Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell

• Citation: 271 Mass. 1,170 N.E. 819
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 25 March 1930
• Parties: TREMONT & SUFFOLK MILLS v. CITY OF LOWELL.

271 Mass. 1

170 N.E. 819

TREMONT & SUFFOLK MILLS

v.CITY OF LOWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

March 25, 1930.

Report from Superior Court, Middlessex County; Hammond, Judge.

Complaint by the Tremont & Suffolk Mills against the City of Lowell. On report from Superior Court.

Judgment for petitioner.

W. H. Hitchcock and J. F. Doherty, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

H. V. Charbonneau, of Lowell, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a complaint filed under G. L. c. 59, § 65, by way of appeal from the refusal by the assessors of the defendant city to abate taxes assessed upon the complainant. The case was referred to a commissioner and was heard on his report as the only evidence by a judge of the superior court. He found the facts to be as set out in the commissioner's report, including the fair cash value of the complainant's land, buildings and machinery, and granted an abatement. He gave some, and denied other, requests for rulings. Exceptions were saved by each party. The case was then reported.

1. The first question for determination is whether the complainant filed a sufficient list of its property under G. L. c. 59, § 29, which, by G. L. c. 59, § 61, is a prerequisite to the granting of an abatement. Central National Bank v. Lynn, 259 Mass. 1, 4, 156 N. E. 42. The relevant facts upon this branch of the case are these: A list purporting and intended by the complainant to be a ‘full, true and accurate list’ of all its real and personal estate in Lowell liable to taxation was seasonably sworn to and filed with the assessors. Copy of it is annexed to the report. It appears to be a complete statement of its several parcels of land and of its numerous buildings, together with the uses to which the latter were put. It has not been argued that there was any insufficiency in the list so far as it concerns land and buildings. The contention is that it is insufficient as to machinery. As to machinery the list gives in general with each building a statement of the machinery in it. For example as to ‘Engine Room Building,’ together with description of its material, size, stories and floor space, occurs this: ‘It contains Weaving machinery (235 looms) and Carding Machinery.’ At the end of the list is this: ‘The total number of spindles reported above is 220,928 and looms 6,284.’ This list was accepted by the assessors without comment or objection. Further findings of the commissioner on this point are: The list was in substance and form similar to schedules or lists of taxable property made and seasonably filed by the complainant in the years 1924 and 1925. The term ‘spindle’ has been used by the assessors of Lowell for many years, and was so used in 1926, as the unit for measuring and assessing the machinery of the textile mills of that city, and included all of the operating machinery of every mill so measured and assessed, the assessment being x dollars per spindle, varying with the different mills according to the extent of their respective manufacturing processes and to comparative valuations determined by the assessors. Mr. Dwyer, chairman of the assessors, testified that from personal inspections, variously made by all the assessors, the members of the board were familiar with the extent of the manufacturing processes of the Tremont and Suffolk Mills and the character and quantity of its operating machinery. The lists of schedules filed by the complainant in the years 1924, 1925, and 1926 were intended by the complainant to be lists of the taxable property of this corporation physically situated in Lowell, on the first day of April of the year of disclosure, as called for by the assessors in their annual notice to the taxpayers, and were prepared and filed in compliance with such notice. ‘I therefore find, if the list filed on May 11, 1926 by the petitioner shall be held in law to comply with the requirements of the statute, and the unit of measuring textile machinery adopted by said assessors is proper and justifiable, that in fact this instrument was prepared, sworn to and filed by the petitioner and accepted by the respondent as a true list of its taxable property on April 1, 1926, and fully informed the assessors of Lowell of the particulars of the real estate of the taxpayer, both land and buildings, and the quantity and character of its operating machinery.’ At a later point in the report this appears: ‘At a later quest of counsel for the petitioner I extend and amplify certain portions of the foregoing report, namely in respect of the use of the word spindle as a unit of measure. * * * I therefore find, in adaptation of the finding of the commissioner as reported in Tory Cotton & Woolen Manufactory v. City of Fall River, 167 Mass. at page 518, 46 N. E. 99, and supplemented by the finding of the court, that the word spindle, as commonly used in the trade and by the assessors of our textile cities in relation to cotton mills, signifies more than the pin and bobbin upon which the yarn is twisted or spun; that it is used as a unit of measure or capacity, and includes all the machinery and appliances necessary to operate the mill in connection with which it may be applied; that the statement of the number of spindles in a mill, more particularly when the number of looms is also stated as in this case, fairly and adequately signifies to persons acquainted with textile mills the size and capacity of the mill and the quantity of preparatory, spinning, weaving and finishing machinery installed; that the meaning and use of this term was understood by the assessors of Lowell; that the assessors knew the kind and extent of the manufacturing processes of the taxpayer; were also informed by statements contained in the list filed by the petitioner of the nature of such processes conducted in various indicated portions of the plant, as well as given reasonably adequate information of the amount and kind of power machinery; that they were not misled by any statements contained in the list and asked for no further or fuller statement; and that there is no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the petitioner. I ruled and find that this list was sufficient under the statute.’ The assessors made their assessment on the machinery of the complainant on ‘a flat rate or unit of measure of $16.75 per spindle.’

