Treece v. Greyhound Bus Co., Docket No. 14595

• Decision Date: 11 August 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 14595
• Citation: 63 Mich.App. 63,234 N.W.2d 404
• Parties: Kenneth TREECE and Wanda Nichols, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. 63 Mich.App. 63, 234 N.W.2d 404
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 404

234 N.W.2d 404

Kenneth TREECE and Wanda Nichols, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 14595.

63 Mich.App. 63, 234 N.W.2d 404

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 11, 1975.

Released for Publication Nov. 3, 1975.

[63 MICHAPP 64] Zeff & Zeff, P.C., by A. Robert Zeff, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert E. Sullivan, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and R B. BURNS and MAHER, JJ.

R. B. BURNS, Judge.

Plaintiff Treece was awarded a verdict by a jury of $1,000 and plaintiff Nichols was awarded a verdict of $15,000 against the defendant was a result of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the verdicts were inadequate and defendant cross-appeals claiming that plaintiffs' causes of action should have been dismissed, alleging that the statute of limitations had expired.

We affirm.

There is no dispute as to the facts of the accident. The accident occurred in Tennessee. Plaintiffs had stopped on the highway because of stalled vehicles in front of them. The defendant's bus could not stop on the icy highway and ran into the rear of plaintiffs' automobile.

Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in that it failed to specifically instruct the jury as to future damages. GCR 1963, 516.2, provides:

'Objections. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider the verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. * * *'

The record shows that the trial judge did instruct the jury as to future damages and that [63 MICHAPP 65] plaintiffs' attorney expressly stated that he had no further requests for instructions. No error.

Plaintiffs next claim that defense counsel made prejudicial comments that require reversal.

The first such comment occurred during counsel's opening statement:

'* * * I feel you may be wondering: Well, if the accident occurred the way they said, it was a bus that crammed into the rearend of them, why haven't the parties resolved their differences?'

Plaintiffs' attorney objected and the court sustained the objection. Plaintiff did not request any cautionary instruction. One statement made at that particular time of the trial was not so prejudicial that it could not have been corrected by such an instruction had one been requested and does not constitute reversible error.

Next plaintiffs claim that there were references on cross-examination that Wanda Nichols' hospital bills were paid by hospital insurance and not by herself.

A reading of the transcript disputes this contention. Defendant's attorney did not mention insurance. It was plaintiffs' attorney who mentioned insurance. Defendant's attorney asked:

'Mrs. Nichols, I show you the plaintiffs' proposed exhibit #10 and ask you if you paid that?

'Mr. Berger: Your Honor, I object. It is immaterial. You know that you want to get in that Blue Cross paid it. She had to pay Blue Cross back.'

Plaintiffs also claim that it was error for defense counsel to mention on cross-examination and in closing argument that Dr. Miller was an osteopath and could not practice in a certain hospital.

[63 MICHAPP 66] Defense counsel asked the witness if he could practice at Grace Hospital. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to the question. The court sustained the objection. Again, no cautionary instruction was asked and none was given.

The last claim of prejudicial remarks concerns questions to Dr. Berke and statements made by defense counsel about the relationship of Dr. Berke and plaintiffs' counsel.

During the course of the trial and during argument, it was brought out that Dr. Berke and plaintiffs' counsel had attended college together and had remained friends socially, that the doctor had testified approximately 30 times for clients of plaintiffs' attorney, and that plaintiffs had not been sent to Dr. Berke for treatment, but for examinations to enable the doctor to testify.

All of these questions were probative of the weight which should have been given to the doctor's testimony by the jury.

In Grand Rapids v. Assfy, 44 Mich.App. 473, 474, 205 N.W.2d 502, 503 (1973), this Court stated:

'In Michigan, when such error appears, opposing counsel must take two steps. First, he must object, and then, after obtaining a ruling, must...