Treister v. City of Miami

• Decision Date: 13 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 86-1117-CIV.,86-1117-CIV.
• Citation: 893 F. Supp. 1057
• Parties: Kenneth TREISTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

893 F. Supp. 1057

Kenneth TREISTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI et al., Defendants.

No. 86-1117-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

August 13, 1992.

Joe N. Unger, Miami, FL, Bernard S. Mandler, Miami, FL, James J. Kenny, Kevin J. Murray, Miami, FL, Alan E. Deserio, Tampa, FL, Toby Prince Brigham, Miami, FL, for plaintiffs.

Joel V. Lumer, Miami, FL, for Sierra Club.

Joseph Z. Fleming, Miami, FL, A. Quinn Jones, III, Joel Maxwell, Miami, FL, Parker D. Thomson, Miami, FL, Gary M. Held, Miami, FL, for defendants.

ORDER

MARCUS, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendants' Restated and Amended Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a (Second) Amended Complaint. Before us at this time are various constitutional claims contained in Count V of the First Amended Complaint (DE 17). The state law claims contained in Counts I-IV of the Amended Complaint were remanded to the state courts and resolved. The primary issue at this juncture is the preclusive effect of the state court ruling as to the state claims upon the federal constitutional claims remaining before us in Count V. We conclude, for the reasons detailed below, that most of Plaintiffs' federal claims are barred by res judicata and the full faith and credit statute, and, accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' constitutional claims asserting a taking without just compensation, a substantive due process violation based upon arbitrary and capricious conduct, and a due process takings claim. In addition, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is DENIED.

I. The Summary Judgment and Motion to Amend Standards

The standard to be applied in reviewing a summary judgment motion is stated unambiguously in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

It may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, the moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

In applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1608; Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 at 991 (5th Cir.1981). All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Casey Enterprises v. Am. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir.1981). If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Marsh, 651 F.2d at 991; Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co., 420 F.2d at 1213. If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026 at 1031 (5th Cir.1982); Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1970).

Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with any affidavits or other evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-10; Marsh, 651 F.2d at 991. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). See Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir.1977).

Clemons v. Dougherty County, Ga., 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir.1982); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1502 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107, 106 S.Ct. 1513, 89 L.Ed.2d 912 (1986).

The United States Supreme Court has provided significant additional guidance as to the evidentiary standard which trial courts should apply in ruling on a motion for summary judgment:

The summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court in Anderson further stated that "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-movant." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. If the non-movant in a summary judgment action fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, to support a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.

In another case the Supreme Court declared that a non-moving party's failure to prove an essential element of a claim renders all factual disputes as to that claim immaterial and requires the granting of summary judgment:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (emphasis added).

As for the motion to amend, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has written:

A decision whether to grant leave to amend is within the discretion of the district court, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), but that discretion is severely circumscribed. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Because "this mandate is to be heeded," there must be a justifying reason" for a court to deny leave. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. at 230; see also Halliburton & Associates v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1985) ("substantial reason" needed).

Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 1604, 94 L.Ed.2d 790 (1987). "The mere passage of time, without anything more, is an insufficient reason to deny leave to amend." Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1490 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991). As stated by the Third Circuit, "the district court may deny leave to amend only if a plaintiff's delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the opposing party. The court may also refuse to allow an amendment that fails to state a cause of action." Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 864 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1122, 105 S.Ct. 806, 83 L.Ed.2d 799 (1985).

II. Procedural History

The procedural history of this case is complex, involving both the state and federal courts at various junctures. After several attempts to obtain rezoning of their Coconut Grove property, Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Appellate Division and an original, de novo action in the Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Appellate Division, Circuit Court denied Plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, see Order, No. 86-120AP (Fla. 11th Jud.Cir.App.Div. Aug. 16, 1988), filed at Volume I, Component 8, entry 87,¹ and was in turn affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeals. See Treister v. City of Miami, 537 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) hereinafter "Treister I". The de novo action — this action — was removed to federal court on May 23, 1986. See Petition for Removal (DE 1). Subsequent to removal, on August 5, 1986, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint. See Amended Complaint (DE 17). The First Amended Complaint included in counts I-IV a variety of pendent state law claims, and in Count V contained a prayer for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. This Court, the Honorable Eugene P. Spellman, United States District Judge, before whom the case was then pending, declined to exercise jurisdiction over the...