Treiber v. Knoll

• Decision Date: 06 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-2115,85-2115
• Citation: 398 N.W.2d 756,135 Wis.2d 58
• Parties: Patricia S. TREIBER, Patrick W. Cotter, and First Wisconsin Trust Company, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Irene M. Stackner, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Robert R. KNOLL, Milwaukee County Register in Probate, Paul J. McCormick, Milwaukee County Treasurer, Defendants-Appellants, Charles P. Smith, Treasurer for the State of Wisconsin, Defendant.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 756

398 N.W.2d 756

135 Wis.2d 58

Patricia S. TREIBER, Patrick W. Cotter, and First Wisconsin Trust Company, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Irene M. Stackner Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Robert R. KNOLL, Milwaukee County Register in Probate, Paul J. McCormick, Milwaukee County Treasurer Defendants-Appellants Charles P. Smith, Treasurer for the State of Wisconsin, Defendant.

No. 85-2115.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued Oct. 28, 1986.

Decided Jan. 6, 1987.

George E. Rice, Corp. Counsel, and John Jorgensen, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for defendants-appellants.

Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., John A. Rothstein and Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, for plaintiffs-respondents.

CALLOW, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Judge Leo B. Hanley presiding, which held sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., unconstitutional. At the request of the parties, this court granted bypass, pursuant to sec. (Rule) 809.60, Stats.

Section 814.66(1)(a), Stats., establishes the filing fees to be collected by the register in probate in proceedings concerning decedents' estates. This appeal raises the question of whether sec. 814.66(1)(a) is unconstitutional on either of the following grounds: (1) It constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution or the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that it establishes statutory classifications for which there exists no reasonable basis; or (2) it violates Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that "[every person] ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it." Because we conclude that sec. 814.66(1)(a) violates neither the guarantees of equal protection under both the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions nor Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

Irene M. Stackner, a Wisconsin resident, died testate on September 27, 1980. On October 10, 1980, Mrs. Stackner's personal representatives ¹ filed a petition with the Milwaukee County circuit court, seeking probate of the Stackner estate (Estate). Thereafter, on February 24, 1984, the Estate filed an inventory showing assets of $12,106,073.93, debts of $3,511,125.68, and a net value of $8,594,948.25.

Pursuant to sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., a probate filing fee of $12,106.07 was to be paid at the time that the Estate's inventory was filed with the probate court. [All references in this opinion are to the 1983-84 Wisconsin statutes unless otherwise noted.] The Estate refused to pay the required fee. On February 27, 1984, Robert R. Knoll, the Milwaukee County Register in Probate, wrote and requested that the Estate pay the prescribed filing fee. The Estate, after again refusing to pay the required fee, commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Milwaukee County circuit court, seeking a ruling that sec. 814.66(1)(a) ² was unconstitutional.

Following trial, the court found sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., unconstitutional on both its face and as applied to the Stackner estate. In reaching its conclusion, the court made a number of factual findings. According to the court, the services performed by the register in probate are the same regardless of the size of the testator's estate. Furthermore, the amount of work to administer an uncontested estate is approximately the same in a small estate as in a large estate. A typical probate file, not involving a contest, involves a number of documents which are statutorily required in order to complete the estate; those documents are the same regardless of the size of the estate. Additionally, the volume of work generated by the Estate would be required in all estates regardless of size or valuation.

Based on the above, the court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law stated that there was "no necessary correlation between the sums to be paid [under sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats.] (widely different in amounts with respect to estates of different values) and the nature of the proceedings, or the character or extent of the services which may be required of the probate system." Because the court concluded there was no necessary correlation (rational relationship) between the fees charged and the cost to the court in administering an estate, the court ruled that sec 814.66(1)(a) was unconstitutional in that (1) it constituted a purchase of justice as prohibited under Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (2) it violated the constitutional protections of "equal protection" under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. On March 13, 1986, the Estate, joined by Milwaukee County, filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals. We accepted the petition to bypass on April 8, 1986.

We must determine in this case (1) whether sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., violates the equal protection guarantees of either the State Constitution or the Federal Constitution and, if it does not, (2) whether sec. 814.66(1)(a) constitutes a purchase of justice.

In determining whether sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., is constitutional, the trial court's findings of evidentiary or historical facts will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Woods, 117 Wis.2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984). However, the trial court's holding that sec. 814.66(1)(a) is unconstitutional is a question of law, and thus we do not give deference to the trial court's decision. See State v. Ludwig, 124 Wis.2d 600, 607, 369 N.W.2d 722 (1985).

In reviewing the constitutionality of sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., we recognize that there is a strong presumption that a legislative enactment is constitutional. State v. Cissell, 127 Wis.2d 205, 214, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985). A party who challenges the constitutionality of an act carries a heavy burden of persuasion. Our cases make it clear that "[i]t is not enough that respondent establish doubt as to the act's constitutionality nor is it sufficient that respondent establish the unconstitutionality of the act as a probability. Unconstitutionality of the act must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality." State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973); County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis.2d 466, 478, 312 N.W.2d 731 (1981). We affirm our previous statement that:

"If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may constitutionally rest, the court must assume that the legislature had such fact in mind and passed the act pursuant thereto. The court cannot try the legislature and reverse its decision as to the facts. All facts necessary to sustain the act must be taken as conclusively found by the legislature, if any such facts may be reasonably conceived in the mind of the court." State ex rel. Carnation Milk Products Co. v. Emery, 178 Wis. 147, 160, 189 N.W. 564 (1922); State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 Wis.2d 482, 489, 222 N.W.2d 912 (1974).

We begin by noting that the disputed assessment, although designated a "fee" in the statute, is in reality a tax upon the disposition of one's property upon death. This court has previously held that, where the amount of an exaction is in no way dependent upon the amount of services provided by the judge or register in probate but depends entirely upon the valuation of the estate, then the exaction is a tax. The State ex rel. Sanderson v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469, 474-75, 46 N.W. 51 (1890); see also In re Estate of Zoller, 53 Del. 448, 451, 171 A.2d 375, 376 (1961) (court quoted 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, sec. 14 (1944), for the proposition that an arbitrary standard of probate fees graded according to the value of the estate and manifestly intended for the purpose of raising revenue has been decided to be a tax). Under sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., the exaction charged estates is based entirely upon the value of the estate; it is not based upon the services performed by the probate court. Furthermore, it appears from the legislative history that the exaction was designed to raise revenue to pay for the court system. See generally Legislative Council of Wisconsin, Technical Advisory Committee on Court Fees and Costs, Summary of Proceedings (1980). We therefore conclude that the exaction required by sec. 814.66(1)(a) is a tax.

Having held that the exaction under sec. 814.66(1)(a), Stats., constitutes a tax, we note the greater presumption of constitutionality given to tax statutes. This court has repeatedly stated:

"[W]here a tax measure is involved, the presumption of constitutionality is strongest. The courts have given recognition to the essentiality of taxation in preserving an ordered society, and there is implicit recognition in judicial decisions that the principle of absolute equality and complete congruity of the treatment of classifications is impossible and must be sacrificed in the interests of preserving the governmental function." Simanco, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 57 Wis.2d 47, 54, 203 N.W.2d 648 (1973); Department of Revenue v. Moebius Printing Co., 89 Wis.2d 610, 625, 279 N.W.2d 213 (1979).

The United States Supreme Court has also recognized this broad discretion in the legislature as to tax legislation. According to the Court, "in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88, 60 S.Ct. 406, 408, 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[n]o scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in...