Trees v. Glenn

• Decision Date: 25 November 1935
• Docket Number: 243
• Citation: 181 A. 579,319 Pa. 487
• Parties: Trees et al. v. Glenn, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

181 A. 579

319 Pa. 487

Trees et al. v. Glenn, Appellant

No. 243

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

November 25, 1935

Argued October 17, 1935

Appeal, No. 243, March T., 1935, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., July T., 1934, No. 3062, in case of J C. Trees and M. L. Benedum v. H. S. Glenn. Decree affirmed.

Bill in equity.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Preliminary objections to defendant's answer sustained, and defendant directed to file an additional answer. Decree pro confesso entered for want of an answer. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned was final decree.

Decree affirmed at appellant's cost.

Lee C McCandless, of Marshall & McCandless, with him James F. Coyle and Zeno F. Henninger, for appellant.

C. L. Wallace, of Weller, Wicks & Wallace, for appellees.

Before FRAZER, C.J., KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SCHAFFER:

The broad question for decision on this appeal by defendant is whether a court of common pleas in one judicial district of the State may enjoin a litigant from proceeding by bill in equity in another judicial district of the State, on the ground that the claim asserted in the other district has been adjudicated and finally determined against the plaintiff by the court issuing the injunction, and is therefore res judicata as to the cause of action, and, on the further ground that the second suit is vexatious.

This is part of protracted litigation carried on by appellant and his brother, C. E. Glenn, against the appellees, J. C. Trees and M. L. Benedum. The transaction out of which it grew occurred in 1909. It involved the sale of certain oil and gas properties in Louisiana and Texas, which it was alleged were sold by Trees and Benedum for a much larger sum than they represented to appellant and his brother had been received. For the alleged difference in price C. E. Glenn called Trees and Benedum to account in a proceeding in equity in the Common Pleas of Allegheny County on December 28, 1916. The final decree dismissing the bill was entered by that court on March 27, 1922, and we affirmed January 3, 1923 (Glenn v. Trees, 276 Pa. 165).

In the instant case the chancellor found that the issues sought to be raised in a bill in equity filed by H. S. Glenn in Butler County were embodied and included in the original proceeding in Allegheny County and were there decided adversely to C. E. Glenn. The bill in the original case was a class one brought by C. E. Glenn as a stockholder of the J.C. Trees Oil Company in his own behalf and in behalf of such other stockholders as might desire to join with him. The court there found as to the appellant in the case now before us, "H. S. Glenn is a brother of the plaintiff; up to the time of the sale of the company's property he was a business partner of the plaintiff and although he is not named as party plaintiff he has the same interest in the suit as the plaintiff has and is sharing in the expense of the suit." Under this finding appellant was as much bound by the adjudication and decree entered in that proceeding as was his brother.

But the original bill was not the only litigation against appellees in which the Glenn brothers have indulged themselves. In 1925 they brought an action at law against appellees in the Common Pleas of Allegheny County for the purpose of relitigating the matters determined in that court in the original equity proceeding. They were enjoined from carrying on their suit on the grounds that it was vexatious and involved a stale claim. Following this, in May, 1929, the Glenn brothers petitioned the Allegheny Court to open its original decree, alleging after-discovered evidence. This petition was dismissed and its dismissal was affirmed on appeal (300 Pa. 53).

In May, 1932, appellant, who is a resident of Allegheny County, filed the bill now before us in Butler County and served it upon Trees, who is also a resident of Allegheny County, when the latter was temporarily in Butler County. We held the service good (314 Pa. 550), but determined nothing more.

Thereafter the bill before us was filed in the Common Pleas of Allegheny County by the appellees against appellant to restrain him from prosecuting the suit in Butler County and the court enjoined him. From the decree forbidding him to proceed he prosecutes this appeal.

Without encumbering this opinion by reciting the details of the original equity proceeding in Allegheny County, we are unhesitatingly in agreement with the court below that what it determined is res judicata as to the cause of action set forth in the case in Butler County. It is urged by counsel that the matters with which the Butler County action is concerned have not been previously litigated. On the contrary, the record shows that the same matters were involved in the Allegheny County proceeding begun in 1916. The object of the Butler County action is to obtain discovery and accounting of certain shares of stock and cash alleged to have been received by plaintiffs as the price for property sold to the Arkansas Natural Gas Company; in the 1916 suit this transaction was set forth in the bill and the court was specifically asked, inter alia, to order a discovery of the agreement with the Arkansas Natural Gas Company. While apparently this was considered a somewhat minor matter at that time, there can be no doubt that, in refusing discovery of the whole transaction in 1916, the question now sought to be litigated was disposed of, for the greater includes the less. Defendant's suit to have this matter tried again in a new forum is clearly vexatious.

These conclusions bring us to the consideration of the fundamental proposition before us. May the Allegheny County Court restrain appellant from proceeding with his suit in Butler County? We are clear in our view that it can.

Appellant's counsel argue that equity will refuse to enjoin a party from proceeding in equity. They are mistaken in this. Under certain conditions an equity court will issue its process to restrain a litigant from proceeding in another equity tribunal. The general governing principle is thus stated in 14 R.C.L., page 410: " The theory on which a court of equity acts in enjoining a proceeding in another court of coordinate jurisdiction is that it has jurisdiction in personam, and that, so acting, it has power to require the defendant to do, or to refrain from doing, anything beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, which it might require to be done or omitted within the limits of such territory. In such a case it may restrain a party from prosecuting a subsequent suit in another jurisdiction, whether the objects of the two suits are the same or not, if the effect of the second suit is to withdraw from the court first acquiring jurisdiction a part of the subject-matter of the first suit. When an injunction is granted for this purpose, it is in no just sense a prohibition to those courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. It is not addressed to them and does not even assume to interfere with them. The process is directed only to the parties. It neither assumes any superiority over the court in which the proceedings are had, nor denies its jurisdiction."

While it has been held that as a general rule a court of equity will refuse to enjoin a party from proceeding with a suit in equity, and appellant's solicitors cite to us 32 C.J section 126, page 110, as authority for this principle, they fail to cite in full the doctrine there announced. It is there stated: " However, a court of equity has 'power' to enjoin a party from proceeding with other equitable suits, and such an injunction, when issued, is not void and must be obeyed; but the power should be exercised only in extreme cases. The court first acquiring jurisdiction of a case will protect that jurisdiction by enjoining an action by the same parties on the same subject-matter in another court, even though that other court may also have equity jurisdiction. . . . A bill of peace lies to prevent a multiplicity of suits, even though the suits may themselves be in court...