It is plain that the list as filed although not containing a specified and detailed description and enumeration of each machine owned by the complainant was nevertheless a sufficient list under the controlling decision of Troy Cotton & Woolen Manufactory v. Fall River, 167 Mass. 517, 518, 519, 46 N. E. 99, where this precise point was in issue. A statement of the number of spindles in a cotton mill describes with accuracy to those familiar with the language of the trade the quantity of machinery of the various kinds in the mill. It was the basis of the valuation adopted by the assessors. Thus it follows that the list as filed was ‘the equivalent of a catalogue, inventory or schedule itemized in sufficient detail to convey a reasonable understanding of the extent and nature of the subject to which it refers.’ Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, 216 Mass. 508, 510, 104 N. E. 478;Boston & Maine Railroad v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, 450, 160 N. E. 419. It is apparent from the list that there was some knitting machinery belonging to the complainant. In his summary of valuation the commissioner grouped the machinery outside the power and heating plant as follows: (1) Machinery sold as junk about May 1, 1926, (2) spinning frames, (3) looms, (4) miscellaneousother machinery, affixing a gross valuation to each group. This was but a summary. It was not the list filed by the complainant. There is nothing in these suggestions to shake the effect of the findings that the spindle is a just unit of measure or of capacity of a mill and includes all the machinery and appliances necessary for the operation of the mill even though the number of certain kinds of machines may vary somewhat with the quality of kind of goods produced. Troy Cotton & Woolen Manufactory v. Fall River, 167 Mass. 517, at page 518, 46 N. E. 99.

The rulings of the judge to the effect that the list filed by the complainant was sufficient and that there had been compliance by the complainant with all provisions of law as to obtaining an abatement, and his denial of requests of a contrary nature were right.

2. The second question is whether there was error in the findings and rulings of the judge based on the report of the commissioner, touching the value of the real and personal estate of the complainant for purposes of taxaction on April 1, 1926. The complainant contends that such value is governed largely if not wholly by the sale by it in November, 1926, of all its real estate and machinery, thus subject to taxation, to the Nashua Manufacturing Company. The respondent contends that such sale should be disregarded because the transaction did not represent a willing seller and a willing buyer but was under real or fancied compulsion by the seller. The pertinent facts respecting this matter are set forth by the commissioner. The property of the complainant was a cotton textile plant originating nearly a century ago. For a period immediately preceding 1920, its operations had been profitable and dividends of ten per cent. had been paid regularly. Its stock sold in the market for $280 per share. A sharp decline followed this period of prosperity. Heavy losses were sustained in each of the years 1920 to 1925 both inclusive. Its net quick assets dwindled from about $6,000,000 in January, 1920, to about $500,000 in November, 1926. The plant was being run during the years last named at a continuously diminishing proportion of its total capacity for production. This conditionwas not confined to the business of the complainant. Beginning with 1920 the cotton mills of New England entered upon a period of depression which continued with...