcome is foreordained" and in such cases summary judgment is appropriate. Mason v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 361, 367 (7th Cir.1983).

Discussion

Defendant Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC ("TKBPG") maintains a superstore of used cars, commonly referred to as the "Superstore." TKBPG is part of a group of separate dealerships, commonly known as the "Kelley Automotive Group" (hereinafter "Kelley"). Ms. Treat was employed by TKBPG from June 2006 until her termination on October 12, 2006. Ms. Treat believed her termination was in violation of her federal civil rights and state law, and thus she instituted the instant action ¹.

The Kelley Defendants are seeking summary judgment on all of Ms. Treat's remaining claims. The following facts, which are supported by the record, are relevant to the motions under consideration.

In 2006, Kelley's owner and managers, including Tom Kelley, President and Owner of Kelley, Gary Thelen, Chief Financial Officer of Kelley, and Fred Grote, KelleyGeneral Manager, decided to create a new department within TKBPG to help customers with special finance needs. Previously, TKBPG had used its finance and insurance managers for special financing on a case by case basis. Kelley planned for the new Special Finance Department to service the TKBPG's "Superstore," and later it expanded to other stores. Special Finance Department deals were contracted through TKBPG.

To open the department, based upon the recommendation of an industry colleague, Grote hired defendant Daniel Henderson ("Henderson") to manage the Special Finance Department in June 2006. Henderson received a $15,000 sign-on bonus. Grote instructed Henderson that he could either retain Erika Monroe ("Monroe") and Lee Bowman ("Bowman"), who were then performing some special finance functions, or they could be placed somewhere else. Henderson chose to keep Monroe, but Bowman was transferred out of the Special Finance Department.

Henderson then interviewed and hired Ms. Treat to serve as Assistant Manager/Assistant Co-Director of the Special Finance Department. During the interview, Henderson told Ms. Treat that "somebody had to be the boss, and it would be him." ² Unlike Henderson, Ms. Treat did not receive a sign-on bonus. Ms. Treat subsequently recommended that her adult children, Cody Treat ("Mr. Treat") and Tiffany Johnson ("Johnson") work in the Special Finance Department, and Henderson hired Mr. Treat and Johnson as well.

On June 28, 2006, Ms. Treat received Kelley's Team Member Handbook, including TKBPG's anti-harassment policy. Ms. Treat also completed TKBPG's sexual harassment training course on August 23, 2006. The anti-harassment policy provides: "If you believe you are subjected to conduct or comments that violate this policy, you are encouraged to, and have a responsibility to immediately report these matters to your team leader or to the General Manager." ³ Ms. Treat understood that failing to report a violation of the anti-harassment policy to senior management (identified as Tom Kelley, Thelen and Grote) could subject her to disciplinary action, including discharge.⁴

At the beginning of Ms. Treat's employment, her office was located in the Superstore building on the Avenue of Autos in Fort Wayne, across the showroom floor from Henderson's office. At the end of July, 2006, Henderson decided to centralize the Special Finance Department, and Ms. Treat moved her office across the showroom floor, and in approximately August...